Abstract
Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end—its final value—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. They support this claim by appealing to examples: Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln’s pen, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to Lady Diana’s dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. They contend that these things may have final value in virtue of their historical or societal roles. These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to establish the conditionalist position. But the widespread faith in such cases is, I believe, unjustified. This is because, surprisingly, the pen, the dress, and the coat cannot have final value. I argue that the problem is internal: these cases are ruled out by every conditionalist account of final value. Further, the problem with these well-known cases applies to most other supposed examples of extrinsic, final goods. Thus nearly all cases given to support the conditionalist view cannot succeed. I suggest a kind of diagnosis: I claim that these examples are best seen as instances of sentimental value, rather than final value. I close by providing a brief account of sentimental value and explain how it relates to instrumental, intrinsic, and final goodness.
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Notes
Philosophers speak of this issue in different ways: Bradley (2002), Dorsey (2012), Hurka (1998) and Kagan (1998) use “intrinsic value” to refer to the value something has as an end, or for its own sake, and some other term, like “intrinsic value proper” to refer to the value something has in virtue of its intrinsic features. Korsgaard (1983), Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000), Fletcher (2009) and Zimmerman (2001), (2010) use “intrinsic value” to refer to the value a thing has intrinsically, and some other term, like “final value” to refer to the value a thing has as an end, or for its own sake. I will follow Korsgaard’s usage in what follows and will translate other authors to speak in this way. This will not alter the propositions expressed; as these philosophers admit, these are simply different ways of speaking. For more on terminology see Dorsey (2012), Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005) and Zimmerman (2010).
Kagan (1998: 290) writes “Why should this type of value [i.e. intrinsic value] be of any more interest to us as value theorists than it would be to pick out the value that an object has on the basis of its relational properties alone? Or the value that an object has on the basis of its 17-place properties alone?” Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen ask “what is so special about value that supervenes on the object’s internal rather than relational properties…? One can easily see the normative relevance of the notion of a final value…but the concept of an intrinsic value seems to lack a special normative interest.” (2000: 127).
See e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000: 115–116, 127).
In general, I will say that a thing has value because of some feature F just in case F explains—in part or in whole—the value of that thing; we may say that F is a part (proper or otherwise) of what makes that thing good.
Korsgaard does, however, attempt to specify the bearers and source of this kind of value. On the Kantian theory she advances in her (1983) and (1986), there is one unconditional final good: the good, or rational, will. All conditional final goods have their value conferred upon them by the good will. Thus, the good will is the “source” of conditional final value. However, she has since modified her view: she claims now that nothing has final value unconditionally. See her (1996: 407).
There may be other ways to support the conditionalist program; see e.g. Dorsey’s (2012). I will not engage with such arguments here. My aim is to undermine the popular examples that have been given to support the conditionalist position; arguments like Dorsey’s make no appeal to particular cases.
Zimmerman later restricts his view; he claims that only the atoms of final value have non-derivative value. We should note also that Zimmerman is a Moorean; he defends a non-derivation view as a dialectically neutral account of final value before arguing that the final and intrinsic values of a thing must always coincide. However all Mooreans should accept the non-derivation thesis. This is because the Moorean position entails the non-derivation view: if the final value of a thing depends only on its intrinsic properties, then the final value of a thing cannot also depend on the value of something else.
I borrow this example from Zimmerman. See his (2010).
I use ‘because of’ as indicated in fn. 4.
We may wish to make an exception for complex goods: those things that have final value because of the values of their parts. We can then say that a thing has non-derivative value just in case it does not have its value in virtue of the value of anything outside of it—i.e. in virtue of anything that is not a part of it. This decision will not affect what follows: neither version of the non-derivation account is compatible with the claim that the pen, the dress, and the coat have final value.
Olson adds a clause to the view: he says that final value is a kind of non-derivative, non-contributory kind of value. I am skeptical that this addition is desirable; its omission will not be relevant here.
This is not ad hoc: these examples must be plausible. After all, the conditionalist cannot support his view by claiming that there is some case in which we could, implausibly, claim that a thing has final value because of its extrinsic features.
Some may say that we should be more liberal; we should say that something has non-derivative value just in case it does not have value only because something else has value. If final value is non-derivative in only this weaker sense, then our three examples are not excluded: their value depends on the value of other things but does not depend entirely upon the value of these things. But this defense cannot succeed, even if we admit that our three examples do not have value only because of the values of others things. This is because the proposed weakening of the non-derivation view renders it trivial: nearly every kind of value is non-derivative in this liberal sense. Instrumental goods, for example, will now have non-derivative value: the instrumental value of a knife, for example, depends not only on the value of certain outcomes, but also on the fact that the knife can bring about those outcomes. And what the knife can bring about depends upon the shape, curve, and other physical properties of the knife, as well as facts about the laws of nature. The proposed understanding of the non-derivation views therefore renders it toothless; it should be rejected.
I speak in terms of care here, but other philosophers have suggested other pro-attitudes. Some also speak not of the pro-attitudes that would be fitting but those that would be required, apt, or correct. These differences will not be relevant here.
Again, one could object that a thing is fitting to care about for its own sake just in case it is not fitting to care about only because it is fitting to care about something else (see fn. 14). But, as before, this would render the view we are considering untenable: things with instrumental value are not fitting to care about only because of the value of something else but also because they are connected to these other goods in the right way: it would be absurd to care about a because of the value of b if a and b are unrelated.
Bradley refines his account later, to deal with some possible counterexamples. But these modifications will not affect our argument.
Still, some examples may escape from this argument. E.g. O’Neil (1992) points to a forest “untouched by human hands.” It is not clear how we could apply our argument to such a case. And some of Kagan’s examples may be similarly immune. These cases will therefore have to be handled differently—and though I am confident that this is possible, I will not aim to address them here. I am content merely to show that the vast majority of examples given—and the examples most often discussed—do not give us any reason to separate final and intrinsic value.
See also Fletcher (2009).
Some conditionalists use the term “non-instrumental value” as a synonym for “final value.” (See e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000)). They might then insist that the distinction is exhaustive. But if the conditionalist wanted to talk only about non-instrumental value in this sense, then his thesis is neither controversial nor inconsistent with Mooreanism. Moore never claimed that all non-instrumental value is intrinsic, nor should any Moorean maintain such a view. There are simply too many kinds of non-instrumental values; it would be absurd to assume that, for example, being a good toaster is an intrinsic kind of goodness. Since I do not believe that the conditionalist is radically mistaken about his own position and what it is in conflict with, I will assume that when conditionalists speak of non-instrumental value this is merely a somewhat confusing way of specifying a particular kind of non-instrumental value, rather than the many kinds of value that fall under this label.
I do not mean to claim that no subjectivist program in meta-ethics can succeed. I mean to claim only that the very simple kind of subjectivism advanced here is not plausible when applied to final value.
See e.g. Brentano (2009: 18–19): “How are we to know that a thing is good? Should we say that whatever is loved or is capable of being loved is something that is worthy of love and therefore good? Obviously this would not be right, and it is almost impossible to comprehend how it could be that some have fallen into such an error. One person loves what another hates.”.
This phrase comes, of course, from Sidgwick, who used it in a slightly different context. See his (1981: 382).
Some may object that I have misunderstood the conditionalist: perhaps she did mean to speak of a kind of relative value. This cannot be, I think, for two reasons. First, consider the views provided. It would, I think, be absurd to claim e.g. that something is good for a person when it directly contributes to the overall value of the world. Second, and most significantly, consider the dialectic. Final value is nearly always introduced in opposition to the Moorean notion of intrinsic value: the conditionalist points to Moore’s concept, and explains that final value differs, in that it need not depend upon the intrinsic features of a thing (see e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000: 115–116) and Kagan (1998: 278–279)). But Moorean intrinsic value is impartial; indeed, Moore (infamously) rejected the notion of partial value entirely. So if final value can be understood in relation to the Moorean concept of intrinsic value, as the conditionalist claims, then it must be impartial. Further the conditionalist position has nearly always been presented in opposition to the Moorean view (see e.g. Korsgaard (1983: 173), Rønnow-Rasmussen (2011: 8)). But if final value is supposed to be a relative kind of value, then the conditionalist position is entirely consistent with Moore’s.
It may sometimes be a property of events, also—as in the case of anniversaries.
In this I agree with Hatzimoysis (2003).
The distinction between sentimental and instrumental value can be given additional support in two ways. First conceptually: if, as some philosophers do, we dispense with final value, we cannot speak of instrumental value—if nothing has value as an end, then nothing has value as a means. But we can still speak of sentimental value: this kind of value depends only on the existence of our sentiments. Second, we may justify the distinction epistemically: We cannot know the instrumental value of a thing unless we know the final value of what it brings about. But to know that a thing has sentimental value, for a person, we just need to know how it affects him.
Fletcher (2009) argues that sentimental value is a kind of final value. I believe this is because Fletcher assumes that sentimental value is either a kind of value as a means or a kind of value as an end. I think this is a mistake: the distinction between value as an end and value as a means is not exhaustive. And without this premise, I do not see how Fletcher’s argument can succeed.
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Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Peter Graham, Maya Eddon, Kim Soland, Bob Gruber, Jordan Kroll, Luis Oliveira, Ed Ferrier, Daniel McGloin, Dennis Kavlakoglu, and an anonymous referee from Philosophical Studies for their many thoughtful comments. I am especially grateful to Fred Feldman, Jean-Paul Vessel, and Lisa Tucker for all their help on this project.
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Tucker, M. The pen, the dress, and the coat: a confusion in goodness. Philos Stud 173, 1911–1922 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0584-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0584-0