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EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science pp 299–310Cite as

Carnap and the Perils of Ramseyfication

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Abstract

Frank Ramsey’s proposed regimentation of the theoretical terms of scientific theories has been much discussed recently as an articulation of the position of “structural realism”, a position intended to take its place between scientific realism and its denials. My concern here is different. It is to consider what the now standard criticism of the method of “ramseyfication” – based on Newman’s objection to Russell’s structuralism – means for Rudolf Carnap’s adoption and development of that method from the perspective of Carnap’s own philosophical programme and whether it could accommodate the objection.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Carnap (1959), (1963, §24C-D), (1966 [1995, Chs. 26 and 28]).

  2. 2.

    See Carnap (1966 [1995, 270–271]) for various formulations.

  3. 3.

    Carnap (1950b) appeared independently of Feigl (1950a) and the exchange about the latter in Philosophy of Science.

  4. 4.

    Carnap’s awareness of the possibility of incommensurable frameworks was expressed fully explicitly in Carnap (1936), but it was already implicit in his Logische Syntax (1934).

  5. 5.

    See Carnap (1950a, 3–5) and Carus (2007) for further discussion.

  6. 6.

    See Carnap (1961, 2000) and the discussion in Psillos (2000a, 157–8).

  7. 7.

    See Psillos (1999, Ch.3; 2000a,b).

  8. 8.

    That the Carnap sentence R(TC)- > (TC) is not happily represented as characterising scientific realism seems to have been recognised by Psillos since (see below).

  9. 9.

    Psillos (2009) argues that Carnap preferred intentional interpretations, but both are, for him, legitimate.

  10. 10.

    See Carnap (1950b [1956, 206–207]).

  11. 11.

    Here I disregard certain formulations in (the first edition of) Philosophical Foundations of Physics that Carnap later withdrew as misleading (see Psillos 1999, 58–61).

  12. 12.

    Here “range over” replaces “extend beyond” in the published version; in so replacing the latter I follow Psillos’ personal communication.

  13. 13.

    On the notion of the relative a priori in early logical empiricism, see Friedman (1994).

  14. 14.

    Carnap only used the unqualified expression “logical term”.

  15. 15.

    See Ryckman (1992).

  16. 16.

    I am indebted to Bill Demopoulos for spelling out this objection to me in correspondence.

  17. 17.

    For discussion and correspondence I wish to thank Richard Creath, William Demopoulos, Michael Friedman and Stathis Psillos.

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  1. University of Manchester, Manchester, England

    Thomas Uebel

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fac. Filosofía, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Planta Sótano, Edificio B, Madrid, 28040, Spain

    Mauricio Suárez

  2. Dipto. Filosofia, Universita di Roma, Tre, Via Ostiense 234, Roma, 00144, Italy

    Mauro Dorato

  3. Political Science, London School of Economics &, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom

    Miklós Rédei

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Uebel, T. (2009). Carnap and the Perils of Ramseyfication. In: Suárez, M., Dorato, M., Rédei, M. (eds) EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_26

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