Abstract
In two recent papers Button (Analysis 66:130–135, 2006, Analysis 67:325–332, 2007) has developed a particular view of time that he calls no-futurism. He defends his no-futurism against a sceptical problem that has been raised (by e.g. Bourne in Aust J Phil 80:359–371, 2002) for a similar “growing block” view—that of Tooley (Time, tense, and causation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997). If Button is right, then we have an important third option available to us: a half-way house between presentism and eternalism. If, on the other hand, the criticism of Tooley-style “Growing-Block” views holds, then we are left with just presentism and eternalism. In this paper I show that Button’s defence fails.
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Notes
Throughout, I identify this view as the “Growing-Block” view of time.
At least, those belief tokens that are not of the form of logical truths (for instance, “I am hungry or not hungry”) are false.
That is, we believe that the past, present, and future are equally real.
Including the challenge I suggested in Tallant (2007).
Where capitalisation is ontologically ascriptive—see Button (2007: 325–326). The idea, in brief, is that there might be two uses for tensed sentences. A merely indexical function, and a function that serves to point to some feature of the Growing Block Ontology. Thus, to say that a time is PRESENT is to say that it is the last moment of the PAST—of the block. When we evaluate our predecessors use of the term ‘present’ it is tempting to view it as a merely indexical term: that is, since the term no longer picks out the Growing Block theorist’s present (the last moment of the PAST), so they are merely ‘present’ where we are, now, PRESENT.
Where italicised verbs are tensed.
I should make it clear that Button never actually goes as far as to endorse no-futurism. Rather, he only intends to offer a defence of the view against the sceptical objection.
For instance, Huddleston (1984: 134–135) notes only two types of verb-phrase: tensed and non-tensed; Langendoen (1970: 189–191) argues that all English sentences include tense, though is prepared to concede that the present tense can be used to express “generic” claims using a “timeless predicate” (as in “A mirror reflects light”); Declerck (1991: 7) draws a distinction between tensed and tenseless sentences, but mentions no other category. No text that I have been able to find makes mention of the kind of verb Button requires: e.g. Hudson (1971), Radford (2009: esp. p. 3).
I concede that I’m not entirely certain that I understand what it actually means to treat a verb “as part of a primitive”. I assume that what Button means is that there is some primitive notion expressed by “is-real-as-of” and that the expression of that notion requires that the ‘is’ as a component part of the expression and that, as such, there is nothing to be said concerning the tense, or otherwise, of the term.
See Oaklander and White (2007) for discussion of our awareness of the B-theoretic structure of reality.
See Sider (2003) for a discussion of the problems of overdetermination.
Obviously, the case should generalise, too. That is, there is no conceptual space in any causal process for the property of presentness to play a role.
The argument is structurally similar to that offered by Liggins (2006) against abstract objects.
Tooley, of course, gives us a sustained defence of his view and an excellent account of the erstwhile benefits. But since Button’s account is not Tooley’s, it remains to be seen what, exactly, is motivating Button’s view. Of course, that’s not to say that nothing is motivating Button’s view; merely that at the current time we have not been told.
See for instance, Williamson (1985: 251). Thus, if my fork is “to the left of” my knife then although it’s clearly false to say that by knife is thereby “to the left of” my fork, it’s also clearly true to say that my knife is such that “my fork is to the left of it”.
See Bigelow (1996) for an introduction to the idea of Lucretian properties and Sider (2001: 41), Merricks (2007: Chap. 6) and Cameron (forthcoming) for discussion.
As we saw above, Button himself has ruled out the possibility of permitting tenseless verbs on the grounds that they generate the sceptical problem. As he puts it, ‘[t]ense is plainly indispensible to this solution’ (Button 2006: 133).
I ignore the future-tensed option, here, since the no-futurist denies the reality of the future.
For instance, the view espoused by Lowe (1998: 88–94).
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Acknowledgments
I’m very grateful to Ross Cameron, Mark Jago, Carrie Jenkins, Daniel Nolan and Neil Sinclair. The paper has improved in light of conversations I’ve had with each of them. I’m also very grateful to three referees for this journal. One referee, in particular, gave extremely extensive and helpful comments that have helped me to radically improve the paper.
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Tallant, J. There’s No Future in No-Futurism. Erkenn 74, 37–52 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9245-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9245-z