Journal of the History of Philosophy

356 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The Common-Sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699). By Robert Todd Carroll. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975. Pp. vii + 179. Gld. 52.50) Edward Stillingfleet is an interesting figure in the history of English philosophy, and his historical significance is not limited to his well-known controversy with Locke. In his thought one can trace a remarkable transition from the renascent Aristotelianism of Hooker, through a perceptive criticism of empiricism, to suggestions about the rational grounding of ideas that sound very like prefigurations of Kant. Yet it can hardly be claimed that he was a very good, let alone, great, philosopher. He left too many strings untied; he rarely followed insightful suggestions with developed, coherent argument; he was capable of muddling things he seemed to have gotten right. He often managed to oversimplify what he had learned from philosophers of the past. One need only compare what he says about natural law in his Irenicum with the treatment of the subject by earlier countrymen such as Hooker and Richard Holdsworth (to say nothing of authors such as Suarez and Vasquez) to fear that subtlety and precision had pretty much disappeared from philosophy in England by the middle of the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, though systematic philosopher he was not, there was a streak of, if not brilliance, persistent reasonableness running through his philosophical comments that makes him still worth reading and invites a book about his philosophy. Robert Carroll does well to concentrate on the theme of common sense and reasonableness in Stillingfleet'sthought, and he has provided us with a good and useful guide through Bishop Stillingfleet 's philosophy of religion. It is entirely appropriate that he should write about Stillingfleet 's philosophy of religion, because religion was of course his author's absolutely primary concern. His famous criticisms of Locke were motivated by no abstract interest in empiricism or the philosophy of mind but by his belief that the implications of Locke's philosophy were dangerous for true religion. After some opening discussion about influences (particularly Chillingworth 's) on Stillingfleet and the religious, political, and social context of his life and work, Carroll's book concentrates on what its author calls the "reasonableness of Christianity" and the "defense of natural religion" as these subjects are treated in StiUingfleet's writings. The author's most valuable work is to be found in these chapters dealing with central themes in Stillingfleet'sphilosophy of religion. Here he demonstrates his ability to put some system into highly unsystematic material. Not only was Stillingfleet not a very systematic philosopher, but apart from his sermons his writings are almost entirely occasional pieces, interventions in some ongoing controversy or other. Carroll gives a clear and organized account of his positions and of the issues involved in the controversies that occasioned them. I have noted that elements in his thought that are most likely to interest the historian of philosophy are not necessarily Stillingfleet 's central interests but more likely supplementary or more peripheral matters, such as his criticism of empiricist epistemology or his objections to Locke's suggestion that matter might think. The issues involved in these disputes are well summarized by Carroll, but one might wish that he had indulged in a little more extended analysis and criticism. Indeed, sometimes he seems not quite to give his author his due. For example, on the subject of Stillingfleet'sopposition to Locke's contention that it is possible for matter to think he maintains, "it was only by falsifying Locke's philosophy that Stillingfleet was able to claim with any degree of confidence that either Locke must renounce his 'Doctrine of Certainty by Ideas' or conclude that 'Matter cannot think'" (p. 141). How he falsifies Locke is by supposing that Locke clearly distinguished the ideas of body and spirit. In fact, Locke expressed uncertainty about ideas of corporeal and immaterial substance. Stillingfleet might have replied, so much the worse for Locke, and he undoubtedly wanted to push Locke further than he was prepared to be pushed; but, in any case, this is not where the force of the argument is to be found. Give up general ideas of materiai...