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A model theory for propositional attitudes

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My chief aim has been to convey the thought that the application of model theoretic techniques to natural languages needn't force a distortion of intentional phenomena. I hope that at least I have succeeded in accomplishing this.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA

    Richmond H. Thomason

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  1. Richmond H. Thomason
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This paper grew out of a joint project with Anil Gupta, which involved a theory that represented propositions as functions taking possible worlds into sets of entities, the value of the function at a world being the set of things that believe the proposition in the world. This theory was first presented at a talk given during the summer of 1973. While writing up a revised version somewhat later I realized that the actual representation of propositions was not connected to the workings of the theory of projection. This led to an earlier version of the present paper, which was mimeographed and privately distributed in November, 1977. I am grateful to Roy Endersby and to the referees of this journal for useful comments which have helped to improve the final version.

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Thomason, R.H. A model theory for propositional attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 4, 47–70 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00351813

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