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Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Philosophy Department of the University of Wisconsin at Madison in the Winter of 1984, at the Tarski Memorial Conference at Ohio State in the spring of 1984 and at the Pacific Division meeting of the APA in the spring of 1985. I received many valuable comments on all of these occasions and, in particular, from Paul Benacerraf and Clifton McIntosh, who commented on my paper at the APA meeting. I should also like to thank Michael Friedman for his comments on an earlier version and for our many discussions of its subject matter.
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Tait, W.W. Truth and proof: The Platonism of mathematics. Synthese 69, 341–370 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413978
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00413978