Abstract
Toleration is perhaps the core commitment of liberalism, but this seemingly simple feature of liberal societies creates tension for liberal perfectionists, who are committed to justifying religious toleration primarily in terms of the goods and flourishing it promotes. Perfectionists, so it seems, should recommend restricting harmful religious practices when feasible. If such restrictions would promote liberal perfectionist values like autonomy, it is unclear how the perfectionist can object. A contemporary liberal perfectionist, Steven Wall, has advanced defense of religious toleration that grounds perfectionist toleration in an innovative account of reasons of respect. He thus defends perfectionist toleration on two grounds: (i) the appropriate manner of responding to perfectionist goods like autonomy and membership is to respect the religious choices of others; (ii) citizens can acquire reasons to respect the religious choices of others through internalizing a value-promoting moral and political code. I argue that both defenses fail. The cornerstone of both arguments is the connection Wall draws between reasons to promote value and reasons to respect it. I claim that Wall’s conception of the relationship between promoting and respecting value is inadequate. I conclude that the failure of Wall’s defense of perfectionist toleration should motivate liberal perfectionists to develop more sophisticated accounts of normative reasons. The viability of a truly liberal perfectionism depends upon such developments.
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Notes
Rawls makes toleration the conceptual core of liberalism: ‘political liberalism applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself’ (Rawls 2005).
I appeal to a broad conception of harm below as reductions in the achievement or enjoyment of perfectionist goods. The harms with which I am concerned can be committed without wrongdoing. They may also include harms to self.
Wall uses “the term ‘repress’ very broadly to stand for repress, persecute, harm, offend, insult, etc.” (Wall 1998, pp. 63–64).
I will assume that Wall’s “moral motivation” requires an attitude of respect throughout the paper.
See King (1998, pp. 21–72) for a classic account of toleration.
Wall notes that this account is extremely general because it does not specify a conception of a valuable and worthwhile life.
In the same passage, Wall argues that perfectionists can be value pluralists and that there will be no direct connection from sound ideals of the good to the structure of political institutions without substantial empirical work.
Wall also maintains that he will not defend this claim about the independence of reasons to promote value and reasons to respect it.
Ibid.
The question of trade-offs still arises even if respect for a candidate good promotes perfectionist value to a great degree. In the first defense, Wall does not argue that respect for certain values tends to promote more value than disrespect on the whole.
Wall does not give an “autonomy-derived” defense of toleration and even suggests difficulties for it. However, Wall thinks it contains some “measure of truth” (Wall 2003, p. 235). Reviewing problems with the good will prove illuminating nonetheless.
Wall makes a detailed prima facie case for six distinct claims about the value of autonomy (Wall 1998, pp. 144–161).
The points I make here are essentially identical to the ones Rawls makes about the application of decision theory to rational intuitionism (Rawls 1971, pp. 30–36).
Indifference curve analysis is emphatically not the same as cost–benefit analysis. Indifference curve analysis can be employed at a completely formal level to clarify any number of problems of rational choice.
Here I follow Stanley Benn’s indifference curve analysis of choosing between incommensurable goods (Benn 1988, pp. 43–64).
Following standard decision theory, we may also generate multiple indifference curves for different values of R and P. Higher and lower aggregate values of R and P will also admit of indifference points, and thus their own indifference curves.
Some qualifications arise. The Waldensians survive in small numbers and the doctrines of some other groups merged into Protestantism.
Wall often speaks of interests and of values. I shall understand serving human interests as promoting value for humans.
Sometimes autonomy requires membership, but not always.
Wall’s strategy is surprisingly similar to Brad Hooker’s strategy which focuses on evaluating the value of inculcating a code with norms of respect that promotes well-being (Hooker 2000, p. 32).
One might worry that we should inculcate a code with exceptions for disvaluable religions, but Wall notes that “[t]oo many exceptions will undermine the ethic” (Wall 2003, p. 245).
Note that the OSE is valued as a set of dispositions not as a set of propositions.
Wall grants that this response will not provide everyone with a non-instrumental reason to tolerate. But his case does not require showing “that all persons have reason to value toleration for its own sake.” Instead, “instrumental considerations as well as those derived from indifference or skepticism may be sufficient to motivate support for the ethic” (p. 247).
Emphasis mine.
Larry Temkin has denied that the axiom of transitivity applies to practical reasoning (Temkin 1996).
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to a number of people who provided me with feedback on this article, including Nathan Ballantyne, Thomas Christiano, Chris Freiman, Jerry Gaus, Uriah Kriegel, Mark LeBar, Jonathan Quong, Steven Wall and members of a 2009 University of Arizona writing workshop, along with an anonymous reviewer. I especially thank Gregg Keithley for pressing me to think hard about the relationship between perfectionism and toleration and to Aira Burkhart for graphic illustration.
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Vallier, K. Can liberal perfectionism justify religious toleration? Wall on promoting and respecting. Philos Stud 162, 645–664 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9787-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9787-1