Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is Kn correct? I offer a rival account of warranted assertion and argue that it beats Kn as a response to the "knowledge" version of Moore's Paradox. © 2007 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
CITATION STYLE
Stone, J. (2007). Contextualism and warranted assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 88(1), 92–113. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00282.x
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