Abstract
Governments and non-govermental organizations (NGOs) that plan projects to conserve the environment and alleviate poverty often attempt to modify rural livelihoods by halting activities they judge to be destructive or inefficient and encouraging alternatives. Project planners typically do so without understanding how rural people themselves judge the value of their activities. When the alternatives planners recommend do not replace the value of banned activities, alternatives are unlikely to be adopted, and local people will refuse to participate. Human behavioral ecology and behavioral economics may provide useful tools for generating and evaluating hypotheses for how people value economic activities in their portfolios and potential alternatives. This is demonstrated with a case example from southwestern Madagascar, where plans to create a Mikea Forest National Park began with the elimination of slash-and-burn maize agriculture and the encouragement to plant labor-intensive manioc instead. Future park plans could restrict access to wild tuber patches, hunting small game, and fishing. The value of these activities is considered using observational data informed by optimal foraging theory, and experimental data describing people’s time preference and covariation perception. Analyses suggest that manioc is not a suitable replacement for maize for many Mikea because the two crops differ in terms of labor requirements, delay-to-reward, and covariation with rainfall. Park planners should promote wild tuber foraging and stewardship of tuber patches and the anthropogenic landscapes in which they are found. To conserve small game, planners must provide alternative sources of protein and cash. Little effort should be spent protecting lemurs, as they are rarely eaten and never sold.
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Notes
Kirby et al. (2002) reported median k/day and Pender reported k/year; I convert to k/month for comparison. In experiments of Kirby et al. (2002) with cash rewards, median k = 0.12/day, and for candy rewards, median k = 0.14/day. Pender (1996) conducted ten different experiments and reported k = 0.26–1.19/year.
A summary of the labor cost and time for each task: 360 min of foraging at 4.5 kcal/min; 15 min searching for firewood at 4.3 kcal/min; 90 min spent resting (1.2 kcal/min) while the tenrecs are being smoked; 240 min spent transporting the tenrecs to the market at 3.5 kcal/min; 120 min spent vending at resting metabolic rate (1.2 kcal/min); and finally, another 4 h at 3.5 kcal/min to transport the purchased manioc home [expenditure rates from Durnin and Passmore: collecting firewood (Durnin and Passmore 1967:51); resting (Durnin and Passmore 1967:39); walking at 4 kph (Durnin and Passmore 1967:42)].
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Acknowledgements
This paper has benefited greatly from comments by Pete Brosius, Flora Lu, Dan Steck, Sarah Hitchner, Dave Himmelfarb, Amber Huff, Elaina Lill, James Yount, Keri Goodman, and Ted Maclin. Research described in this paper was funded by Fulbright IIE (1997–1998), the National Science Foundation (1999), and travel grants from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1996), Ohio State University (2003, 2004), and the University of Georgia (2006). Thanks to the many research participants in the Mikea Forest and to Gervais Tantely, and to my colleagues at the Université de Toliara, Tsiazonera, Jaovola Tombo, and Tsimitamby.
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Tucker, B. Applying Behavioral Ecology and Behavioral Economics to Conservation and Development Planning: An Example from the Mikea Forest, Madagascar. Hum Nat 18, 190–208 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-007-9017-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-007-9017-x