Skip to main content
Log in

Relational Models for the Modal Syllogistic*

  • Published:
Journal of Philosophical Logic Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

An interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is proposed which is intuitively graspable, if only formally correst. The individuals to which a term applies, and possibly-applies, are supposed to be determined in a uniform way by the set of individuals to which the term necessarily-applies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  1. Johnson, Fred (1989): Models for modal syllogisms, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 30: 271–284.

    Google Scholar 

  2. McCall, Storrs (1963): Aristotle's Modal Syllogisms, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, North-Holland, Amsterdam.

  3. Thom, Paul (1991): The two Barbaras, Hist. Phil. Logic 12: 135–149.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Thomason, S. K. (1993): Semantic analysis of the modal syllogistic, J. Philos. Logic 22: 111–128.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Thomason, S.K. Relational Models for the Modal Syllogistic* . Journal of Philosophical Logic 26, 129–141 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004200616124

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004200616124

Keywords

Navigation