Abstract
Several philosophers have argued that natural selection will favor reliable belief formation; others have been more skeptical. These traditional approaches to the evolution of rationality have been either too sketchy or else have assumed that phenotypic plasticity can be equated with having a mind. Here I develop a new model to explore the functional utility of belief and desire formation mechanisms, and defend the claim that natural selection favors reliable inference methods in a broad, but not universal, range of circumstances.
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Stephens, C.L. When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument. Philosophical Studies 105, 161–189 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010358100423
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010358100423