Elsevier

Cognitive Systems Research

Volume 1, Issue 4, February 2001, Pages 241-249
Cognitive Systems Research

Computation, reduction, and teleology of consciousness

Action editor: Vasant Honavar
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1389-0417(00)00013-9Get rights and content

Abstract

This paper aims to explore mechanistic and teleological explanations of consciousness. In terms of mechanistic explanations, it critiques various existing views, especially those embodied by existing computational cognitive models. In this regard, the paper argues in favor of the explanation based on the distinction between localist (symbolic) representation and distributed representation (as formulated in the connectionist literature), which reduces the phenomenological difference to a mechanistic difference. Furthermore, to establish a teleological explanation of consciousness, the paper discusses the issue of the functional role of consciousness on the basis of the aforementioned mechanistic explanation. A proposal based on synergistic interaction between the conscious and the unconscious is advanced that encompasses various existing views concerning the functional role of consciousness. This two-step deepening explanation has some empirical support, in the form of a cognitive model and various cognitive data that it captures.

Section snippets

Mechanistic views of consciousness

Can we explain consciousness in mechanistic terms? In science, we generally assume the sufficiency and necessity of mechanistic explanations (if we are not going to be dualists). By mechanistic explanation, it is meant any concrete physical processes, that is computational processes in the broadest sense of the term ‘computational’. In general, ‘computation’ is a broad term that can be used to denote any process that can be realized computationally, ranging from chaotic dynamics (Freeman, 1995)

Teleological views of consciousness

In terms of mechanistic explanations of consciousness (e.g., in the form of a cognitive model), I have shown that the explanations in terms of knowledge content, knowledge organization, or knowledge processing are untenable. Thus, it leaves us with one possibility — knowledge representation; that is, the difference in representation accounts for the phenomenological distinction between the conscious and the unconscious. However, a further issue concerning the functional role of consciousness

Concluding remarks

In this paper, I focused on the issue of the physical (mechanistic or computational) basis of consciousness, proposing the framework of a mechanistic account of consciousness and, in turn, a teleological account of consciousness in this framework. Analyses and argumentation showed that the difference between localist (symbolic) representations and distributed representations (as employed in the connectionist theorizing and modeling) led to a plausible account of consciousness and its functional

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