Volume 3, Number 6
June 2009
www.thereasoner.org
ISSN 1757-0522
Contents
§1
Editorial
§2
Features
§3
News
§4
What’s Hot in . . .
§5
Introducing . . .
Rad even. Mike had a lot of interesting, and to me entirely new, things to say about double standards and deceit, as well as similarly interesting things to say about
1 the people who prospered by them. I recall reading an
interview with him in Thrasher (a skateboarding mag2 azine) where he said (something pretty much like) the
following: It was only when he was an outcast amongst
6 the liars, when “they were kicking him face down in
the mud”, that he came alive. He came alive at that
12 point because he knew it was then that he was close to
the truth, and the truth was what he was interested in.
13
This brings me to this month’s
issue of The Reasoner, to whose
§7 Jobs
18 editors I remain indebted for the invitation to write this guest editorial.
§8 Courses and Studentships
19 Hello. My name is Sebastian, and I
am your Guest Editor this month.
Wonderful! The business of philosophy is to distinguish truth-hood
from false-hood. Good. In light of this, it is unsurpris§1
ing that philosophers have never been particularly popEditorial
ular with people who rely on lies for their power or for
their livelihood. If you are planning on doing something
In the Before Time, the Long Long Ago, I rode a skate- God-awful for some insane reason or other, then the last
board. A lot. I was, I suppose, good enough at it. I people on Earth you want running around are a bunch of
practiced just about every waking hour, and I paid at- irritating philosopher types encouraging open and enertention to the professionals in the business. One pro- getic debate. That sort of thing is likely to lead to all
fessional to whom I paid a great deal of attention was sorts of awkward questions like “Hang on a minute . . . I
Mike Vallely. When I was young, I wanted to be Mike thought Bin Laden hated Saddam Hussein to death on
Vallely. I even shaved my head. Mike was not (and account of Saddam being, in Bin Laden’s view, a secis not) just a skateboarder. He was also an exhilarat- ular heathen?”. Anyhow, I suppose that this is why I
ingly uncompromising loud mouth. Mike was punk. never bothered reading Heidegger. Instead of fleeing
§6
Events
15
1
ID : Definitely silence.
SSG: So you have come from art to philosophy.
ID: Yes.
SSG: How do you see the relationship between philosophy and other disciplines, including art and the sciences and so forth?
ID: The kind of philosophy that I liked when I started
studying philosophy, and the kind I study still . . . was
philosophy related to the sciences. Because there hadn’t
been a tradition of analytic philosophy [in Holland], the
philosophers who published in analytic journals were
typically scientists. So my supervisor was a chemist.
My teacher for logic was a mathematician, others were
physicists . . . and that’s quite typical for at least that
generation of analytic philosophers, at least in Holland.
And it still is.
SSG: Okay . . .
ID: So in relation to the arts, if you want to study philosophy of art then there’s a type of philosophy which
is, or pretends to be, related to the arts. Continental philosophy is, I mean that’s what these people think right!?
They have—what they think of as—a literary approach
to philosophy. But that’s certainly not what I like! I
mean, I was not looking in philosophy for what I already
knew how to find in art, in music especially. So for me
there was no relation between the arts and philosophy.
Except at one point I was interested in aesthetics—in
analytic aesthetics—for which it is good to know a little
bit about art.
[laughs]
SSG: Do you look strictly within philosophy for research ideas and so on?
ID: No no, I don’t think so. Especially in the last
five years, I’ve been looking quite a bit at psychology
papers, and a little bit at what has been happening in
economics.
SSG: That’s certainly very topical . . .
ID: Yeah!
[laughs]
That was also a little bit of a coincidence, because in
Rotterdam, which is where I was before I came to Leuven, for four years, there I was a member of a group that
was basically a philosophy of economics group. That’s
basically it, I mean I’m also very interested in physics,
but I just don’t have the right backgroud to do anything
related to that! For me it’s a no-go area . . .
SSG: Ha! Fair enough. So philosophy of economics
aside for a moment, what other issues do you think more
philosophers could and should be interested about than
we are at present?
ID: Mmmm . . . that’s very . . . that’s very hard . . . So
this sounds much more like general advice, and not the
sort of advice that I think I would need to give to anyone
who is reading this . . .
[laughs]
Nazi Germany like a right-thinking positivist, he started
goose-stepping around Freiburg. “Here is a man . . . ”, I
thought to myself, “. . . who is a little bit dodgy. A man
not to be trusted to shoot entirely straight”.
In philosophy we need to shoot straight. Shooting
straight is how we start out on our way at arriving at the
truth. Aiming might not always be a sufficient condition, alas, but it is usually a necessary one (alas twice).
Being an articulate, uncompromising, and honest pursuer of the truth is unlikely to make you popular with
dishonest pseudo-intellectual posers. But who wants
these people as friends anyhow? This was Mike’s point,
and it is a good one still. Now I am no longer a skateboarder, I am a philosopher. And now I want to be Igor
Douven.
Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson
Formal Epistemology Project, University of Leuven
§2
Features
Interview with Igor Douven
Igor Douven is the Director of the Formal Epistemology
Project, and a professor of philosophy at the Centre for
Logic and Analytical Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven.
Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson: How did you get into
philosophy, in the beginning?
Igor Douven: I started quite late.
I wanted to be a professional musician. I played piano, but then got
an injury in the fifth finger of my
right hand. So now I can play the
piano, but not professionally any
more. Then at 27 I started studying philosophy. But I had been interested in philosophy since I was
a teenager. So if I had not started out as a musician, I
think that I would have gone straight into philosophy.
SSG: You are obviously still very interested in music...?
ID: Yes!
SSG: Do you ever use music as an inspiration for
your philosophy?
ID: No!
SSG: Not at all?
ID: Ha! No no, not at all. It has nothing at all to do
with my philosophical work.
[laughs]
SSG: Inspiration aside, do you ever use music as a
backing track as you work? Or do you prefer complete
silence?
2
. . . but of course in epistemology, and also in philosophy of language . . . I don’t know, but certainly in epistemology, there is a growth of formal approaches, that
we are now using, and many other people all over the
world are now using, and I think that this is very valuable. So if you look at mainstream epistemology, then
that’s still very often just . . . I don’t know what you call
it in English . . . intuition mongering!
[laughs]
SSG: That will do!
ID: Yeah, so it’s the methodology that I would very
much like to propagate, or to popularise. As for topics,
I think that that’s really one of the hard things in our
business. To come up with topics that are worthwhile
investigating, and to come up with new ones every one
or two years or so. I mean when you want to keep enjoying your research, you have to find new things . . .
SSG: Of course . . .
ID: Some people I think, can work all of their lives,
just doing . . . conditionals! Which is fine if you can do
that. But I can’t.
SSG: When you do hit about a research project then,
what is your process of paper writing? Do you just have
an initial idea that you then work out as you go, or do
you have a proper map worked out beforehand?
ID: It’s something in between. I think that I have
at least the structure of the paper pretty clearly in my
mind’s eye, so to speak. But very rarely is that also how
the paper is going to look!
[laughs]
SSG: Even the best laid plans, right?
ID: Of course I’m never worried about that. At some
point you just know that this is how it works.
SSG: Moving around research projects within disciplines is one thing, but what about moving around disciplines! Do you see yourself doing philosophy forever?
ID: Yeah. I think so, yeah yeah. I mean the obvious
other choices, the things that other people in academia
sometimes do, where you become the Dean or something like that, or higher up. You don’t do any research
but you’re the administrator . . . I certainly, wouldn’t
want to do that! What we have been doing a little bit,
and what I would certainly like to do more, is this cooperation with Sarah [Sarah Verbrugge—in the psychology department at Leuven], she was on the formal epistemology project, but now has her own project [in] experimental psychology. So if I have more ideas in that
direction in the future, then I would be very happy doing
that. So if it’s interesting and you can continue with it,
then if in that case, even if it’s not called philosophy, if
instead it’s called experimental psychology, then there I
wouldn’t mind.
SSG: So what is next then, on the research agenda?
ID: There are a couple of things of course. There
is some new research on conditionals, which I think
still looks promising. I was very happy with the work
that came out of the collaboration with Sarah, so now
there are some people interested, Richard [Richard Dietz], Helen [Helen De Cruz], and our new postdoc who
is coming, David Etlin [from MIT]—they are all interested in doing experimental work. That’s one thing.
Then there is also some work on judgment aggregation,
along with simulation approaches.
SSG: That will keep you busy for a while!
[laughs]
ID: Yeah . . .
SSG: Which other academics, philosophers or otherwise, do you find most inspirational or respectable? Be
it their methodology or their results or whatever?
ID: Timothy Williamson, I mean, he’s so committed.
And of course he has incredible abilities right? Also Bas
van Fraassen’s work is something that I really admire.
And I like the early Putnam a lot!
SSG: What did you want to be as a child?
ID: I wanted to be a musician from very early on!
That’s typical of most people who want to be a musician, at least if they have studied music. Most people
who are serious about that have wanted to be a musician from a very early age. So as far as I can remember,
from the age of around seven or eight, I wanted to become a musician.
SSG: Okay, and if you could be a superhero, what
would your superpower be?
[laughs]
ID: Um . . . maybe you have something bigger in
mind, but let’s say, you know, playing the piano really
perfectly right!?
[laughs]
SSG: I’m not sure of that’s a superpower . . . so much
...?
ID: Well, perfection in that profession is really very
rare! It has been accomplished by very few people. I
can think of two pianists who are really perfect, maybe
three. It’s really incredibly difficult, even if it doesn’t
look incredibly difficult!
SSG: So where can we catch you next? Where are
your upcoming speaking events?
ID: There is Dusseldorf and St Andrews, although
these will have been and gone by the time people read
this. There are also many things happening here in
Leuven! There is Chris’s [Chris Kelp’s] epistemology
workshop, where I’ll be speaking. The conditionals
workshop with Richard. There’s a workshop on the lottery paradox in Glasgow, and there is a conference on
decision theory in Groningen. And there’s a conference
in Bristol, on conditionals . . .
SSG: On metacognition?
ID: Yes!
SSG: So do you have any parting words of advice and
wisdom to the readers of The Reasoner?
ID: Yes. If you’re doing formal epistemology, then
keep doing what you’re doing. If your not, then start!
3
(D7)
SSG: You can catch Igor at:
The European Epistemology Network Conference, July
4–5, 2009, Formal Epistemology Project, Leuven.
Conditionals and Conditionalisation Sep 4–6, 2009,
Formal Epistemology Project, Leuven.
Workshop on Metacognition, Belief Change and Conditionals, 11-12 September 2009, Department of Philosophy, Institute for Advanced Studies, University of
Bristol, UK.
Progic 2009, 17–19 September, Groningen.
D(A) = D(the truth value of B is True)
The transitivity of identity applied to (D5) and (D7)
yields:
(D8)
D(A) = D(B)
If we are to use (Sub) in order to reach (D7), we have
to interpret (D6) as an identity between referring definite descriptions. Drai concedes that much:
[. . . ] the two expressions ‘the truth value of
A’ and ‘the truth value of B’ are co-referential
not in virtue of any assumption about the
references of the embedded sentences A and
B. They are co-referential because they are
proper names which have the same reference:
True or False. [. . . ] the difficult question
of whether truth values are objects is not addressed by the slingshot argument, but assumed by it. Given the assumption that truth
values are objects, the slingshot argument
proves that they are the references of sentences. (2002: 200)
Bogus singular terms and substitution salva
denotatione
Take two sentences A and B to be doxastically synonymous (A ∼d B) iff it is not possible for someone who
understands A and B, to believe one of them without
believing the other. Assume the following two principles:
(Sub) Substitution of co-referential expressions within a sentence doesn’t change the
reference of the whole sentence.
Another thing to observe is that the passage from
(D1) to (D6) isn’t purely logical. If there are no objects that are truth-values, then (D6) will be false even
if (D1) is true.
On Drai’s account, we should read (D2) as:
(Dox sen )
Doxastically synonymous sentences are co-referential.
Relying on (Sub) and (Dox sen ), Drai (2002: The
Slingshot Argument: an Improved Version, Ratio (new
series), XV(2)) developed an argument to the effect that
any two true sentences refer to the same thing, if sentences refer at all (see also Urbaniak, “Slingshot arguments: two versions”, The Reasoner 3(4); “Doxastic
synonymy vs. logical equivalence”, The Reasoner 3(5)).
Drai’s doxastic slingshot argument starts with three
premises:
(D20 ) (i) It is impossible for a competent
speaker to believe that A and not to believe
that the truth value of A is True, and (ii) it is
impossible for a competent speaker to believe
that the truth value of A is True and not to
believe that A.
Claim (ii) seems quite compelling. Arguably, to accept
(ii) one has to embrace the existence of truth values and
in such a case one has to believe that A, if one believes
(D2) A ∼d the truth value of A is True
that the truth value of A is True.
Alas, (i) does not seem equally convincing. In order
(D3) B ∼d the truth value of B is True
to believe that the value of A is True in the sense reAn application of (Dox sen ) to (D2) and (D3) yields quired for the argument to work, one has to believe that
(D(A) is the denotation of A; since there is no threat there is a unique object which is the value of A, there
is a unique object which is True, and these objects are
of ambiguity, I don’t use quotation marks):
identical.
(D4) D(A) = D(the truth value of A is True)
This being the case, it seems that even if we assume
that truth values actually exist and behave as expected,
(D5) D(B) = D(the truth value of B is True)
(D20 ) is still false. (D20 ) is a modal claim and to falsify
it, it is enough to indicate that no matter whether truth
(D1) entails:
values really exist, there is a possible situation where
someone believes that A and yet disbelieves the claim
(D6) the truth value of A = the truth value
that the truth value of A is True. Suppose I am a radical
of B
nominalist who believes that A. Yet, I have pretty strong
Thanks to (D6), (Sub) allows to substitute ‘the truth feelings against the claim that there is a unique object
value of B’ for ‘the truth value of A’ in (D4).
which is the truth value of A, or that there is a unique
(D1)
A∧B
4
object that is called ‘True’. So I do not believe that
the truth value of A is True in the sense required by the
argument.
Drai defends (D2) as follows:
of all kinds of cognition, and try a completely modelbased rewriting of it.
The first idea: internally, there is no difference between “true” models and “wrong” models. Mainly, we
do not know in advance (sometimes—for centuries),
Anyone who understands the notions of truth
which parts of our models or theories are true, and
value and True, knows that to say [that the
which are not. Sometimes we know that our model
truth value of A is True] is no more and no
is “wrong” in many respects, but it remains useful,
less than to say [that A]. (2002: 202)
nevertheless. Many people may continue believing
in an overthrown model or theory for a long time—
This sounds misleading: my commitment when I be- and continue acting accordingly. Hence, the somelieve that A is different from the commitment I make what paradoxical term—“wrong” knowledge. This corwhen I believe that the truth value of A is True, if the responds well to “The Dappled World” picture (Nancy
claim is to be understood literally.
Cartwright), see Paul Teller (2004: How We Dapple the
It remains to explain why one might in fact initially World, Philosophy of Science, 71(4): 425–447). Thus,
feel that (D2) and (D3) are true. From the nominal- for the philosophy of cognition, “wrong” knowledge
ist standpoint, definite descriptions that seem to refer should be as prominent a subject as the “true” knowlto abstract objects may serve slightly different purpose. edge.
For instance, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, a representative of
And, if we wish to answer non-trivial questions like
Lvov-Warsaw school (1966: Gnosiology. The Scien- as “Is it true that quarks really exist?”, then our phitific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, trans. by O. losophy of cognition shouldn’t introduce the notion of
Wojtasiewicz), a radical nominalist, insisted that singu- “truth” too early, as something primary, and therefore,
lar terms that on the face of it name something, but do mystical. Truth is emerging later, on top of cognition,
not name concrete individuals, do not name anything. it doesn’t reside at the bottom of it. We can derive
For him, their role, insofar as their use is meaningful, ontologies and truths only by analyzing invariants of
is to abbreviate or reword some expressions that do not a successful model evolution—as I tried to propose in
contain such abstract noun phrases.
“Is Scientific Modeling an Indirect Methodology?” (The
On this approach, there is a reading of ‘the truth value Reasoner, 3(1)).
of A is True’ which allows also a nominalist to believe
In terms of theories, a similar idea was proposed as
it. It is the sense in which ‘the truth value of A’ and the “Deepening Maxim” by Paul Thagard (2007: Co‘True’ are not interpreted objectually as expressions that herence, truth, and the development of scientific knowlin fact refer to objects, and the whole sentence is treated edge, Philosophy of Science, 74, 28-47):
just as a fancy and ontologically misleading way of saying that A is true. But in this interpretation, the slingIf a theory not only maximizes explanatory
shot does not work, because the descriptions that occur
coherence, but also broadens its evidence
in (D6) are just bogus singular terms, and thus (Sub)
base over time and is deepened by explanacannot be applied.
tions of why the theory’s proposed mechanism works, then we can reasonably conclude
Rafal Urbaniak
that the theory is at least approximately true.
Philosophy, Ghent & Gdansk University
(41).
And by Jeffrey Alan Barrett (2008: Approximate
Towards a Model-Based Model of Cogni- Truth and Descriptive Nesting. Erkenntnis, 68(2): 213–
224)—as “a notion of local probable approximate truth
tion
in terms of descriptive nesting relations between current
and subsequent theories” (213).
The second idea: models are the ultimate results of
all (scientific, non-scientific, and anti-scientific) kinds
of cognition. Therefore, philosophy of cognition should
start with the following fundamental distinction: there
are models, and there are means of model-building.
Laws of nature and theories are useful only as a means
of model-building—“The Toolbox of Science”—as put
by Mauricio Suárez and Nancy Cartwright (2008: Theories: Tools versus Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39: 62-81).
In data mining, people are working (sometimes with almost no theory behind them) with a variety of computer
models that are extremely useful in practice, but hardly
resemble their target objects. “All models are wrong,
but some are useful.”—as put by the statistician George
E. P. Box (1979: Robustness in the strategy of scientific
model building. Robustness in statistics, 201–236).
This wide experience with “theory-less, wrong and
useful” models is provoking three radical ideas. None
of them is completely new, the novelty might be the
composition proposed below: let’s consider philosophy
5
The third idea: to cover all kinds of cognition, the notion of model should be defined as broadly as possible:
a model is anything that is (or could be) used, for some
purpose, in place of something else. To put it somewhat paradoxically: models are tiny fragments of the
Universe possibly usable (for some purpose) in place
of other fragments (or, even in place of the entire Universe). Mathematical models, fictional worlds, mental
structures and processes are included here, of course.
Among philosophers, this broadest possible notion of
model was stated by Paul Teller (2001: Twilight of the
Perfect Model Model. Erkenntnis, 55: 393–415). But,
among computer scientists, it can be traced back to Marvin Minsky (1965: Matter, Mind and Models. Proceedings of IFIP Congress 65, 1: 45-49).
Minsky applies the notion of model in a way, that is
very natural from computer scientist’s point of view, but
seems not very popular among philosophers. I would
put this “robotic ontology” as follows:
In my head, I have a model of the world (an incomplete one, incoherent, inconsistent, in part fictional,
containing all my knowledge, beliefs, dreams etc.). And
I’m acting according to this model. In this model, other
persons are believed to have their own models of the
world (in some respects—different from my model).
And they are acting according to their models. I may
know these models more or less, and in this way I can
predict—to some extent—people’s behavior. Thus, my
model of the world may contain “models of models”—
for example, a simplified model of your model of the
world.
And, to complete the picture: how about modelbuilding in philosophy? Perhaps, many will agree with
Peter Godfrey Smith (2006: Theories and Models in
Metaphysics. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, XIV:
4-19):
unified notion of model. Or, according to the account
given by Eric Schwitzgebel (2006: Belief, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), there are several competing approaches to explaining “what is it to believe”.
Couldn’t these complications be caused by the idea of
“propositional attitude”—the idea that separate propositions are believed in, and not entire models, theories,
or fragments of them?
If it’s true that models are the ultimate results of cognition, then shouldn’t we try reordering the field, starting with the notion of model? In this way, couldn’t we
obtain a unified and more productive picture—a modelbased model of cognition?
Karlis Podnieks
Computer Science, University of Latvia
§3
News
How Should Research be Organised?
Donald Gillies (2009): How Should Research be Organised? College Publications.
This book is divided into three parts. Part 1 presents
a criticism of the Research Assessment Exercise (or
RAE) which has been used to organise research in the
UK from 1986 to 2008. The RAE is based on peer review, and the criticism consists in pointing out a surprising flaw in peer review. Many works which in retrospect are seen as constituting major advances were
judged by contemporaries of the researcher, his peers,
to be valueless. An example of this is provided by
Frege whose Begriffsschrift was judged in 6 contemporary reviews to have made no advance in the subject.
. . . much metaphysical work, especially of the
Nowadays it is seen as having introduced mathematicontemporary systematic kind, might best be
cal logic in its modern form. Another example, from a
understood as model-building, . . . (4).
completely different field, is provided by Semmelweis,
a doctor who carried out research into childbed fever.
However,
Semmelweis’s explanation of the cause of the disease
was broadly correct from a modern point of view, and
It would be foolish to suppose that such a hyhe recommended antiseptic precautions (doctors washpothesis could be applied to all metaphysical
ing their hands in chlorinated lime before examining
discussion, but it might be true of an imporpatients) which greatly reduced the death rate from the
tant part of the field. (5).
disease, as he showed statistically. Yet Semmelweis’s
ideas were not accepted by his contemporaries, and the
But how about trying this “foolish” step?
If none of the above theses is completely new, then— antiseptic precautions he recommended were only genwhat is missing? My general impression: despite many erally adopted in hospitals more than twenty years after
brilliant insights, generated by philosophers for many his research.
years, the field (philosophy of cognition) remains unA Kuhnian explanation is given of these historical
ordered for too long a time. For example, according failures of peer review. Researchers always work within
to the account given by Roman Frigg and Stephan Hart- a paradigm, and hence any new development which
mann (2006: Models in Science, Stanford Encyclopedia contradicts the paradigm is likely to be regarded as misof Philosophy), there is still no generally acknowledged taken, even though, with hindsight, it constituted a ma6
jor advance.
Researchers like Frege and Semmelweis who make
major advances which are not at first appreciated by
their contemporaries are referred to as pink diamonds,
since such diamonds are about a thousand times more
valuable than ordinary clear diamonds, but might be
mistaken for valueless flawed diamonds by a careless
sorter. The mistake of the RAE then is that it is likely to
throw away pink diamonds.
Part 2 of the book criticises the new system (the Research Excellence Framework, or REF) which has been
introduced in the UK to replace the RAE. Where this
does not continue to use peer review, it uses metrics
such as citation indices. A citation index judges the
merit of a research paper by the number of times it is
cited by other researchers. However, the papers of pink
diamonds like Frege and Semmelweis whose work is
not appreciated by their contemporaries will not be cited
by their contemporaries. So they will do badly on metrics such as citation indices as well as on peer review.
So the new system has exactly the same fault as the one
it replaces. It is likely to result in pink diamonds being
thrown away, and hence in progress in research being
held up.
Part 3 outlines an alternative system of research organisation designed to avoid the faults of the RAE and
REF. The main idea is that research can be improved by
the indirect strategy of rewarding teaching.
Journal of Argument & Computation, which aims to
promote the interaction and cross-fertilisation between
the fields of argumentation theory and computer science. It will be of interest to researchers in the fields
of artificial intelligence, multi-agent systems, computer
science, logic, philosophy, argumentation theory, psychology, cognitive science, game theory and economics.
Topics of interest span a wide spectrum of topics, ranging from argumentation-based techniques to nonmonotonic reasoning and game-based semantics of programs,
to computer-assisted deliberation and argument-based
coordination in multi-agent systems.
Argument & Computation will publish three issues
per year to start with. The journal is accepting submissions now, and the first issue is due to appear in early
2010. The journal will accept full articles, describing
novel theoretical or applied research in any of the areas
of interest; reviews, condensing and critiquing an appropriate subfield of research; system descriptions, focusing on implementations (typically offering online access or downloadable code) and letters, providing pithy
polemic on burning issues.
Iyad Rahwan
Institute of Informatics, British University in Dubai &
School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh
Konstanz-Leuven Series in Formal Epistemology, 6 April
Donald Gillies
Science and Technology Studies, UCL
The Bi-Annual Konstanz-Leuven Series in Formal
Epistemology takes place once in spring in Konstanz
and once in fall in Leuven. It is jointly organized by Igor
Douven (Leuven) and Franz Huber (Konstanz). At the
first meeting at the University of Konstanz, Igor Douven
and Richard Dietz from Leuven were invited as speakers.
In the first talk “Lotteries, Assertion, and the Pragmatics of Belief” Igor Douven confronted the audience
with the fact that the “standard” formulation of our epistemic goal, saying that we should aim at believing only
what is true and at believing all that is true, implies that
in the standard lottery case we should believe all but
one lottery proposition. This is not only counterintuitive, but generates a problem for the rational credibility account of assertion, because lottery propositions are
generally held to be unassertable. Douven explained the
unassertability of lottery propositions with reference to
Gricean conversation rules. Furthermore, he argued that
something like Gricean conversation rules do not only
apply to assertion, but also to believing. This led him to
give the following reformulation of our epistemic goal:
We should aim at believing only what is right and at
believing all that is right, where a sentence S is “right”
iff it is true and has only true conventional implicatures.
Journal of Argument & Computation
In recent years, a substantial and well-established technical literature has emerged at the intersection between
Argumentation Theory and Computer Science. On the
one hand, formal models of argumentation are making
significant and increasing contributions to Computer
Science in general, and Artificial Intelligence in particular, from defining semantics of logic programs, to implementing persuasive medical diagnostic systems, to
specifying negotiation protocols in multi-agent systems.
On the other hand, Computer Science has also made an
impact on Argumentation Theory and Practice, for example by providing formal tools for argument annotation, analysis, evaluation, and visualisation.
A testimony to the emergence of this new field is the
appearance of various journal special issues in recent
years (e.g., in the AI Journal and IEEE Intelligent Systems), the commencement of a new biannual conference
on the Computational Modelling of Argument, and a
number of successful workshop series (namely CMNA
and ArgMAS).
Publisher Taylor & Francis has recently launched the
7
As lottery propositions have false implicatures, it follows that we should not believe them. Thus, in contrast
to the standard epistemic goal, the reformulated epistemic goal has no counterintuitive consequences when
applied to the lottery case.
The second talk “Ramsey’s Test, Adams’ Thesis, and
Conditional Evidence” by Richard Dietz was about updating on conditional information. There is a whole
range of plausible accounts of updating ones beliefs
if new evidence in form of a factive sentence is being
received. However, new information need not always
come in form of a factive sentence, it might as well
come in form of a conditional. In his talk Richard Dietz
was discussing three requirements (the Judy Benjamin
requirements) which an update procedure for conditional sentences is supposed to meet according to van
Fraassen (1981: A problem for relative information
minimizers in probability kinematics, in British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 32: 375-379).
Dietz first showed that a generalization of Adams’
Thesis to left nested conditionals is a valid alternative to Adams’ conditioning—previously established
in Richard Bradley (2005: Radical probabilism and
Bayesian conditioning, in Philosophy of Science, 72:
342-364)—because it fulfills the Judy Benjamin requirements. But secondly Dietz presented examples
of updating on conditional evidence in which two of
the Judy Benjamin requirements are violated and thus
showed that the Judy Benjamin requirements are materially inadequate.
The next meeting of the Konstanz-Leuven series
takes place in Leuven on November 26. Everybody is
cordially invited to attend!
this contribution laid the foundations of argumentation
theory as a mathematical discipline, sparkling a rich and
lively research area within Artificial Intelligence, its interaction with Game Theory and Logic Programming
has been relatively neglected. The symposium filled
this gap by highlighting a number of recent scientific
developments as well as stimulating future research directions.
The talks presented can be grouped according to four
focus points: talks concerning argumentation theory in
general; and talks focusing on the three overlapping areas of games and logic (programming), games and argumentation, argumentation and logic.
Argumentation. Dr. Martin Caminada (University
of Luxembourg) provided a thorough introduction to argumentation theory, presenting novel results concerning, in particular, algorithmic aspects of argumentation
theory and dialogue games. The implementation of the
algorithms introduced by Dr. Caminada were then presented in a comprehensive demo by Patrizio Barbini
(Universities of Turin and Luxembourg) and Yining Wu
(University of Luxembourg). Finally, Prof. Gerhard
Brewka (University of Leipzig) proposed a multi-agent
framework for argumentation generalizing Dung’s setting to cover the interaction of different argumentative
contexts.
Games and Logic. The contribution of Prof. Juergen Dix (Technical University of Clausthal) concerned
the use of logic as a formal language for talking about
games. It illustrated a number of systematic extensions
of ATL—focusing in particular on their complexity—
able to capture several game-theoretic concepts, from
the typical “power-view” of games based on effectivity
functions, to the full-fledged characterization of equilibrium concepts such as the Nash equilibrium. Along
a similar line, Dr. Marina de Vos (University of Bath)
showed how Answer Set Programming can be successively used to encode games and, consequently, compute their Nash equilibria. Then, somehow closing the
circle, she showed how the solutions of answer set programs can be seen as the product of playing winning
strategies in appropriately designed logic games.
Argumentation and Games. This was definitely the
richest section in the symposium. Its talks focused on
two main aspects: 1) the game-theoretic proof theory of
argumentation based on the so-called dialogue or discussion games; 2) the application of argumentation theory to strategic situations in rational interaction, such as
dispute resolution. In the first group, Dr. Sanjay Modgil
(King’s College London) introduced dialogue games for
an extension of argumentation frameworks incorporating, besides the standard attack relation between arguments, an attack relation from arguments to attack relations. Prof. Henry Prakken (Universities of Utrecht
and Groningen) emphasized the procedural and goaldriven aspects of dialogue games, besides their logical
Benjamin Hoffmann and Alexandra Zinke
Formal Epistemology Research Group, Zukunftskolleg
and Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz
Games, Argumentation and Logic Programming, 23–24 April
The GALP symposium held by the Individual and Collective Reasoning Group (ICS) of the University of
Luxembourg on 23th-24th April 2009 brought together,
for two days, a number of distinguished researchers
who are contributing and have contributed to interdisciplinary research at the interface of the disciplines of
games, argumentation and logic (with particular focus
on logic programming). The aim of the symposium
was to foster the interaction between the aforementioned research areas along the lines already present in
the seminal contribution of Dung (“On the Acceptability of Arguments and Its Fundamental Role in NonMonotonic Reasoning, Logic Programming, and NPersons Games”, Artificial Intelligence 1995). While
8
and argumentation-theoretic nature, which still await a
full-fledged formal analysis.
As to the second group, Serena Villata proposed an
argumentation-theoretic approach to study the dynamics of coalition-formation in multi-agent systems. Finally, professor P. M. Dung (Asian Institute of Technology) introduced a novel argumentation-theoretic perspective to dispute resolution based on a form of mechanism design for dialogue games. According to this perspective, dialogue games are viewed as procedures for
dispute resolution where all arguments defensible via
the procedure are also admissible (soundness) and, vice
versa, all admissible arguments are defensible via the
procedure (completeness).
Argumentation and Logic. The symposium hosted
two talks which bridged argumentation theory with
modal logic. The first one, by Prof. Dov Gabbay
(King’s College London) applied Provability Logic to
characterize the content of an argumentation framework as a modal formula whose models naturally correspond to the possible complete extensions of the framework. The second one, by Dr. Davide Grossi (University of Amsterdam) systematically investigated the simple idea of viewing Dung’s argumentation frameworks
as Kripke models. The talk showed how such perspective opens up the possibility of importing techniques
(e.g., calculi, evaluation games) and results (e.g., complexity of model-checking) from modal logic to argumentation theory.
All in all, the symposium has beautifully shown how
rich the overlaps are between game theory, argumentation theory and logic, and how promising future research lines can be in further investigating such overlaps. For the abstract of the talks, as well as the slides,
see the website of the event.
ing. Jennifer Nagel (Toronto) and Ángel Pinillos (ASU)
both appealed to the distinction between ‘System 1’ and
‘System 2’ processing to shed light on certain intuitions.
Nagel used dual-process accounts of cognition to explain patterns in our intuitions that conflict with closure principles for knowledge. Pinillos presented experimental results in support of the conclusion that people
are less likely to have ‘Knobe Effect’ intuitions when
placed in better epistemic conditions, and he suggested
that these results might be due to System 2 processing
being used in the better conditions and System 1 in the
worse conditions.
David Chalmers (ANU) and Carrie Jenkins (Nottingham) offered contrasting views on what makes a dispute
a ‘merely verbal’ dispute. Benjamin Jarvis (Brown),
Jonathan Schaffer (ANU, Arché) and Anand Vaidya
(SJSU) all engaged Timothy Williamson’s influential
work on methodology. Jarvis defended the a priori versus a posteriori distinction against Williamson’s critique
of it. Schaffer argued, against Williamson, that Gettier’s famous arguments should be viewed as targeting a
claim of conceptual necessity. Vaidya offered an alternative to Williamson’s account of modal epistemology,
based partly on Jonathan Kvanvig’s distinction between
understanding and knowledge. Helen Beebee (Birmingham) and Ephraim Glick (MIT) both explored in principle limitations of specific philosophical arguments.
Beebee argued that appeals to the phenomenology of
free action can establish little in debates about free will,
and Glick examined the limitations of arguments in debates about the nature of knowledge-how.
Other talks addressed more general methodological
issues. Daniel Nolan (Nottingham) argued that our
‘armchair’ knowledge is often a posteriori. Ernest Sosa
(Rutgers) developed a competence-based account of raDavide Grossi tional intuition. Thomas Kelly (Princeton) argued that
Institute of Logic, Language and Computation, the fact that one believes that p gives one a reason to
University of Amsterdam increase one’s confidence that p is true, a conclusion
that was claimed to support the Moorean idea that philosophy is unlikely to ever dislodge our commonsense
beliefs. Jonathan Weinberg (Indiana) outlined a neoPhilosophical Methodology, 25–27 April
pragmatist account of epistemic norms, and he used
The AHRC ‘Philosophical Methodology’ Project at the this account to make certain prescriptions about the use
Arché Research Centre at The University of St Andrews of intuitions in philosophy. Schaffer also argued that
held a major conference on philosophical methodol- there is no distinctively philosophical form of inquiry;
ogy on 25–27 April 2009. The aim of the conference there are just general methods for answering questions.
was to explore any questions concerning philosophical Tamar Szabó Gendler (Yale) compared philosophy that
methodology. Consequently, the papers presented cov- aims to address theoretical questions with philosophy
ered a wide range of issues but there were numerous that aims to contribute to human flourishing.
connections between them.
The conference was a great success. The talks were
A number of papers offered hypotheses about the all excellent and the discussion sessions (formal and inpsychological origins of important intuitions in philoso- formal) were extremely productive and conducted in a
phy. Eugen Fischer (East Anglia) argued that intuitions great spirit. Arché’s methodology project has a very
that have been used to support dualism about the mind active blog where you can find more discussion of the
are based on an erroneous form of analogical reason- conference and other topics in philosophical methodol9
ogy.
ical question: What are we realists about? French argued that ontic structural realism with respect to obYuri Cath jects and causal structuralism with respect to properties
Arché, University of St Andrews commits to what metaphysics ground structural realism,
and one should make such metaphysical commitments
to minimize ‘metaphysical humility’ and effectively reduce the domain of facts we cannot have knowledge of.
Scientific Realism Revisited, 28–29 April
Bradley Monton’s (University of Colorado at BoulThis conference invited key contributors to the scien- der) discussion of ‘What Constructive Empiricism Gets
tific realism debate to revisit their views and those of Wrong, and What it Might get Right’ revisited Van
others. Damien Fennell (LSE) opened the conference Fraassen’s view that scientific theories aim to empirby specifying its aim. The comments of Bradley Mon- ical adequacy. Monton presented arguments for conton (University of Colorado at Boulder) who spoke last structive empiricism (the pessimistic induction, the arseemed to sum up the result: views seem settled in the gument from underdetermination of theory by data) and
middle of the range of previously expressed ones.
against it (science is interested in the unobservable,
John Worrall (LSE) emphasized that the intuition truth and empirical adequacy are not the only possicaptured by the no-miracles argument “won’t go away”. ble aims of science). Monton also interestingly located
He argued against entity and ontic structural realism, what he called an ‘empiricist structuralist’ view in Van
as well as inference to the best explanation, and sup- Fraassen’s work.
ported his view. The demand made by “Realisms for
Sophia Efstathiou
Sale: entity, experimental, structural (epistemic and onCPNSS, LSE &
tic), partial, ‘full-on’ .... But will the real realism stand
Philosophy,
UCSD
up please?” picked out epistemic structural realism.
Mauricio Suárez (Complutense University) didn’t reconsider experimental realism, but instead presented a
stimulating talk on “Fictions, Inference, and Realism”. Putting Causation in Context: Causes and
Suárez argued that the only fictionalist view that could Effects in Law and Philosophy, 1 May
be incompatible with scientific realism, what he termed
‘wide fictionalism’, does not speak against (or for) the The workshop brought together philosophers and legal
scholars to discuss issues of causation as they arise in
realist claim that science aims at truth.
Nancy Cartwright (LSE and UCSD, “Phenomeno- Law and Philosophy. The workshop consisted of five
logical Realism: how bold should we be?”) rejected sessions of over an hour, each started with a short preentity realism for the same reasons as Worrall. She sentation of a paper followed by a thorough discussion.
Jonathan Schaffer (Philosophy, ANU/Arché) opened
clarified she would support ‘phenomenological’ and not
‘high theory’ realism, because the only scientific laws the workshop with a paper he wrote for the workshop
we can confirm inductively (and can legitimately be re- entitled ‘Contrastive Causation in the Law’, in which he
alists about) are complicated phenomenological ones. defends his contrastive view of causation and explores
To accord with the conference theme, Cartwright con- its applications in the law. The paper raises four argusidered other entity realist views: those of Ian Hack- ments to defend the contrastive treatment of causation
ing’s and Bas Van Fraassen’s who—surprising some— and argues that it can serve as the theoretical basis for
the sine qua non test, which is commonly used in the
she described as an observable entity realist.
Sherrilyn Roush (UC Berkeley) argued for “Opti- Law.
Amit Pundik (Law, Cambridge) presented his paper
mism about the Pessimistic Induction”. She specified
a ‘second-order’ property about the ‘first-order’ content ‘Can One Deny both Causation by Omission and Causal
of our theories that old and current scientific theories Pluralism? The Case of Legal Causation’. The paper
share (contemporary belief in these theories) thus giv- argues that it is inconsistent to hold that (1) omissions
ing a basis for an inductive (pessimistic) inference about cannot be genuine causes and (2) that causation is a sincurrent theories to go through. She countered that asym- gle concept which is shared by various disciplines. The
metries between old and current scientific methodolo- paper also identifies a type of omission which was negies should block a pessimistic induction to the failure glected by philosophers of causation (the failure to do
enough) and shows why it creates additional difficulties
of current science.
Steven French (Leeds, “One Trope or Two: How for those who wish to deny that omissions can be genmuch metaphysics should the realist take with her tea?”) uine causes.
focused on the relationship between metaphysics and
Alex Broadbent (Philosophy, Cambridge) discussed
science. French called his view complementary to Wor- his paper ‘Facts and Law in the Causal Inquiry’. The
rall’s; complementing epistemology with the metaphys- paper defends the importance of the distinction between
10
law and facts in the causal inquiry, but argues that separating factual and legal causation as different elements
of liability is not the best way to implement it. Instead, the paper proposes a contrastive view of causation which more clearly distinguishes matters of fact
from matters of law within the cause-in-fact inquiry.
Jane Stapleton (Law, Texas/ANU/Oxford) presented
her paper ‘Choosing what we mean by “Causation” in
the Law’. The paper proposed a new account of “causation” in the law by separating three forms of causal “involvement”: necessity, duplicate necessity, and contribution (though contribution subsumes the others). This
account is aimed to improve clarity, identify the normative issues involved, and transparently distribute issues
between causation and other analytical elements within
the legal analysis.
Roderick Bagshaw (Law, Oxford) closed the workshop with his paper ‘Intervening Events’. The paper
challenged Jane Stapleton’s account on various grounds
and argues that tort law rules about the scope of liability may require causal interrogations other than the
question as to ‘involvement’. The paper also raises an
important question about the degrees of causal contribution, namely whether causation is a binary status (either something is a cause or it is not) or whether it is a
continuum (one cause can contribute more than another
cause in bringing about the effect).
The workshop was hosted by the Hughes Hall Centre
for Biomedical Sciences in Society and was generously
supported by Hughes Hall and the PHG Foundation.
sibility in its design; Moore presented a hint mechanism for automatic functional instantiation through an
adaptation of Huet-Lang’s pattern matching algorithm;
Kaufmann presented a new facility for printing large
terms in the theorem prover and provided glimpses of
what goes on in the design of a new feature; Hunt discussed a new symbolic simulation technique and its
application; Liu discussed a specific approach, based
on a syntactic term-manipulation capability, to automatically discharge a certain type of linear inequality
proofs; Greve discussed two utilities, (1) for automating
proofs of formulas involving first-order quantification,
and (2) for introducing arbitrary recursive definitional
axioms in ACL2 with an added hypothesis that the recursion terminates where the added hypothesis permits
the introduction of a (conditional) definitional axiom
and associated induction scheme while not requiring a
possibly difficult proof of termination.
Schmaltz and his students presented progress on
verification of communication models for network-onchips; Ralston discussed a proof of AVL tree implementation; Gamboa and Cowles gave two talks, i.e.,
(1) a formalization of inverse functions in ACL2(R)
(the extension of ACL2 supporting real numbers) , and
(2) a formal proof of a number-theoretic result that determines which triangular numbers are perfect squares;
Kaufmann, Kornerup, and Reitblatt discussed the use of
ACL2 in National Instruments to verify LabVIEW programs; Hardin discussed verification of security-critical
data structures; Pierre and her students discussed the use
Amit Pundik of ACL2 in the verification of fault-tolerance properties
Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge of systems; Rager presented a formal proof of security
protocol JFKr.
Page discussed his experience introducing computa-
ACL2 Theorem Prover and Its Applica- tional logic in the undergraduate curriculum; Eastlund
discussed doublecheck, a framework for testing ACL2
tions, 11–12 May
The ACL2 workshops provide the key technical forum
for researchers to present and discuss improvements to
the theorem prover, comparisons of ACL2 with other
systems, and applications of ACL2 in formal verification. ACL2, co-authored by Matt Kaufmann and
J. Moore, is a state-of-the-art automated reasoning system that has been used in academia, government, and
industry. ACL2 2009 was held in Boston, MA, USA,
on May 11–12, 2009.
The presentations in ACL2 2009 involved (1) implementations and utilities to extend the reach of ACL2,
(2) application of ACL2 to different domains, and
(3) pedagogical applications and user interfaces. In addition to regular papers, ACL2 2009 included an invited
keynote, a panel discussion, and “rump sessions” discussing on-going research.
Sumners presented a user-controllable term simplifier, and discussed the role of user control and exten11
conjectures; Eastlund and Felleisen presented an approach to verify graphical user interfaces; Lozano and
his colleagues presented a tool based on XML to render
ACL2 output in more accessible format.
The keynote lecture by Barrett outlined recent progresses in SMT solving and discussed how theorem
proving and SMT might benefit from each other.
The panel topic was “What is the Future of Theorem
Proving?”. Panelists argued that while interactive theorem proving is here to stay, for the technology to be
pervasive it is critical to integrate it into the design flow
as a debugging aid rather than as an activity performed
post-facto.
Sandip Ray
Department of Computer Sciences, University of Texas
at Austin
Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, of Ludwik Flecks methodological insight for cognitive
linguistics (Henryk Kardela).
14–16 May
The name most often referred to during the conference was undoubtedly that of the German logician, Gottlob Frege. His legacy has proved to be of unquestionable importance for contemporary philosophers of language and linguists alike. Also the continuing influence
of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Willard Van
Orman Quine, Donald Davidson, Noam Chomsky and
Saul Kripke was clearly visible in numerous presentations and discussions.
The idea of bringing together researchers working
within different disciplines and traditions and interested
in natural language proved highly successful, and therefore the next PhiLang conference is planned for May
2011.
The Chair of English and General Linguistics (University of Lodz, Poland) organized in May 2009 the first International Conference on Philosophy of Language and
Linguistics: PhiLang2009. During the conference 6 invited guest speakers presented 5 plenary lectures, and
62 participants from 18 countries delivered 60 papers in
3 parallel sections.
The principal aim of the conference was to bring together philosophers and linguists, and also logicians
with interests in formal analyses of natural language.
The title of the conference was deliberately ambiguous: the organizers wished to investigate the relation
between philosophy of language and linguistics, and to
focus on philosophy of language as opposed to philosophy of linguistics. An additional question was connected with the myths and dogmas current in contemporary philosophy of language.
The five plenary lectures concentrated on the myth of
semantic structure (Jaroslav Peregrin), the myth of the
sign (Michael Morris), events as a phenomenon lying at
the intersection of linguistics, cognitive psychology and
philosophy (Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk), time
in language and thought (Katarzyna Jaszczolt), and on
two dogmas of contemporary philosophical linguistics
(Eros Corazza and Kepa Korta).
Peregrin claimed, not uncontroversially, that autonomous semantic structure is only a convenient working conjecture, a myth stemming from uncritical acceptance of received wisdoms. Morris offered two reasons for questioning the traditional assumption that languages are systems of signs, the first was connected
with giving account of poetic language, the second
with rebutting the unattractive idealism about the nature of the world. Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk elaborated on asymmetric events and negative events in
the framework of cognitive linguistics. Jaszczolt corroborated the hypothesis that the human concept of
time is supervenient on the concept of epistemic possibility. Corazza and Korta discussed the dogmas of
monopropositionalism and sententialism, and proposed
a pluri-propositional framework.
Other topics which attracted considerable attention
where approaches to proper names (Filip Kawczynski, Piotr Wilkin), formal semantic theories (Brendan
Gillon, Mieszko Talasiewicz, Christian Bassac, Chris
Fox), context and context-dependence (Lucian Zagan,
Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska, Tadeusz Ciecierski), and
different approaches to metaphor (Aleksander Szwedek,
Jakub Macha). Several papers discussed historiographical issues, such as the influence of science and scientism
upon modern linguistics and philosophy of language
(Yrsa Neuman, Pius ten Hacken), the unfading influence of Frege (Piotr Stalmaszczyk), and the importance
Piotr Stalmaszczyk
Chair of English and General Linguistics, University of
Lodz
Calls for Papers
Animal Minds: Special issue of Teorema, deadline 15
June.
Deconstruction and Science: Special issue of Derrida
Today, deadline 30 June.
Causality in the Sciences
A volume of papers on causality across the sciences
Deadline 1 July
David Hume’s Epistemology and Metaphysics: Special
issue of Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy,
deadline 31 July.
Is Logic Universal?: Special issue of Logica Universalis, deadline 31 August.
Logic and Social Interaction: Special issue of Synthese
KRA, deadline 1 September.
Psychology and Psychologies: which Epistemology?:
Special issue of Humana.Mente, deadline 5 September.
Experimental Philosophy: Forthcoming issue of The
Monist, deadline April 2011.
§4
What’s Hot in . . .
We are looking for columnists willing to write pieces
of 100-1000 words on what’s hot in particular areas
of research related to reasoning, inference or method,
broadly construed (e.g., Bayesian statistical inference,
legal reasoning, scientific methodology). Columns
should alert readers to one or two topics in the particular area that are hot that month (featuring in blog
discussion, new publications, conferences etc.). If you
12
wish to write a “What’s hot in . . . ?” column, either on HYLOCORE’09, a workshop on hybrid logic held at
a monthly or a one-off basis, just send an email to fea- Roskilde University, has been also reported by Rasmus
tures@thereasoner.org with a sample first column.
Rendsvig. Rasmus’s report also covers the presentation of Jens Ulrik Hansen on hybrid epistemic logic.
Back to justification logic, LORI announced three reFormal Epistemology
cent publications by people related to the topic: S. ArteHandy tips and helpful advice from the Formal Philoso- mov’s “Intelligent Players,” which gives surprising rephy Seminar series at the Formal Epistemology Project, sults in interactive epistemology, M. Fitting’s “Justification Logics, Logics of Knowledge, and ConservativUniversity of Leuven.
Hannes Lietgeb (in his joint work with R. Pettigrew) ity”, putting together the whole family of Justification
took us on a Baysian exploration of how it is that we Logics, and Bryan Renne’s “Propositional Games with
might go about justifying our beliefs. The key was a Explicit Strategies”, which provides a game semantics
mathematical precisification of the norm: Try to mini- for Artemov’s Logic of Proofs.
mize the inaccuracy of your beliefs. Getting all of this
LORI was also proud to publish Minghui Ma’s reup and running properly required replacing Jeffrey con- port on an intensive Dynamic Logic Seminar in Beiditionalisation with their own, custom-shop condition- jing, connecting work by locals with PhD students from
alisation. Neat!
the ILLC in Amsterdam. Still on the announcement
Wiebe van der Hoek (in his joint work with Thomas side, two very good pieces of news from Groningen
Agotness and Michael Wooldridge) made the case for University went out through LORI: first Rineke VerPauly’s Coalitional Logic actually being more about brugge’s new appointment as full professor at ALICE
Cooperative Games than Coalitional Games. A succinct (Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Engineering) in
variation of Pauly’s Coalitional Logic was used to de- the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences and
fine further epistemic logics. Several formalisations for her new research project on logical and computational
epistemic logics for explicitly Coalitional Games were models of higher-order social cognition, and second Suthen developed.
jata Ghosh’s new project on the logic of strategies.
Richard Bradley gave us an altered model of Baysian
I take the occasion to remind you that you can stay in
conditioning that dropped the assumption of maximally touch with loriweb.org by registering to the newsletter,
opinionated agents. I was interested in this from an or to our recently improved RSS feed. You can find all
epistemic logic point of view. It’s canonical in epis- details about these on loriweb.org.
temic logic circles that knowledge and belief are duals.
As usual, I’ll close by mentioning that Logic and RaBut, obviously on cursory reflection, this only holds
tional Interaction is a collaborative venture. We welif the agent is maximally opinionated. I’m wondering
come any contributions relevant to the theme, and are
what sorts of relations between knowledge and belief
also constantly looking for new collaborators. So, if
(as operators) fall out if you start restricting the agent’s
you would like to joint the team, of if you have inforopinion across the domain in various ways. To make my
mation to share with the broader research community,
job easier, I just set this as a question for my masters stuplease do not hesitate to contact our web manager, Rasdents in my formal epistemology class. If any of them
mus Rendsvig.
choose to answer it, and if any of them say something
especially insightful, then readers of The Reasoner will
Olivier Roy
be the first to know!
Philosophy, Groningen
Next month: Luc Bovens and Tomoji Shogenji!
Pics of the FPS seminars are available here. The full
FPS program is available here.
Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson
Formal Epistemology Project, Leuven
§5
Introducing . . .
In this section we introduce a selection of key terms,
texts and authors connected with reasoning. Entries
will be collected in a volume Key Terms in Logic, to
be published by Continuum. If you would like to contribute, please click here for more information. If you
have feedback concerning any of the items printed here,
please email features@thereasoner.org with your comments.
Logic and Rational Interaction
The last month on loriweb.org has belonged to Melvin
Fitting and Justification Logic. Fitting gave an interview to LORI, where he situates justification logic with
respect to epistemic logic and formal epistemology, and
points out to new and exiting research concerning the
place of evidence in social contexts. Fitting’s talk at
13
Begriffsschrift
Semantics
Logics may be defined syntactically by deductive calBegriffsschrift is the book that inaugurated modern culi that include a formal language: Proof theory inlogic. Written by the German mathematician Gottlob vestigates a logic from the point of view of deducibility
Frege and published in 1879, it gave the first exposition and provability. However, logics are often motivated by
of predicate logic, introducing a notation for quantifica- an intended interpretation of their symbols, and it is detion, and also offered an axiomatization of propositional sirable to specify an interpretation formally. The interlogic. The book is divided into three parts. The first part pretation of the logical symbols is the same in all interexplains Frege’s logical symbolism, which he called pretations, whereas the interpretation of the nonlogical
‘Begriffsschrift’ (literally, ‘concept-script’), the second symbols may vary to some extent. An interpretation of
shows how to represent and derive certain propositions, a logic is called a model for the logic. Semantics and
and the third uses the symbolism to provide a logical model theory comprise the models of a logic and the investigation of their properties. For example, Boole gave
analysis of mathematical induction.
two different interpretations of his algebra of logic.
Frege’s crucial innovation lay in extending the use of
The first rigorous definition of a semantics for classifunction-argument analysis from mathematics to logic. cal first-order logic was given in the mid 1930s. AssumIn traditional (Aristotelian) logic, simple propositions ing that the language contains ¬ (“not”), ∨ (“or”) and ∀
such as ‘Gottlob is cool’ had been seen as having (“for all”) as logical constants, denumerably many varisubject-predicate form, represented by ‘S is P’, with ables x0 , x1 , x2 , . . . , and predicate symbols Pn11 , Pn22 , . . .
‘S ’ symbolizing the subject and ‘P’ the predicate, as nonlogical symbols, the interpretation may be outjoined together by the copula ‘is’. In Fregean logic, lined as follows. Let D be a nonempty set of arbitrary
they are seen as having function-argument form, rep- objects (the domain), I an interpretation function and v
resented by ‘Fa’, with ‘a’ symbolizing the argument a valuation function.
(in this case Gottlob) and ‘x is F’ the function (in this
case, the concept is cool), the ‘x’ here indicating where (1) I(¬ϕ)v = T iff I(ϕ)v = F,
the argument term goes to yield the proposition. With a
notation for quantification, more complex propositions (2) I(ϕi ∨ ϕ j )v = T iff I(ϕi )v = T or I(ϕ j )v = T ,
such as ‘All logicians are cool’ (involving the quantini
fier ‘All’) can then be formalized. Traditional logic had (3) I(Pi (x1 , . . . , xni ))v = T iff hv(x1 ), . . . , v(xni )i ∈
ni
I(Pi ),
also seen these as having subject-predicate form, ‘All
logicians’ in this case being the subject. In Fregean
logic, however, this is seen as having a quite different (4) I(∀x. ϕ)v = T iff for any valuation v[x7→d] ,
I(ϕ)v[x7→d] = T ,
and more complex (quantificational) form: in modern
notation, symbolized as ‘(∀x)(Lx → Cx), i.e. ‘For all
x, if x is a logician, then x is cool’. The advantages where v[x7→d] is a one-point modification of the valuation
of Fregean logic come out, especially, when we con- function setting x’s value to d (where d ∈ D).
The relationship between a logic and its semantics is
sider statements of multiple generality (involving more
expressed
by the soundness and the completeness theothan one quantifier), such as ‘Every philosopher loves
rems.
An
axiomatization
of first-order classical logic is
some logician’, which traditional logic had had great
sound
if
ϕ’s
provability
from
Γ implies that every interdifficulty in analysing.
pretation mapping all elements of Γ into T , interpret ϕ
Michael Beaney into T . Completeness states the converse, that is, if ϕ is
Philosophy, York a semantic consequence of the set of formulas Γ, then ϕ
is derivable from Γ.
14
Nonclassical logics require more intricate interpretations than classical logic does. A semantics may include 3, 4, finitely many or infinitely many values. A
logic may have algebraic semantics, where the logical
constants are mapped into operations and constants of
the algebra. A semantics—often used in completeness
proofs—may be built from expressions (or equivalence
classes of expressions) of the logic, some of which are
called “term semantics.”
The preferred type of semantics for nonclassical logics is the relational semantics. Kripke introduced such
semantics for normal modal logics, and they are nowadays usually called “possible worlds semantics.” In relational semantics, sentences are interpreted as propositions, which are sets of possible worlds or situations.
Connectives (that do not occur in classical logic) are
defined from a compatibility (or accessibility) relation
on situations. Relational semantics for relevance logics utilizing a ternary accessibility relation were introduced by Routley and Meyer. A uniform framework—
called generalized Galois logics—encompassing relational semantics for nonclassical logics was introduced
by Dunn. A precise characterization of classes of relational structures for a logic can be obtained by adding a
topology to the structures. This leads straightforwardly
to dualities between the categories of algebras of logics
and of relational structures for logics.
Katalin Bimbó
Philosophy, Alberta
§6
Events
June
IRMLeS: Inductive Reasoning and Machine Learning
on the Semantic Web, Heraklion, Crete, 1 June.
Questioning Scholastic Reason: Maison Française
d’Oxford, UK, 1 June.
Theory and Practice: 4th Joint Workshop on Integrated
History and Philosophy of Science, Durham University,
1 June.
Commonsense: 9th International Symposium on Logical
Formalizations of Commonsense Reasoning, Toronto,
Canada, 1–3 June.
Memory
and
Self-Understanding:
HanseWissenschaftskolleg (HWK), Delmenhorst, Germany,
3–5 June.
Argument Cultures: Ontario Society for the Study of
Argumentation, Windsor, Canada, 3–6 June.
The Phenomenal Qualities: University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK, 5 June.
O-Bayes: International Workshop on Objective Bayes
15
Methodology, Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 5–9 June.
Skepticism Graduate Philosophy Conference: University of Southampton, 6 June.
MODGRAPH: Probabilistic graphical models for integration of complex data and discovery of causal models
in biology, Nantes, France, 8 June.
Philosophy of Probability II: Graduate Conference,
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science,
London School of Economics, 8–9 June.
CNL: Controlled Natural Languages, Marettimo Island,
Sicily, 8–10 June.
Groups and Models: Cherlin Bayrami, Bilgi University,
Istanbul, Turkey, 8–12 June.
Erasmus Workshop: with Max Kölbel on Relativism
and Context Dependence, Department of Philosophy,
Universitá degli studi di Genova, Italy, 9–11 June.
Philosophy of Darwin: Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, 10 June.
Formal methods in the Epistemology of Religion:
KULeuven, Leuven, Belgium, 10–12 June.
The Aim of Belief: Centre for the Study of Mind in
Nature, University of Oslo, 11–13 June.
Toward a Science of Consciousness: Hong Kong, 11–
14 June.
Vagueness: Predication and Truth: Workshop on
Vagueness organised by the Vagueness Research Group,
University of Navarra, 12–13 June.
Society for Philosophy and Psychology: 35th Annual
Meeting, Indiana University, Bloomington, 12–14 June.
Scepticism: University of St Andrews, 13–14 June.
NA-CAP: Networks and Their Philosophical Implications, Indiana University in Bloomington, 14–16 June.
NAFIPS: 28th North American Fuzzy Information
Processing Society Annual Conference, University of
Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, 14–17 June.
ICML: 26th International Conference On Machine
Learning, Montreal, Canada, 14–18 June.
MSRL: Multidisciplinary Symposium on Reinforcement Learning, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 18–19 June.
SPSP: Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice,
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 18–20 June.
Formal Epistemology Workshop: Carnegie Mellon
University, 18–21 June.
COLT: 22nd Annual Conference on Learning Theory,
Montreal, Canada, 18–21 June.
UAI: 25th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Montreal, Canada, 18–21 June.
Non-Classical Mathematics: Hejnice, Czech Republic,
18–22 June.
Pragmatism & Science Conference: Center for Inquiry,
Amherst, NY, 19–20 June.
WoLLIC: 16th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation, Tokyo, Japan, 21–24 June.
LOGICA: The 23rd in the series of annual international
symposia devoted to logic, Hejnice, northern Bohemia,
22-26 June.
Petri Nets: International Workshop on Petri Nets and
Software Engineering, Paris, 22–26 June.
Consciousness and the Self: Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, 25 June.
Metaphysics of Physics: Department of Philosophy,
University of Birmingham, 25 June.
TABLEAUX: Automated Reasoning with Analytic
Tableaux and Related Methods Oslo, Norway, 6–10
July.
TACL: Topology, Algebra and Categories in Logic, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation University
of Amsterdam, 7–11 July.
SPT: Converging Technologies, Changing Societies,
16th International Conference of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, University of Twente, Enschede,
The Netherlands, 8–10 July.
Multiplicity and Unification in Statistics and
IC-EpsMsO:
3rd
International
ConferProbability
ence
on
Experiments/Process/System,
Modelling/Simulation/Optimization,
Athens,
Greece,
University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, 25–26 June
8–11 July.
Logics and Strategies: University of Groningen, The
Interdisciplinary Social Science: Athens, 8–11 July.
Netherlands, 26 June.
ARCOE: Automated Reasoning about Context and OnAnnual Conference: Society for Applied Philosophy,
tology Evolution, Pasadena, 11-12 July.
University of Leeds, 26–28 June.
Aim of Belief: Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature,
ACM SIGKDD International Workshop: Knowledge
University of Oslo, 11–13 June.
Discovery from Uncertain Data, Paris, France, 28 June.
IJCAI: 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial
Practical Reasoning: University of Edinburgh, 28–29 Intelligence, Pasadena, CA, 11–17 July.
June.
ISHPSSB: International Society for the History, PhilosBRICKS: Workshop on Game Theory and Multiagent ophy, and Social Studies of Biology, Emmanuel ColSystems, Amsterdam, 30 June.
lege, St. Lucia, Brisbane, Australia, 12–16 July.
Logic and Heresy in the Middle Ages: Leeds Medieval
Congress, 13–16 July.
July
DMIN: International Conference on Data Mining, Las
Two Streams in the Philosophy of Mathematics: Ri- Vegas, 13–16 July.
val Conceptions of Mathematical Proof, University of ICAI: International Conference on Artificial IntelliHertfordshire, Hatfield, UK, 1–3 July.
gence, Las Vegas, 13–16 July.
EDM: Educational Data Mining, Cordoba, Spain, 1–3 MJCAI: 1st Malaysian Joint Conference on Artificial
July.
Intelligence, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 14–16 July.
ECSQARU: 10th European Conference on Symbolic ICLP: 25th International Conference on Logic Proand Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncer- gramming, Pasadena, California, 14–17 July.
tainty, Verona (Italy), 1–3 July.
ISIPTA: 6th International Symposium on Imprecise
E-CAP: Computing and Philosophy, Universitat Probability: Theories and Applications, Durham UniAutònoma de Barcelona, 2–4 July.
versity, 14–18 July.
Metaphysics of Science: University of Melbourne, 2–5 DGL: 3rd Workshop in Decisions, Games & Logic,
July.
HEC Lausanne, Switzerland, 15–17 June.
Proof Theory and Constructivism: Leeds, 3–16 July.
AIME: 12th Conference on Artificial Intelligence in
The European Epistemology Network Conference: Medicine, Verona, Italy, 18–22 August.
Formal Epistemology Project, Brussels, 4–5 July.
ViC: Vagueness in Communication, Bordeaux, France,
Set Theory Meeting: in Honour of Ronald Jensen, 20–24 July.
Mathematical Research and Conference Center, IWSM24: 24th International Workshop on Statistical
Bedlewo, Poland, 5–10 July.
Modelling, Cornell University in Ithaca, NY, 20–24
CALCULEMUS: 16th Symposium on the Integration July.
of Symbolic Computation and Mechanised Reasoning, LMSC: Workshop Logical Methods for Social ConOntario, Canada, 6–7 July.
cepts, Bordeaux, France, 20–31 July.
FTP: International Workshop on First-Order Theorem, ICCBR: Eighth International Conference on CaseOslo, Norway, 6–7 July.
Based Reasoning, Seattle, Washington, 20–23 July.
TARK: Twelfth Conference on Theoretical Aspects of ESSLLI: 21st European Summer School in Logic, LanRationality and Knowledge, Stanford University, 6–8 guage and Information, Bordeaux, France, 20–31 July.
July.
Buffalo Ontology Week: A series of events relating
Information Fusion: 12th International Conference, to ontology, and the first International Conference on
Grand Hyatt, Seattle Washington, 6–9 July.
Biomedical Ontology, Buffalo, 20–27 July.
16
Case-Based Reasoning in the Health Sciences: Seattle,
Washington, 21 July.
History of Science and Technology: XXIII International Congress of History of Science and Technology: Ideas and Instruments in Social Context, Budapest,
Hungary, 28 July–2 August.
Logic Colloquium: Sofia, 31 July–5 August.
August
CADE-22: 22nd International Conference on Automated Deduction, McGill University, Montreal, 2–7
August.
Logic and Mathematics: University of York, 3–7 August.
Science in Society: University of Cambridge, UK, 5–7
August.
The Skeptic’s Toolbox: The Scientific Method: Annual Conference of the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry, University of Oregon, 6–9 August.
Meaning, Understanding and Knowledge: 5th International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication, Riga, Latvia, 7–9 August.
LCC: 10th International Workshop on Logic and Computational Complexity, Los Angeles, 10 August.
LICS: Logic in Computer Science, Los Angeles, 11–14
August.
Probability and Stochastic Processes: Isfahan University of Technology, Iran, 14–15 August.
FSKD: 6th International Conference on Fuzzy Systems
and Knowledge Discovery, Tianjin, China, 14–16 August.
ICNC: The 5th International Conference on Natural
Computation, Tianjin, China, 14–16 August.
ASAI: X Argentine Symposium on Artificial Intelligence, Mar del Plata, Argentina, 24–25 August.
ICSO: Issues in Contemporary Semantics and Ontology, Buenos Aires, 26–28 August.
LGS6: Logic, Game Theory, and Social Choice 6,
Tsukuba Center for Institutes, Japan, 26–29 August.
PASR: Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning
in Early Modern Science and Mathematics, Ghent, Belgium, 27–29 August.
EANN: Artificial Neural Networks in Engineering,
University of East London, 27–29 August.
Practice-based Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics:
ILLC, Amsterdam, 31 August–2 September.
SOPHA: Triannual congress of the SoPhA, the Société
de Philosophie Analytique, University of Geneva, 2–5
September.
Naturalism and the Mind: Kazimierz Dolny, Poland,
4–8 September.
UC: 8th International Conference on Unconventional
Computation, Ponta Delgada, Portugal, 7-11 September.
CLIMA: 10th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems, Hamburg, Germany, 9–10 September.
Mechanisms and Causality in the Sciences
University of Kent, Canterbury, UK, 9–11 September
Phloxshop II: Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 9–11
September.
MATES: Seventh German Conference on MultiAgent System Technologies, Hamburg, Germany, 9–11
September.
MoS: Grand Finale Conference of the Metaphysics of
Science AHRC Project, Nottingham, 12–14 September.
The New Ontology of the Mental Causation Debate:
Old Shire Hall, Durham University, 14–16 September.
ISMIS: The Eighteenth International Symposium on
Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, University of
Economics, Prague, Czech Republic, 14–17 September.
ESSA: 6th European Social Simulation Association
Conference, University of Surrey, Guildford, 14–18
September.
LPNMR: 10th International Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Potsdam,
Germany, 14–18 September.
KI: 32nd Annual Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
Paderborn, Germany, 15–18 September.
Artificial by Nature: 4th International Plessner
Conference, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 16–18
September.
FroCoS: Frontiers of Combining Systems, Trento, Italy,
16–18 September.
Progic
4th Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic,
special focus: new approaches to
rationality in decision making,
Groningen, The Netherlands, 17–18 September
History of Statistics and Probability: Santiago de
Compostela, Galicia, Spain, 17–18 September.
Logic, Language, Mathematics: A Philosophy Conference in Memory of Imre Ruzsa, Budapest, 17–19
September.
September
Evolution, Cooperation and Rationality: Bristol, 18–
Foundations of Uncertainty: Probability and Its Rivals, 20 September.
Villa Lanna, Prague, Czech Republic, 1–4 September.
ICAPS: 19th International Conference on Automated
Trends in Logic VII: Trends in the Philosophy of Math- Planning and Scheduling, Thessaloniki, Greece, 19–23
ematics, Goethe-University Frankfurt, 1–4 September. September.
17
Applied Statistics: Ribno (Bled), Slovenia, 20–23
September.
The Social Self: Summer School in Neuroscience and
Philosophy of Mind, Alghero, Sardinia, Italy, 20–27
September.
International Darwin Conference: Norcroft Centre,
University of Bradford, 24–26 September.
Humanities and Technology Annual Conference: Special Topic: Technology, Democracy, and Citizenship,
University of Virginia, 24–26 September.
LACSI: The Logic and Cognitive Science Initiative
Conference on Ontology, North Carolina State University, 25–26 September.
PASR: Philosophical Aspects of Symbolic Reasoning in
Early Modern Science and Mathematics, University of
Ghent, Belgium, 28–29 August.
KES: Knowledge-Based and Intelligent Information &
Engineering Systems, Santiago, Chile, 28–30 September.
ASCS: The 9th conference of the Australasian Society
for Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Sydney,
30 September–2 October.
November
Darwin in the 21st Century: Nature, Humanity, and
God: University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA, 1–3
November.
ACML: 1st Asian Conference on Machine Learning,
Nanjing, China, 2–4 November.
Logic, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science: Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia, 4–6 November.
AAAI: Fall Symposium on Complex Adaptive Systems,
Arlington, VA, 5–7 November.
AICI: Artificial Intelligence and Computational Intelligence, Shanghai, China, 7–8 November.
CSMN/Arché Graduate Conference: University of St
Andrews, 7–8 November.
Epistemology, Context, and Formalism: Université
Nancy 2, France, 12–14 November.
SPS: Science and Decision, Third Biennial Congress of
the Societe de Philosophie des Sciences, Paris, 12–14
November.
M4M-6: 6th Workshop on Methods for Modalities,
Copenhagen, Denmark, 12–14 November.
ICITE: International Conference on Information TheOctober
ory and Engineering, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, 13–15
Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference: Univer- November.
VI Conference: Spanish Society for Logic, Methodolsiteit van Amsterdam, 1–3 October.
Joint Attention: Developments in Developmental and ogy and Philosophy of Science, Valencia, Spain, 18–21
Comparative Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and So- November.
cial Neuroscience, Bentley University, Greater Boston, LENLS: Logic and Engineering of Natural Language
Semantics,Campus Innovation Center Tokyo, Minato1–4 October.
Buffalo All X-Phi Weekend: University at Buffalo, 2– ku, Tokyo, 19–20.
Knowledge, Value, Evolution: An international con3 October.
IC3K: International Joint Conference on Knowledge ference on cross-pollination between life sciences and
Discovery, Knowledge Engineering and Knowledge philosophy, Prague, 23–25 Novermber.
ISKE: The 4th International Conference on Intelligent
Management, Madeira, Portugal, 6–8 October.
Hugh MacColl Centenary: Boulogne sur Mer, 9–10 Systems & Knowledge Engineering, Hasselt, Belgium,
27–28 November.
October.
EPIA: 14th Portuguese Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Universidade de Aveiro, Portugal, 12–15 Octo- December
ber.
Case Studies of Bayesian Statistics and Machine ICDM: The 9th IEEE International Conference on Data
Learning: Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, Mining, Miami, 6–9 December.
16–17 October.
Interpretation and Sense-Making: University of
Breaking Down Barriers: Blackwell Compass Inter- Rouen, France, 9–11 December.
disciplinary Virtual Conference, 19–30 October.
Emergence and Reduction in the Sciences: 2nd
P-NPMW: Paris-Nancy PhilMath Workshop, Nancy, Pittsburgh-Paris Workshop, Center for Philosophy of
21–22 October.
Science, University of Pittsburgh, 11–12 December.
EPSA: 2nd Conference of the European Philosophy of FIT: International Conference on Frontiers of InformaScience Association, 21–24 October.
tion Technology, Abbottabad, Pakistan, 16–18 DecemRR: Third International Conference on Web Reasoning ber.
and Rule Systems, 25–26 October.
Seventeenth Amsterdam Colloquium: University of
Darwin Conference: Chicago, Illinois, 29–31 October. Amsterdam, 16–18 December.
Language, Epistemology and History: 2nd SIFA Grad- MBR: Abduction, Logic, and Computational Discovuate Conference, Bologna, Italy.29–31 October
ery, Campinas, Brazil, 17–19 December.
18
Visiting International Fellowship: Department of Sociology, University of Surrey, Guildford, deadline 30
September.
Post-doc positions: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM, Mexico, deadline 10 October.
January 2010
SODA: ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Hyatt Regency Austin, Austin, Texas, 17–19
January.
February
IWCogSc-10: ILCLI International Workshop on Cognitive Science, Donostia-San Sebastian, 10–12 February.
Logical Approaches to Barriers in Computing and
Complexity: Alfried Krupp Wissenschaftskolleg, Greifswald, Germany, 17–20 February.
§8
Courses and Studentships
Courses
HPSM: MA in the History and Philosophy of Science
and Medicine, Durham University.
Master Programme: Philosophy of Science, Technology and Society, Enschede, the Netherlands.
MSc in Mathematical Logic and the Theory of Computation: Mathematics, University of Manchester.
MSc in Artificial Intelligence: Faculty of Engineering, University of Leeds.
§7
Jobs
Post-doc position: Research project “Tarski’s Revolution: A New History—Semantics and Axiomatics from
Bolzano to Tarski against the background of the Classical Model of Science”, Faculty of Philosophy, University Amsterdam, deadline 1 June.
MA in Reasoning
Centre for Reasoning Research Fellowships
Two 2-year research fellowships at the Centre for
Reasoning, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK.
Choose a project and apply for job HUM0078 here.
Deadline 5th June.
Research Fellowship: School of Psychology, Queen’s
University, Belfast, deadline 5 June.
Research Associate: in Cognitive Robotics, Intelligent
Systems Research Centre (ISRC), Faculty of Computing and Engineering, University of Ulster, deadline 5
June.
Research Associate: in the EU-funded project “Intrinsically Motivated Cumulative Learning Versatile
Robots” (ImClever), Intelligent Systems Research Centre (ISRC), Faculty of Computing and Engineering,
University of Ulster, deadline 5 June.
Research Fellowship: 3-year funded position on
“Topos Theory and Quantum Foundations”, School of
Computer Science, University of Birmingham, deadline
10 June.
Full Professorship: in Theoretical Philosophy at the
University of Vienna, deadline 12 June.
Post-doc position: in the research project “The Dynamics of Argumentation” (DYNAR), University of Luxembourg, deadline 15 June.
Professorship/Readership: in Computational Neuroscience, Intelligent Systems Research Centre (ISRC),
Faculty of Computing and Engineering, University of
Ulster, deadline 19 June.
Visiting Fellowships: Joseph L. Rotman Institute of
Science and Values, University of Western Ontario,
deadline 1 July.
19
An interdisciplinary programme at the University of
Kent, Canterbury, UK. Core modules on logical,
causal, probabilistic, scientific, mathematical and
machine reasoning and further modules from
Philosophy, Psychology, Computing, Statistics, Social
Policy and Law.
MSc in Cognitive & Decision Sciences: Psychology,
University College London.
MSc in Cognitive Science: University of Osnabrück,
Germany.
Master of Science: Logic, Amsterdam.
APTS: Academy for PhD Training in Statistics, University of Warwick.
Summer School in Logic and Formal Epistemology:
Carnegie Mellon University, 8–26 June.
Arché Summer School: University of St Andrews, 29
June–1 July.
NN: Summer School in Neural Networks in Classification, Regression and Data Mining, Porto, Portugal, 6–
10 July.
ISSCSS: 1st Graduate International Summer School
in Cognitive Sciences and Semantics, University of
Latvia, Riga, 16-26 July.
Philosophy and Medicine: Summer School & Workshop, University of Rostock, Germany, 27 July–1 August.
ACAI: Advanced Course in Artificial Intelligence,
School of Computing and Mathematics, University of
Ulster, Northern Ireland, 23–29 August.
Fourth Cologne Summer School: Reliabilism and Social Epistemology: Problems and Prospects, Cologne,
24–28 August.
Studentships
PhD Studentship: 3-year AHRC studentship in the
Foundations of Logical Consequence project, University of St Andrews, until filled.
Two PhD Scholarships: in Philosophy of Mind
and Cognitive Sciences, Center for Integrative Neuroscience (CIN), University of Tübingen (Germany),
deadline 7 June.
Two D.Phil Studentships: in AI/Computational Logic,
associated with the EPSRC project “Constraint Satisfaction for Configuration: Logical Fundamentals, Algorithms, and Complexity”, Computing Laboratory, University of Oxford, deadline 10 June.
Two PhD Studentships: in Computing Science, Department of Computing Science and Mathematics, University of Stirling, deadline 10 June.
PhD position: Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Center for
Logic and Philosophy of Science, deadline 15 June.
PhD position: 3-year funded PhD position on “Programming and Reasoning with Infinite Structures”,
Functional Programming Laboratory, University of
Nottingham, deadline 20 June.
PhD position: in OR and Statistics, Centre for OR and
Applied Statistics, University of Salford, deadline 26
June.
PhD position: Cork Constraint Computation Centre
(4C), University College Cork, deadline 1 July.
20