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The use theory of meaning and semantic stipulation

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Abstract

According to Horwich’s use theory of meaning, the meaning of a word W is engendered by the underived acceptance of certain sentences containing W. Horwich applies this theory to provide an account of semantic stipulation: Semantic stipulation proceeds by deciding to accept sentences containing an as yet meaningless word W. Thereby one brings it about that W gets an underived acceptance property. Since a word’s meaning is constituted by its (basic) underived acceptance property, this decision endows the word with a meaning. The use-theoretic account of semantic stipulation contrasts with the standard view that semantic stipulation proceeds by assigning the meaning (reference) to W that makes a certain set of sentences express true propositions. In this paper I will argue that the use-theoretic account does not work. I take Frege to have already made the crucial point: "a definition does not assert anything but lays down something ["etwas festsetzt"]” (Frege 1899, 36). A semantic stipulation for W cannot be the decision to accept a sentence containing W or be explained in terms of such an acceptance. Semantic stipulation constitutes a problem for Horwich's use theory of meaning, especially his basic notion of acceptance.

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Notes

  1. See Boghossian 1996, 376; Horwich 1998, 132–133, 138 and Horwich 2000, 151.

  2. For discussion see Schiffer 2000. Horwich replies in Horwich 2004.

  3. Horwich uses here the notion of holding true. More about holding true in Sect. 4.

  4. I will use “S(W)” for a sentence that contains “W” and I will simplify by talking only about one sentence.

  5. Is “Pooch” really meaningless? “Pooch” is a generic name (Kaplan 1990, 111): One can find it on a list of names appropriate for dogs. According to some proposals, a generic name N means the bearer of N (Katz 1994, 5). But even if generic names had a meaning, the general description of what the ‘stipulator’ has to achieve must assume that the stipulator knows that “Pooch” has no meaning and reference. For we often successfully introduce nonsense words as names knowing that they have no meaning. For example, it is open to me to introduce “ABBA” as a name. This expression has no meaning in English and it does not mean the bearer of “ABBA”, at least not before the successful introduction of it as a name.

  6. In this situation I even know that I know that “Pooch” is a meaningless mark.

  7. What about ellipsis? If the surgeon says “Scalpel!”, there is a sentence with a complete meaning, the sentence is only partly pronounced. In other situations the meaning is completely expressed by incorporating contextual elements.

  8. See Braun 1993, 460ff.

  9. See Braun 1993, 464.

  10. Lewis himself thinks so, but he tries to explain explicit performative utterances, not acceptances of assertoric sentences, see Lewis 1983, 247.

  11. Perhaps it is sufficient for Horwich’s purposes to say that the stipulator presupposes this. But the presuppositions must be available as reasons for the stipulator if the decision shall be a rational action of the stipulator.

  12. See Kavka 1983.

  13. Ibid, 35.

  14. At most, you can form the intention to intend to accept S(W) in the right circumstances. But this intention will not establish the disposition to accept S(W), it will establish a disposition to form intentions.

  15. See Kavka 1983, 35.

  16. See Hornsby 1994, Sect. 1.4; Kemmerling 2001, 84ff; Searle 1989, Sect. V and VI.

  17. For a defence of this description see Bach and Harnish 1992.

  18. This comes very close to Kaplan’s idea that a dubbing is a use of an expression with the intention to originate a new word, see Kaplan 1989, 560.

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Acknowledgements

Many thanks for helpful suggestions and criticism go to Sarah-Jane Conrad, John Higgs, Jennifer Hornsby, Keith Hossack, Silvan Imhof, Jessica Leech, Guy Longworth, Christian Nimtz, David Papineau, Jonas Pfister, Richard Samuels, Gabriel Segal, David Galloway and Wilfried Meyer-Viol. I also want to thank the two anonymous referees for their suggestions that helped to improve the paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK

    Mark Textor

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Textor, M. The use theory of meaning and semantic stipulation. Erkenntnis 67, 29–45 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9049-y

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