Discussion
Misleading observable analogues in paleontology

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Abstract

Carman argues, in ‘The electrons of the dinosaurs and the center of the Earth’, that we may have more reason to be realists about dinosaurs than about electrons, because there are plenty of observable analogues for dinosaurs but not for electrons. These observable analogues severely restrict the range of plausible ontologies, thus reducing the threat of underdetermination. In response to this argument, I show that the observable analogues for ancient organisms are a mixed epistemic blessing at best, and I discuss some cases from the history of paleontology in which the observable analogues—ducks, shrimp, and lizards—have led scientists into persisting error. I also give reasons for thinking that underdetermination will be just as serious a problem in historical as in experimental science. I conclude that Carman has not succeeded in showing that dinosaurs ‘come off better’ than electrons.

Section snippets

The past vs. the tiny—some clarifications

Carman rightly points out that the distinction between things that are unobservable in virtue of their small size, and things that are unobservable because they existed or occurred in the past, is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is not exclusive because many things, such as the electrons of the dinosaurs, are both tiny and past. It is not exhaustive because some presently existing things, such as the center of the earth, are inaccessible for reasons having nothing to do with size. This is

Misleading observable analogues in paleontology

One problem with Carman’s line of argument against (b) is that observable analogues (usually artifacts and living organisms) are something of a mixed blessing in paleontology. Analogies between ancient organisms and living organisms have often misled scientists in the past. I will use three case studies from the history of paleontology to illustrate the various ways in which analogies, though indispensable, have led scientists into persisting errors. In these cases, the misleading analogues

Underdetermination

But perhaps underdetermination poses less of a problem in historical science than in experimental science. Indeed, one reason for thinking that my earlier (2004) discussion is incomplete is that we cannot fully evaluate the abductive arguments for realism without considering the underdetermination problem. That is because some critics of realism object to those abductive arguments by insisting that for any successful scientific theory T, there is at least one incompatible empirically equivalent

Conclusion

Philosophers of science have tended to neglect such comparative questions as whether historical realism is any more or less well supported by the arguments than experimental realism. I am grateful to Carman for seeking to advance this discussion by presenting an argument whose premise states a relevant difference between the past and the tiny—namely, that we have an abundance of observable analogues for dinosaurs, but not for electrons. Even though I hope to have shown here (in Sections 2

Acknowledgements

Section 2 of this paper is based in part on work that I presented at the International Society for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology at Quinnipiac, CT, in July 2001. I also received some valuable feedback on the case studies discussed in that section from participants at a philosophy of biology workshop at Florida State University in March 2002. Thanks finally to Kate Kovenock for her help with this paper.

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