Meaning, Dispositions, and Normativity
Abstract
In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated
dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox
developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of
following a rule (Kripke, 1982). Coates' account appeals to a notion of
'homeostasis', unpacked as a subject's second-order disposition to
maintain a consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions
regarding her linguistic behavior. This kind of account, Coates
contends, provides a naturalistic model for the normativity of
intentional properties and thus resolves Kripke's sceptical paradox.
In this paper I argue that Coates' second-order dispositional account
cannot solve the sceptic's problems regarding meaning and normativity.
My main contention is that in order for second-order dispositions to be
able to effectively regulate the coordinated responses constitutive of
first-order dispositions, those first order dispositions must be
independently identifiable. Yet that's precisely what Kripke's sceptical
argument calls into question. I shall also argue, in a more positive
fashion, that Coates' own appeal to practical breakdowns may suggest a
different —and more effective— response to the sceptic's concern.