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Mind, Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds

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An Erratum to this article was published on 01 January 2006

Abstract

The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation). On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different worlds.

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  1. School of Philosophy, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

    Gabriel Vacariu

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  1. Gabriel Vacariu
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Correspondence to Gabriel Vacariu.

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An erratum to this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-7147-z.

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Vacariu, G. Mind, Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds. Synthese 147, 515–548 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-8366-4

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