Journal of the History of Philosophy

That this comprehensive study of the transformations undergone by Husserl's thought during his formative years in Halle (1886–1900) and Göttingen (1901–1916) is a remarkably impressive work of scholarship will not surprise those familiar with the work of J. N. Mohanty, a highly-regarded advocate of transcendental phenomenology in his own right. The surprise that awaits readers, even those familiar with Mohanty's distinguished body of work, is instead a result of the genre chosen for his latest—and, for this reader, most impressive—book to date.

Whereas Mohanty's earlier works on Husserl focus upon specific philosophical topics, contrasting Husserl's mature philosophy with those of his critics, the approach here is chronological. It begins with a consideration of the problems motivating Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891) and the projected but never completed second volume of that work, moves on to a consideration of Husserl's rejection of that early position as psychologistic and a study of the texts that led to his Logical Investigations (1900–1901), and then to the essays, manuscripts, and lecture courses that develop the transcendental phenomenology famously advanced in Ideas I (1913). As a result, the analyses are not simply static and structural, but dynamic and genetic, attempting to present the problems occasioning Husserl's insights, as well as subsequent considerations motivating further refinements. The effect is akin to a philosophical detective-story, with each chapter introducing new challenges for the protagonist (Husserl) and his attempt to solve the central mystery: How is it possible that one's acts of judging, etc. (especially those giving rise to logical and mathematical judgments), can be recognized as the subjective experiences that they are, while nevertheless also being recognized as instantiations of ideal laws of logic and mathematics? [End Page 321]

As impressive as Mohanty's dedication to offering a comprehensive historical survey of Husserl's various attempts to solve that mystery is, it is matched by the critical scrutiny to which he subjects the various solutions Husserl proposed. Contra Husserl's own subsequent rejection of his early Philosophie der Arithmetik, Mohanty argues that it is not guilty of psychologism. In addition, some of Husserl's early attempts to avoid psychologism are demonstrated to give rise to a kind of Platonism. Mohanty also suggests ways of extending some of the projects ultimately abandoned by Husserl, especially his discussions of axiology and aesthetic consciousness (in particular, the neutrality modification), in which Mohanty suggests directions for extending a phenomenological approach to ethics and aesthetics.

Though Mohanty's study ends with the publication of Ideas I, it is not an arbitrary ending, since it is Husserl's mature theory of intentionality, which emerges with his conception of noema in Ideas I, that ultimately provides the solution to the central problem driving Husserl's thought. Of course, there are also important developments in Husserl's later philosophy, sustained discussion of which is deferred until a projected second volume covering Husserl's Freiburg years. There are, however, brief discussions of that later material in this first volume, including one passage in particular that, it seems to me, bears directly on what Mohanty attempts to accomplish in this work. Discussing the way in which Husserl's later works supplement the Ideas' structural phenomenology with a genetic phenomenology, the main innovation of which is the notion of life-world, so fundamental to Husserl's attempt to come to terms with a recognition of historicity that would not also undermine his commitment to the ideality of meanings, Mohanty writes, "By following the course of historical genesis we cannot reach an absolute beginning of meaningful discourse, but can follow the way generated meanings have become 'sedimented' into the world and 'handed-down' by tradition in such a manner that it is always possible for us to 'reactivate' their original living constitution" (109). Not only a succinct summary of Husserl's thesis, it is perhaps the best description of what Mohanty himself attempts in this impressive study. It should...