Abstract
It is argued that, based on Kant's descriptive metaphysics, one can prescribe the necessary metaphysical underpinnings for the possibility of conscious experience in an artificial system. This project is developed by giving an account of the a priori concepts of the understanding in such a system. A specification and implementation of the nomological conditions for a conscious system allows one to know a priori that any system possessing this structure will be conscious; thus enabling us to avoid possible false-indicators of consciousness like that offered in a behaviouristic analysis. This is an alternative approach to the bottom-up or top-down approaches adopted by, for example CYC (Lenat and Feigenbaum 1992) and COG (Brooks 1994; Brooks and Stein 1993), neither of which, alone, or in some hybrid form, have proved productive.
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Stuart, S. A metaphysical approach to the mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2, 223–237 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000004926.05506.ef
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHEN.0000004926.05506.ef