Abstract
The basic alternatives seem to be either a Humean reductionist view that any particular assertion needs backing with inductive evidence for its reliability before it can retionally be believed, or a Reidian criterial view that testimony is intrinscially, though defeasibly, credible, in the absence of evidence against its reliability.
Some recent arguments from the constraints on interpreting any linguistic performances as assertions with propositional content have some force against the reductionist view. We thus have reason to accept the criterial view, at least as applied to eyewitness reports. But these considerations do not establish that any rational enquirer must have the concept of other minds or testimony. The logical possibility of the lone enquirer, who uses symbols and thereby expresses some knowledge of his world, remains open — but it is a question we have no need to pronounce upon.
The practice of accepting observation-statements is in fact extended to chains of testimonies believed to start in perception or in some other kind of justification, but the arguments for doing this are not so clear.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ayer, A. J.: 1973,The Central Questions of Philosophy, Weidenfeld, London.
Baker, G. P. and P. M. S. Hacker: 1985,Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford.
Coady, C. A. J.: 1973, ‘Testimony and Observation’,American Philosophical Quarterly 10, 149–55.
Coady, C. A. J.: 1992,Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Davidson, D.: 1984, ‘Thought and Talk’, in his,Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 155–70.
Descartes, R.: [1637]/1954,Discourse on Method, inPhilosophical Writings, trans. and ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, Nelson, London [revised ed.: 1970, Open University Press, Milton Keyes].
Evans, G.: 1982,The Varieties of Reference, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Fricker, E.: 1987, ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl.61, 57–83.
Hacking, I.: 1975,The Emergence of Probability, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hume, D.: [1739]/1888,A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Hume, D.: [1748]/1962,Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Kripke, S.: 1982,Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Blackwell, Oxford.
McDowell, J.: 1980, ‘Meaning Communication, and Knowledge’, in Z. van Straaten (ed.),Philosophical Subjects, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 117–39.
Pears, D.: 1988,The False Prison, Vol. II, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Pettit, P.: 1990, ‘The Reality of Rule-Following’,Mind 99, 1–21.
Reid, T.: [1764]/1970,An Enquiry into the Human Mind, ed. T. Duggan, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Ross, A.: 1986, ‘Why Do We Believe What We Are Told?’,Ratio 28, 69–88.
Shoemaker, S.: 1963,Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Stevenson, L.: 1988, ‘Can Truth be Relativized to Kinds of Mind?’,Mind 97, 281–84.
Unwin, N.: 1987, ‘Beyond Truth: Towards a New Conception of Knowledge and Communication’,Mind 96, 299–317.
Welbourne, M.: 1979, ‘The Transmission of Knowledge’,Philosophical Quarterly 29, 1–9.
Welbourne, M.: 1986,The Community of Knowledge, Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1953,Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford.
Wittgenstein, L.: 1969,On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
I am indebted for helpful discussions of earlier versions of this paper to audiences at Macquarie University (where I was kindly given research facilities), at the conference of the Australasian Association for Philosophy in Sydney in 1990, at St. Andrews, and also to a referee for this journal.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Stevenson, L. Why believe what people say?. Synthese 94, 429–451 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064488
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064488