Abstract
If there is such a thing as objectively existing prescriptivity, as the moral realist claims, then we can also explain why—and we need not deny that—strong (conceptual) internalism is true. Strong conceptual internalism is true, not because of any belief in any magnetic force thought to be inherent in moral properties themselves, as Mackie argued, but because we do not allow that anyone has (in the practical sense) ‘accepted’ a normative claim, unless she is prepared to some extent to act on it (to see to it that it is satisfied).
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Notes
Mackie (1977, p. 38).
Ibid. (p. 40), my italics.
See Dreier (2010, p. 82), for an argument to the extent that Mackie ‘mislocated’ the problem to the object of moral beliefs rather than to the beliefs themselves.
There are philosophers who have reported that they have no such internalist intuition; this may be true of them, and they may use the term ‘accept’ differently from how most of us do. Generalizations in the philosophy of language rarely come entirely without exceptions.
To my knowledge, my view has not been stated by anyone before me, even if I believe that it must have occurred to many who have thought about the problem. It is not mentioned in Björklund et al. (2011), where Tresan’s related view is discussed.
I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.
Tännsjö (2007).
Garner (1990, p. 143).
Olson (2011, p. 64).
See for example Hare (1952, p. 164).
Ibid.
Ibid. (p. 41).
Tännsjö (2010).
Mackie (1977, p. 39).
I have said nothing to answer the epistemic aspect of his argument from queerness, to the effect that, even if objective prescriptive properties existed, we would not be able to gain knowledge of them. This is his most serious challenge to the moral realist. I discuss and try to answer it in Tännsjö (2010).
References
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Acknowledgments
I thank Jens Johansson, Victor Moberger, Jonas Olson, and an anonymous reviewer for the journal, as well as the joint Uppsala/Stockholm Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Tännsjö, T. A realist and internalist response to one of Mackie’s arguments from queerness. Philos Stud 172, 347–357 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0306-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0306-z