Abstract
The fact that humans have a special relationship to each other insofar as they belong in the same species is often taken to be a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals, one which justifies a greater moral status for all humans, regardless of their individual capacities. I give some reasons why this kind of relationship is not an appropriate ground for differential treatment of humans and nonhumans. I then argue that even if relationships do matter morally species membership cannot justify a difference in moral status. This has important implications because it removes one barrier to giving animals greater moral status.
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Notes
I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer of this article.
Benson says something similar (1978, p. 536).
I have discussed the argument from marginal cases at greater length elsewhere (2005, 2006). In brief, the argument from marginal cases says that those capacities that are usually supposed to separate all humans from all animals (such as rationality or moral agency) do not include marginal humans (those humans who are not and/or will never be rational). Thus, consistency demands that either animals have as much moral status as marginal humans or marginal humans have as little as animals. Many arguments have been given to oppose this conclusion. I address some elsewhere (2005, 2006).
As Midgley points out, it is hard to find an impartial standpoint (Midgley 1983, p. 103). However, this does not mean that we cannot identify those standpoints that are partial.
Francis and Norman acknowledge this point (1978, p. 511).
Rachels calls this “moral individualism”-individuals should be considered as individuals, not evaluated on the basis of characteristics of their group (1990, pp. 173–4, 194–7). Thus, “how an individual may be treated is determined not by considering his group memberships but by considering his own particular characteristics” (1989, p. 101). Others make similar points: McMahan 2005; Cavalieri 2001, p. 72.
Similarly, women’s qualifications are undervalued and under appraised. A woman’s CV that is identical to a man’s is rated lower (Harris and Narayan 1997, pp. 456–7).
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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal and G. K. Harrison for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Tanner, J. Species as a Relationship. Acta Anal 23, 337–347 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0029-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0029-x