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Enlarging the Sphere of Recognition: A Hegelian Approach to Animal Rights

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Notes

  1. See Michael P. Allen, “Hegel between Non-Domination and Expressive Freedom: Capabilities, Perspectives, Democracy,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, 32 (2006).

  2. See Ludwig Siep, “Kampf und Anerkennung: Zu Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes in den Jaener Schriften,” Hegel-Studien, 9 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1974); see also Robert R. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition (Berkeley, Calif. University of California Press, 1997), pp. 1–28.

  3. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 185.

  4. J. Skidmore, “Duties to Animals: The Failure of Kant’s Moral Theory,” Journal of Value Inquiry, 35 (2001).

  5. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (London: Methuen, 1930), pp. 239–240.

  6. Ibid., p. 239.

  7. Dan Egonsson, “Kant’s Vegetarianism,” Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 31, no. 4 (1997), p. 481.

  8. Allen Wood, “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature,” The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 72 (1998), p. 193.

  9. See Lara Denis, “Kant’s Conception of Duties Regarding Animals: Reconstruction and Reconsideration,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 17 (2000).

  10. See Heather Fieldhouse, “The Failure of Kantian Theory of Indirect Duties to Animals,” Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal, 2 (2004), pp. 1–9; see also Skidmore, op. cit.

  11. Emer O’Hagan, “Animals, Agency, and Obligation in Kantian Ethics,” Social Theory and Practice, 35 (2009), p. 548.

  12. Christine Korsgaard, Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 25 (2005), p. 103.

  13. See O’Hagan, op. cit., pp. 550–553.

  14. See Ludwig Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip der praktische Philosophie: Untersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 1979), pp. 135–195.

  15. Williams, op. cit., p. 49.

  16. Robert B. Brandom, “The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution,” Philosophy and Social Criticism, 33 (2007), p. 136.

  17. Williams, op. cit., p. 51.

  18. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, vol. 3, trans. M. J. Petry (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), p. 332.

  19. See Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 183–209.

  20. See Allen Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 88–93.

  21. See Edith Düsing, “Genesis des Selbstbewusstseins durch Anerkennung und Liebe: Untersuchungen zu Hegels Theorie der konkreten Subjektivität,” in Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes, ed., Lothar Eley (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990).

  22. Axel Honneth, The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 40.

  23. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 192.

  24. Brandom, op. cit., p. 137.

  25. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer, Thomas Magnell, Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry, and Nichole Shippen for helpful comments in revising this article.

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Thompson, M.J. Enlarging the Sphere of Recognition: A Hegelian Approach to Animal Rights. J Value Inquiry 45, 319–335 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-011-9283-z

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