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Consequentialism and Its Demands: A Representative Study

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Notes

  1. For references see Brad Hooker, ‘The Demandingness Objection’, in T. Chappell (ed.), The Problem of Moral Demandingness: New Philosophical Essays, (London: MacMillan, 2009), p. 162 footnote 4, and Alan Carter, ‘Is Utilitarian Morality Necessarily too Demanding?’, in The Problem of Moral Demandingness, pp. 163–185, as well as the works to be cited in the next section.

  2. The works of Thomas Pogge are instructive in this regard. See his World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008) and Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).

  3. See Tanyi Attila, ‘The Case for Authority’, in S. Schleidgen (ed.), Should We Always Act morally? Essays on Overridingness, (Marburg: Tectum, 2012), pp. 159–189.

  4. Cf. Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), Chapter 1.

  5. Cf. Liam Murphy, Moral Demands in Non-Ideal Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Chapter 1.

  6. Cf. Sarah Stroud, ‘Overridingness and Moral Theory’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998): 170–189; Douglas W. Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 2.

  7. For more on this see Scheffler, Human Morality, pp. 24–25.

  8. Paul Hurley, ‘Does Consequentialism Make Too Many Demands?’, Ethics 116 (2006), pp. 680–706.

  9. David Sobel, ‘The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection’, Philosophers’ Imprint 7 (2007), pp. 1–17.

  10. Concerning premise (1), the strategy of denial holds that consequentialism does not make extreme demands, either because of the empirical circumstances (cf. Tim Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001)) or because of its own internal structure (e.g., Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Revised edition, 1994); Michael Slote, ‘Satisficing Consequentialism’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 58 (1984), pp. 139–163). Concerning premise (5), the strategy of extremism holds that not even extreme demands are objectionable (e.g., Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp. 229–243; Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)).

  11. The recent position of scalar-consequentialism opts for the first alternative. See Alastair Norcross (‘Reasons Without Demands: Rethinking Rightness’, in J. Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 38–53). The second alternative is less controversial, and several consequentialists have held it. For critical remarks see Krister Bykvist, Understanding Utilitarianism, (London: Continuum, 2010), pp. 101–102. Note further, that the position of moral rationalism holds that this is conceptually not possible; see Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism for this claim.

  12. Further studies can be found in our ‘Overdemanding Consequentialism?’. We say more about these other experiments in footnotes 35, 40 and 41 below.

  13. In our ‘Overdemanding Consequentialism?’

  14. In particular, Bykvist, Utilitarianism, and Mulgan, Understanding Utilitarianism.

  15. Thus, the study had a 2 (Objective demands: high vs. low) × 2 (Subjective demands: high vs. low) × 8 (Scenario 1–8) design with repeated measures on the last factor.

  16. One might nevertheless insist that we should not consider the second moral intuition in our assessment. But if the intuition referred to in premise (3) is taken seriously, although it too conflicts with consequentialism’s alleged claim to overridingness, then why not take seriously this moral intuition?

  17. How about the case when the demands of consequentialism are found intuitively reasonable but not demanded by morality? Although this case is interesting – not least because one is curious why these demands are contrary to morality – it does not have relevance for us. For though the moral intuition now speaks against consequentialism, it does so on grounds other than its alleged overdemandingness. And this has no bearing on OD and hence it is not something we need to be concerned with in this paper.

  18. Mikrozensus 2011.

  19. E.g., Joseph M. Paxton, Leo Ungar, & Joshua D. Greene, ‘Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment’, Cognitive Science 36 (2010), pp. 163–177.

  20. To do so, we conducted a three (for each of the three questions) 2 (Objective demands: high vs. low) × 2 (Subjective demands: high vs. low) × 8 (Scenario 1–8) mixed-model ANOVAs with repeated measures on the last factor and plotted the estimated marginal means.

  21. 2 (Objective demands: high vs. low) × 2 (Subjective demands: high vs. low) × 6 (Scenario) with repeated measures on the last factor.

  22. Objective demands: F(1, 993) = 40.11, p < .001, η 2p  = .039; subjective demands: F(1, 993) = 54.88, p < .001, η 2p  = .052.

  23. There was no interaction between objective and subjective demands, F(1, 993) = .22, p = .64, η 2p  < .000.

  24. Objective demands: F(1, 994) = 10.71, p = .001, η 2p  = .011; subjective demands: F(1, 994) = 27.55, p < .001, η 2p  = .027.

  25. Objective demands: F(1, 994) = 1.23, p = .268, η 2p  = .001; subjective demands: F(1, 994) = 4.07, p = .044, η 2p  = .004.

  26. We only used the three above-mentioned levels of schooling in the three-pronged German system and excluded all those with no formal education and those who were still attending school.

  27. Main effect of education: F(2, 947) = 3.49, p = .031, η 2p  = .007. Dissent M Low = 44.9%; M Medium = 40.1%; M High = 40.0%. Post hoc tests (Bonferroni) revealed marginally significant differences between those with low formal education and the two other groups.

  28. These partly overlap with the conclusions of our ‘Overdemanding Consequentialism?’. However, the superior quality of the present study lends more credibility to our initial findings and the large sample also allowed us to investigate the moderation of our findings by level of formal education (Hypothesis 3).

  29. This is admittedly a question of numbers, but other empirical research found agreement of around 90% of respondents, whereas in our studies the highest such number we can quote is 62%.

  30. See e.g., J. D. Greene, S. A. Morelli, K. Lowenberg, L. E. Nystrom, & J. D. Cohen, ‘Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment’, Cognition 107 (2008), pp. 1144–1154, and J. M. Paxton, L. Ungar, & J. D. Greene, ‘Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment’, Cognitive Science 36 (2012), pp. 163–177.

  31. See some of the essays in Truth and Realism, (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006). It can be pointed out, though, that we do not distinguish two different notions of intuitions that seem to be in use: the less demanding notion understands intuitions as the content of untutored common-sense or folk morality, the more demanding and technical notion that we also use in this article, considers intuitions as a sort of immediate cognition. Supposing that these two notions exist, two points in response: First, we doubt that we can indeed make use of the less demanding notion because the epistemological status of such intuitions is unclear at best. Second, by opting for the more demanding notion, we aim to strengthen the implications of our discussion.

  32. In moral philosophy recent works include, on the sceptical side, Peter Singer, ‘Ethics and Intuitions’, The Journal of Ethics 9 (2005), pp. 331–352; on the anti-sceptical side, Folke Tersman, ‘The Reliability of Moral Intuitions: A Challenge from Neuroscience’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), pp. 389–405; Matthew Liao, ‘A Defence of Intuitions’, Philosophical Studies 140 (2008), pp. 247–262.

  33. For references see footnote 10. See also Matthew Tedesco (‘Intuitions and the Demands of Consequentialism’, Utilitas 23:1 (2011), pp. 94–104) who pursues this line further by bringing in neuroscientific evidence.

  34. In this paper we present one study, but in our ‘Overdemanding Consequentialism?’ we present the results of three further studies: two scenario studies and a third experimental game in which participants had to make real decisions with real consequences. For further details on these studies see footnotes 40 and 41.

  35. Shaun Nichols and Joseph Ulatowski, ‘Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited’, Mind and Language 22 (2007), 346–365.

  36. See Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner, & Joshua Alexander, ‘Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?’, Philosophical Psychology 23 (2010), pp. 331–355; Eric Schwitzgebel and Fiery Cushman, ‘Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers’, Mind & Language (in press).

  37. For a recent position that appears to favour folk intuitions see M. B. E. Smith, ‘Does Humanity Share a Common Moral Faculty?’, The Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 37–53.

  38. Of course this is only an objection in one respect (namely, that concerning our methodology). In another, that concerning our conclusion, it supports our position: since if uniformity was a sensible requirement, our results would definitely refute OD (not just put its empirical premise into doubt, as we prefer to say).

  39. In our ‘Overdemanding Consequentialism?’, we have presented the results of an experimental game. The goal of this study was to create an actual decision situation with real-life monetary consequences. This was done to investigate the OD-intuition while avoiding the possible adverse effects of the “as if”-character of imaginary scenarios. To do so, we adapted a paradigm previously used in behavioural economics: Participants divided a certain sum (€100) between themselves and the vaccination program of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) benefiting children in developing countries. Participants knew that for one randomly determined participant, this choice would be implemented in real.

  40. As a secondary response, we note that in a small follow-up study, which also appears in our paper ‘Overdemanding Consequentialism?’, we affirmed that results that are reported in this paper are largely parallel in cases that have been introduced in the philosophical literature to illustrate the gist of OD. The examples we used were taken from Bykvist, Utilitarianism, pp. 98–99, and Mulgan, Understanding Utilitarianism, pp. 95–96.

  41. As pointed out in the beginning of this section (footnote 30), we are far from being alone with this statistical approach.

  42. This might be an overly demanding account of intuitions. To illustrate: philosophers put emphasis on lack of inference and sometimes stability, whereas psychologists tend to single out immediacy as an essential characteristic of intuitions. There is thus some work to be done to see whether all three characteristics are needed. In these final remarks, however, we do not want to – and cannot – settle these substantial questions.

  43. Jonathan Haidt, ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment’, Psychological Review 108 (2001), p. 818.

  44. Tersman, ‘The Reliability of Moral Intuitions’.

  45. See Anti Kaupinnen, ‘The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy’, Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007), pp. 95–118, on robust vs. surface intuitions.

  46. E.g., R. W. Holland & M. de Vries, ‘Implicit Evaluation as a Basis for Intuition’, in A. Glöckner & C. Witteman (eds.), Foundations for Tracing Intuition: Challenges and Methods, (New York: Psychology Press), pp. 123–138.

  47. For this claim see, e.g., Sabine Döring, ‘Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation’, Dialectica 61 (2007), pp. 363–394. Going one step further, Sabine Roeser, Moral Emotions and Intuitions, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), identifies emotions with intuitions.

  48. Admittedly, this is a contentious claim. To mention two of the questions that will have to be dealt with: one, we will have to specify which emotions we are going to use, and two, we will have to show that these particular emotions elicit non-inferential knowledge and not inferential knowledge (this is an issue of course, only if it is not the case that all emotions elicit such knowledge).

  49. See E. Sosa, ‘Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Intuition’, Philosophical Studies 132 (2007), pp. 101–102. Such an approach focusing on competence or expertise in moral judgment, on the one hand, and intuitions, on the other, fits well with newer social-cognitive approaches in moral psychology. See, e.g., D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez, ‘A Social-Cognitive Approach to the Moral Personality’, in D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (eds.), Moral Development, Self and Identity, (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2004), pp. 189–212. These approaches also suggest that moral competencies can be successfully developed and taught. See e.g., D. K. Lapsley & F. C. Power, Character Psychology and Character Education, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).

  50. In her On Virtue Ethics, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), esp. pp. 28–29.

  51. The empirical investigation of such common intuitions concerning virtues has become a major research area both in moral (J. Haidt & S. Kesebir, ‘Morality’, in S. Fiske & D. Gilbert (eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology, (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), pp. 797–832) and positive (J. Shryack, M. F. Steger, R. F. Krueger, & C. S. Kallie, ‘The Structure of Virtue: An Empirical Investigation of the Dimensionality of the Virtues in Action Inventory of Strengths’, Personality and Individual Differences (2010), pp. 714–719).

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank audiences in Konstanz, the Hague, Nottingham, Bayreuth, and Lucca, as well as all those who have commented on prior versions of the manuscript. This particularly applies to the editors of the present volume, Sabine Roeser and Joel Rickard. The research reported in this paper was funded by several grants from the Zukunftskolleg at the University of Konstanz. It was also supported by a grant to Attila Tanyi from the German Research Foundation (Grant number: TA 820/1-1).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK

    Attila Tanyi

  2. Zukunftskolleg, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

    Attila Tanyi

  3. Zukunftskolleg and Department of Psychology, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany

    Martin Bruder

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  1. Attila Tanyi
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Correspondence to Attila Tanyi.

Additional information

As subsequent references will show, the present paper is part of a larger project on the experimental foundations of the Overdemandingness Objection. At present, there is one other paper – ‘Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach’, under review – which takes as a starting point the same philosophical problem. However, the two papers follow very different trajectories. Whereas the latter paper investigates the basic problematic using a variety of methods and raises some doubt on whether the empirical assumption implied by OD really applies in the real word, the present paper replicates these findings and moves beyond them in several ways. First, the representative sample ensures that the findings are not limited to the particular sample of students. Second, the size of the sample allows to investigate whether there are predictable differences in the relevant intuition. Also, the present paper presents the philosophical problematic in a different way and discusses problems that are not covered in the other paper, ending with a detailed description of a novel methodological approach to investigate the status of moral intuitions.

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Tanyi, A., Bruder, M. Consequentialism and Its Demands: A Representative Study. J Value Inquiry 48, 293–314 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9418-0

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