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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
The Free Will Defence, as we shall understand it here, is an attempt to show that
(1) God exists and he is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good is logically consistent with
(2) There is moral evil in the actual world.
page 456 note 1 See his God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 131–55Google Scholar; and ‘Which Worlds Could God Have Created?’, Journal of Philosophy, LXX, 17 (11 October 1973); 539–52.Google Scholar The second of these, we should remark, is considerably different in details from the first, but the basic account remains. It is this basic account which we are concerned with here.
page 457 note 1 See his ‘God and Other Minds’, Noûs, iii, 3 (September 1969), 259–84.Google Scholar Incidentally, we have taken the argument (1)-(8), with minor changes, from Rowe's study.
page 458 note 1 Ibid. p. 277. We have changed the numbering here in order to maintain continuity.
page 458 note 2 Ibid. p. 277.
page 467 note 1 See his ‘Causation’, Journal of Philosophy, LXX, 17 (11 October 1973), 556–67.Google Scholar
page 470 note 1 We invite the reader to compare our remarks here with the much discussed views of Davidson's, Donald ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes‘, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685–700.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 475 note 1 We are grateful to Alvin Plantinga for his generous and instructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. The earliest version of this paper was read at California State University, Northridge, and the present version was read at the University of California, Los Angeles.
