Notes
According to the representational theory of consciousness (e.g. Dretske 1995; Crane 1998; Tye 2000; Byrne 2001), the mark of the mental is intentionality or representationality; according to the theory of phenomenal intentionality (e.g. Horgan and Tienson 2002; Pitt 2004; Farkas 2008), it is phenomenal consciousness.
References
Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism defended. The Philosophical Review, 110(2), 199–240.
Crane, T. (1998). Intentionality as the mark of the mental. In A. O’Hear (Ed.), Current issues in philosophy of mind (pp. 229–251). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Farkas, K. (2008). The subject’s point of view. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, G. (1990/1997). The intrinsic quality of experience. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (Eds.), Nature of consciousness (pp. 663–675). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Horgan, T., & Tienson, J. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings (pp. 520–533). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to think that P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(1), 1–36.
Rorty, R. (1970). Incorrigibility as the mark of the mental. Journal of Philosophy, 67, 406–424.
Tye, M. (1992). Visual qualia and visual content. In T. Crane (Ed.), The contents of experience (pp. 158–177). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color and content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Tözsér, J. Mental Realism Reloaded. J Gen Philos Sci 40, 337–340 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9108-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-009-9108-y