Skip to main content
Log in

“Paging Dr. Lauben! Dr. Gustav Lauben!”: Some Questions about Individualism and Competence

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In several works, Frege argues that content is objective (i.e., thethoughts we entertain and communicate, and the senses of which theyare composed, are public, not private, property). There are, however,some remarks in the Fregean corpus that are in tension with this view.This paper is centered on an investigation of the most notorious andextreme such passage: the `Dr. Lauben’ example, from Frege (1918). Aprincipal aim is to attain more clarity on the evident tension withinFrege’s views on content, between this dominant objectivism and someelements that seem to run counter to it, via developing an understandingof the `Dr. Lauben’ example. Then I will argue that this interpretation goes some way toward undermining some prevalent contemporary viewsabout language. Based on the advice of Dr. Lauben, I will argue againsta certain understanding of the causal-historical theory of reference –more specifically, of the phenomenon of deferential uses of linguisticexpressions – upon which these views are premised, and I will drawout some morals that pertain to individualism and competence.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Burge, T. (1979a): ‘Sinning Against Frege’, Philosophical Review 88, 398-432.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1979b): ‘Individualismand theMental’,Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, 73-121.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donnellan, K. (1970): ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions’, Synthese 21, 335-358.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M. (1981): The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, G. (1973): ‘The Causal Theory of Names’, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47.

  • Frege, G. (1879): ‘Begriffsshrift’, in A. Sullivan (ed.), Logicism and the Philosophy of Language, Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frege, G. (1884): Foundations of Arithmetic, J.L. Austin (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1950.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frege, G. (1892): ‘On Sense and Reference’, in A. Sullivan (ed.), Logicism and the Philosophy of Language, Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frege, G. (1903): The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, 2nd vol., M. Furth (trans.), Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frege, G. (1918): ‘The Thought:A Logical Inquiry’, in A. Sullivan (ed.), Logicism and the Philosophy of Language, Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D. (1977): ‘Demonstratives’, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H.Wettstein (eds.) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D. (1989): ‘Afterthoughts’, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1972): Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mill, J.S. (1843): A System of Logic, London: Longmans, 1947.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. (1993): White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neale, S. (1993) ‘Term Limits’, Philosophical Perspectives 7, 89-123.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J. (1979): ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Nous 13, 3-21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (1975): ‘The Meaning of “Meaning” ’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language,Mind, and Knowledge,Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Recanati, F. (1993): Direct Reference, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1905): ‘On Denoting’, in A. Sullivan (ed.), Logicism and the Philosophy of Language, Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1911): ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, in A. Sullivan (ed.), Logicism and the Philosophy of Language, Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2003.

    Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1918): The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, D. Pears (ed.), Chicago: Open Court Press, 1985.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N. (1986): Frege’s Puzzle, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N. (1989): ‘Illogical Belief’, Philosophical Perspectives 3, 247-274.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N. (1998): ‘Nonexistence’, Nous 32, 277-319.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soames, S. (1989): ‘Semantics and Semantic Competence’, Philosophical Perspectives 3, 575-596.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soames, S. (2002): Beyond Rigidity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wettstein, H. (1986): ‘Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?’, Journal of Philosophy 83, 185-209.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1953): Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Sullivan, A. “Paging Dr. Lauben! Dr. Gustav Lauben!”: Some Questions about Individualism and Competence. Philosophical Studies 115, 201–224 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025100125602

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025100125602

Keywords

Navigation