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Idealized Acceptability versus Superassertibility

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Authors
  1. Tadeusz Szubka
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Szubka, T. Idealized Acceptability versus Superassertibility. Philosophical Studies 98, 175–186 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018620925055

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