Skip to main content
Log in

Species as a Relationship

  • Published:
Acta Analytica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The fact that humans have a special relationship to each other insofar as they belong in the same species is often taken to be a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals, one which justifies a greater moral status for all humans, regardless of their individual capacities. I give some reasons why this kind of relationship is not an appropriate ground for differential treatment of humans and nonhumans. I then argue that even if relationships do matter morally species membership cannot justify a difference in moral status. This has important implications because it removes one barrier to giving animals greater moral status.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Benson 1978, pp. 536–7; Diamond 1978; Francis and Norman 1978, p. 518; Narveson 1977, p. 176.

  2. I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer of this article.

  3. Benson says something similar (1978, p. 536).

  4. I have discussed the argument from marginal cases at greater length elsewhere (2005, 2006). In brief, the argument from marginal cases says that those capacities that are usually supposed to separate all humans from all animals (such as rationality or moral agency) do not include marginal humans (those humans who are not and/or will never be rational). Thus, consistency demands that either animals have as much moral status as marginal humans or marginal humans have as little as animals. Many arguments have been given to oppose this conclusion. I address some elsewhere (2005, 2006).

  5. Even those who object to the argument from marginal cases admit people have relationships with animals: Fox 1986, p. 60; Francis and Norman 1978, p. 510.

  6. Similar points are made by: Singer 1993, pp. 76–7; Midgley 1983, p. 109). Midgley also says the preference for our own species is neither constant, nor guaranteed, so it cannot be used to draw an absolute line between humans and animals (1983, p. 109).

  7. Dombrowski 1997, p. 112; Regan 1983, pp. 190–1; Sapontzis 1985, pp. 255–6; Singer 1993, pp. 76–7.

  8. Others who object to partiality include: Almeida 2004, p. 31; Dombrowski 1997, p. 23; VanDeVeer 1983, p. 148.

  9. As Midgley points out, it is hard to find an impartial standpoint (Midgley 1983, p. 103). However, this does not mean that we cannot identify those standpoints that are partial.

  10. Francis and Norman acknowledge this point (1978, p. 511).

  11. Similar points are made by: Dombrowski 1997, p. 23; Singer 1993, pp. 76–7.

  12. Rachels calls this “moral individualism”-individuals should be considered as individuals, not evaluated on the basis of characteristics of their group (1990, pp. 173–4, 194–7). Thus, “how an individual may be treated is determined not by considering his group memberships but by considering his own particular characteristics” (1989, p. 101). Others make similar points: McMahan 2005; Cavalieri 2001, p. 72.

  13. Similarly, women’s qualifications are undervalued and under appraised. A woman’s CV that is identical to a man’s is rated lower (Harris and Narayan 1997, pp. 456–7).

References

  • Almeida, M. J. (2004). Marginal cases and the moral status of embryos. stem cell research. In J. M. Humber (Ed.). Humana Press: Totowa.

  • Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: an essay on autism and theory of mind. MIT Press.

  • Becker, L. (1983). The priority of human interests. In H. Miller, & W. Williams (Eds.), Ethics and animals. Totowa, NJ: Humana Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benson, J. (1978). Duty and the beast. Philosophy, 53(206), 529–549.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cargile, J. (1983). Comments on the priority of human interests. In H. Miller, & W. Williams (Eds.), Ethics and animals. Totowa, NJ: Humana Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carruthers, P. (1992). The animals issue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cavalieri, P. (2001). The animal question: Why nonhuman animals deserve human rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, C. (1978). Eating meat and eating people. Philosophy, 53(206), 465–479.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dombrowski, D. A. (1997). Babies and beasts: The argument from marginal cases. Champaign: University of Illinois Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fox, M. A. (1986). The case for animal experimentation. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Francis, L., & Norman, R. (1978). Some animals are more equal than others. Philosophy, 53, 507–527.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harris, L. C., & Narayan, U. (1997). Affirmative action as equalising opportunity: Challenging the myth of preferential treatment. In H. LaFollette (Ed.), Ethics in practice. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hursthouse, R. (2000). Ethics, humans and other animals. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCloskey, H. (1965). Rights. Philosophical Quarterly, 15, 115–127.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCloskey, H. J. (1979). Moral rights and animals. Inquiry, 22, 23–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCloskey, H. J. (1987). The moral case for experimentation on animals. The Monist, 70, 64–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • McMahan, J. (2005). Our fellow creatures. The Journal of Ethics, 9, 353–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Midgley, M. (1983). Animals and why they matter. Athens: The University of Georgia Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Narveson, J. (1977). Animal rights. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vii, 161–178.

  • Narveson, J. (1987). On a case for animals rights. The Monist, 70, 31–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rachels, J. (1989). Darwin, species and morality. In T. Regan, & P. Singer (Eds.), Animal rights and human obligations. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rachels, J. (1990). Created for animals: The moral implications of Darwinism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rawls, J. (1963). The sense of justice. Philosophical Review, 72.

  • Rawls, J. (1999). A theory of justice, revised edn.. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowlands, M. (1997). Contractarianism and animal rights. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14(3), 235–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sapontzis, S. (1985). Moral community and animal rights. American Philosophical Quarterly, 22, 251–257.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sapontzis, S. F. (1985). Moral community and animal rights. American Philosophical Quarterly, 22, 251–257.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheffler, S. (1997). Relationships and responsibilities. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26(3), 189–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Singer, P. (1993). Practical ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanner, J. (2005). The marginal cases argument: Animals matter too. Think, Issue 10, 53–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanner, J. (2006). Marginal humans, the argument from kinds, and the similarity argument. Facta Universitatis, 5(1), 47–63.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, S. (2001). Carruthers and the argument from marginal cases. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 18(2), 135–147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for this journal and G. K. Harrison for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Julia Tanner.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Tanner, J. Species as a Relationship. Acta Anal 23, 337–347 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0029-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0029-x

Keywords

Navigation