Abstract
Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then give three arguments for the truth of the latter claim, which are also arguments for the truth of the former claim as I interpret it.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Audi R. (2004). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Aune B. (1967). Hypotheticals and ‘Can’: Another Look. Analysis 27: 191–195
Baier K. (1963). Could and Would. Analysis 23 (Suppl.): 20–29
Blum A. (2000). The Kantian Versus Frankfurt. Analysis 60: 287–288
Brink D. (1994). Moral Conflict and Its Structure. Philosophical Review 103: 215–247
Broad, C.D. (1952): ‘Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism’, in his Ethics and the History of Philosophy. London: Routledge
Broome J. (2004). Reasons. In: Pettit, P., Scheffler, S., Smith, M. and Wallace, R.J. (eds) Reason and Value: Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, pp. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Chisholm R.M. (1966). Freedom and Action. In: Lehrer, K. (eds) Freedom and Determinism, pp. Random House, New York
Copp D. (1997). Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility. Noûs 31: 441–456
Dancy J. (2004a). Enticing Reasons. In: Pettit, P., Scheffler, S., Smith, M. and Wallace, R.J. (eds) Reason and Value: Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, pp. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Dancy J. (2004b). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Donagan A. (1984). Consistency in Rationalist Moral Systems. Journal of Philosophy 81: 291–309. Reprinted in Gowans 1987
Ekstrom L.W. (2000). Free Will. Westview Press, Boulder
Ewing A.C. (1964). May Can-Statements Be Analysed Deterministically?. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64: 157–176
Feldman F. (1986). Doing the Best We Can. Reidel, Dordrecht
Fischer J.M. (1994). The Metaphysics of Free Will. Blackwell, Oxford
Fischer J.M. (1999). Recent Work on Moral Responsibility. Ethics 110: 93–139
Fischer J.M. (2003). ‘Ought-Implies-Can’, Causal Determinism and Moral Responsibility. Analysis 63: 244–250
Frankena W.K. (1950). Obligation and Ability. In: Black, M. (eds) Philosophical Analysis, pp. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Frankfurt, H. (1969): ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. Reprinted in his The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988
Frankfurt, H. (1983): ‘What We Are Morally Responsible For’. Reprinted in his The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988
Gowans C. (1987). Moral Dilemmas. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Haji I. (1998). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals and Perplexities. Oxford University Press, New York
Haji I. (2002). Deontic Morality and Control. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hare R.M. (1963). Freedom and Reason. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Harman G. (2000). Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Hobbes T. (1651). Leviathan. Edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge University Press,, Cambridge
Humberstone I.L. (1971). Two Sorts of ‘Ought’. Analysis 32: 8–14
Kane R. (1985). Free Will and Values. State University of New York Press, Albany
Kane R. (1996). The Significance of Free Will. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Kant I. (1781/87). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood. Cambridge University Press,, Cambridge
Kant, I. (1788): ‘Critique of Practical Reason’. Translated by M.J. Gregor, in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996
Kant, I. (1793): ‘On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice’. Translated by M.J. Gregor, in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996
Kekes J. (1984). ‘Ought Implies Can’ and Two Kinds of Morality. Philosophical Quarterly 34: 459–467
Kramer M. (2004). Where Law and Morality Meet. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Lamb J. (1993). Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 90: 517–527
Lehrer K. (1960). Can We Know That We Have Free Will By Introspection?. Journal of Philosophy 57: 145–157
Lehrer K. (1966). An Empirical Disproof of Determinism?. In: Lehrer, K. (eds) Freedom and Determinism, pp. Random House, New York
Lehrer K. (1968). Cans Without Ifs. Analysis 29: 29–32
Lemmon E.J. (1962). Moral Dilemmas. Philosophical Review 71: 139–158. Reprinted in Gowans 1987
Marcus R.B. (1980). Moral Dilemmas and Consistency. Journal of Philosophy 77: 121–136
Matthews G.B. (1998). Augustine. In: Edward, C. (eds) The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. Routledge, London
McConnell T.C. (1978). Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8: 269–287. Reprinted in Gowans 1987
Mele A.R. and Robb D. (1998). Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases. Philosophical Review 107: 97–112
Moore G.E. (1912). Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Moore G.E. (1922). Philosophical Studies. Routledge, London
Parfit D. (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (Suppl.): 99–130
Pereboom D. (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Pietroski P.M. (1993). Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory. Ethics 103: 489–515
Railton P. (1996). The Diversity of Moral Dilemma. In: Mason, H.E. (eds) Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, pp. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Raz, J. (1990). Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford
Raz J. (1999). Engaging Reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Saka P. (2000). Ought Does Not Imply Can. American Philosophical Quarterly 37: 93–105
Scanlon T.M. (1998). What We Owe To Each Other. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass
Schnall I.M. (2001). The Principle of Alternate Possibilities and ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’. Analysis 61: 335–340
Sidgwick H. (1907). The Methods of Ethics. Hackett, Indianapolis
Sinnott-Armstrong W. (1984). ‘Ought’ Conversationally Implies ‘Can’. Philosophical Review 93: 249–261
Sinnott-Armstrong W. (1985). ‘Ought to Have’ and ‘Could Have’. Analysis 45: 44–48
Stern R. (2004). Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?. Utilitas 16: 42–61
Stocker M. (1971). ‘Ought’ and ‘Can”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 303–316
Streumer, B. (2003): `Does ``Ought'' Conversationally Implicate ``Can''?' European Journal of Philosophy 11, 219–228
Streumer, B. (2005): `Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown', Utilitas 17, 226–230
Taylor R. (1962). Fatalism. Philosophical Review 71: 56–66
van Fraassen B.C. (1973). Values and the Heart’s Command. Journal of Philosophy 70: 5–19. Reprinted in Gowans 1987
van Inwagen P. (1978). Ability and Responsibility. Philosophical Review 87: 201–224
van Inwagen P. (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Clarendon Press, Oxford
White A.R. (1975). Modal Thinking. Blackwell, Oxford
Widerker D. (1991). Frankfurt on ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Alternative Possibilities. Analysis 51: 222–224
Widerker D. (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104: 247–261
Widerker D. (2000). Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look. Philosophical Perspectives 14: 181–201
Williams, B. (1973): ‘Ethical Consistency’, in his Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Gowans 1987
Williams B. (1981). `Ought and Moral Obligation'. In his Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Yaffe G. (1999). ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Analysis 59: 218–222
Zimmerman M. (1996). The Concept of Moral Obligation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Streumer, B. Reasons and Impossibility. Philos Stud 136, 351–384 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4282-1
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4282-1