Abstract
Reimer (Neuroethics 2008) believes that how we use language to characterize psychopathy may affect our judgments of moral responsibility. If we say a psychopath has a disorder we may reduce their responsibility for moral failure. If we say a psychopath is merely different, we may not reduce their responsibility. Vincent (Neuroethics 2008) argues that if this were the case, a diagnosis of disorder would be both necessary and sufficient to reduce the responsibility of some agent for moral failure. Vincent presents two examples to suggest that a disorder is neither necessary nor sufficient to exculpate an individual for moral failure: childhood and hypomania. Vincent suggests instead that our judgments of moral responsibility ought to be based on the individual’s capacity for moral agency. I will side with Vincent in this debate, but argue that the example she uses, hypomania, does not work. I will argue that a diagnosis of hypomania, part of Bipolar II Disorder, is sufficient to exculpate an individual for some moral failure. This is because there are responsibility-relevant capacities missing: the capacities for self-awareness and to control ones abilities. Without these capacities, the individual is not a responsible moral agent. Vincent will need to provide an alternative example to show that the presence of a disorder is not sufficient to exculpate an individual for moral failure. Whilst our use of language is important, that use reflects our judgments of the individual’s capacities for moral agency. Responsibilities are determined not only by capacities, but by the right kind of capacities, and this should be reflected in our moral judgments, and our use of language.
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Notes
Dell-Osso, Pini et al [13] conclude that a “large proportion of patients with bipolar disorder lack insight into having an illness” [13: 321]. Their focus was on the depressed state, but since they found the same in mania patients I think it safe to assume that hypomania also involves a lack of insight.
This may imply that we are not responsible for any action, because a significant amount of luck is involved in most events. Most moral failures and successes involve a degree of luck. As Nagel [15] notes, a concentration camp guard may have led a harmless life had he lived in 1980s Switzerland, rather than Nazi Germany. The luck involved in hypomania, however, relates to internal control, not control of or contribution to some situation. The luck is focussed on agency itself, not the available options to employ our agency. I set aside problems with agency itself for the moment.
Not that this is to imply that blame is a finite commodity, and by you accepting some, he has some taken away. But his disorder has to be taken into account when attributing responsibility. His responsibility would be reduced, even if you were not blamed at all.
This is rather misleading but only intended to link language, through meaning, to truth. Davidson proposed a theory to show that we understand the meaning of languages by understanding the conditions under which statements could be true. Davidson’s theory is an empirical one to be tested against facts.
I have used a particular theory of truth, called the disquotational theory, where ‘George has a disorder’ is true when George has a disorder. Other theories are available, such as the correspondence theory. Where ‘George has a disorder’ is true when it corresponds with facts about the world, and false otherwise.
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I would like to thank Nicole Vincent and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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J. Turner, A. Are Disorders Sufficient for Reduced Responsibility?. Neuroethics 3, 151–160 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-009-9041-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-009-9041-0