Malebranche and the general will of god

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Abstract

Central to Nicolas Malebranches theodicy is the distinction between general volitions and particular volitions. One of the fundamental claims of his theodicy is that although God created a world with suffering and evil, God does not will these things by particular volitions, but only by general volitions. Commentators disagree about how to interpret Malebranches distinction. According to the general content interpretation, the difference between general volitions and particular volitions is a difference in content. General volitions have general laws as their content and particular volitions have particular contents. The particular content interpretation holds that all of Gods volitions have particular contents. The difference between general and particular volitions is whether the content of the volition is in accordance with the laws that God has established. A proper interpretation of this distinction is essential to understanding Malebranches theodicy, as well as his account of occasionalism and Gods causal activity in the world. In this paper, I defend the particular content interpretation of the distinction. © 2011 Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.

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APA

Stencil, E. (2011). Malebranche and the general will of god. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 19(6), 1107–1129. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2011.624706

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