Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Species, sets, and the derivative nature of Philosophy

  • Published:
Biology and Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Concepts and methods originating in one discipline can distort the structure of another when they are applied to the latter. I exemplify this mostly with reference to systematic biology, especially problems which have arisen in relation to the nature of species. Thus the received views of classes, individuals (which term I suggest be replaced by “units” to avoid misunderstandings), and sets are all inapplicable, but each can be suitably modified. The concept of fuzzy set was developed to deal with species and I defend its applicability. Taxa at all levels are real and participate in biological processes. Analysis of cause and pattern provides the deep structure in which metabiology is grounded; violation of this principle has led to diverse errors in biology.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Acot, P.: 1983, ‘Darwin et l'écologie’ Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 36: 33–48.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beatty, J.: 1981, ‘What's Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory’, PSA 1980 2: 397–426.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beckner, M.: 1959, The Biological Way of Thought, Columbia University Press, New York. 200 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernstein, H., H. C. Byerly, F. A. Hopf, and R. E. Michod: 1985, ‘Sex and the Emergence of Species’, Journal of Theoretical Biology 117, 665–690.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandon, R. N.: 1981, ‘Biological Teleology: Questions and Explanations’,, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 12, 91–105.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brues, A.: 1972, ‘Models of Race and Cline’, American Journal of Physical Anthropology 37, 389–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burger, W.: 1975, ‘The Species-Concept in Quercus’, Taxon 24, 45–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caplan, A. L.: 1979, ‘Darwinism and Deductivist Models of Theory Structure’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 10, 341–353.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carson, H. L.: 1985, ‘Unification of Speciation Theory in Plants and Animals’, Systematic Botany 10, 380–390.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chaline, J., and L. Thaler: 1977, ‘Les problémes de l'espéce chez les Rongeurs: approachepaléontologique’, Mémoires de la Société Zoologique de France 39, 359–381.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowan, S. T.: 1962, ‘The Microbial Species — a Macromyth?’,Symposia of the Society for General Microbiology 12, 433–455.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dobzhansky, Th.: 1951, Genetics and the Origin of Species, (ed. 3), Columbia University Press, New York. 364 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dobzhansky, Th.: 1970, Genetics of the Evolutionary Process, Columbia University Press, New York. 505 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Durden, C. J.: 1969, ‘Ecological Aspects of the Species Concept’, Armadillo Papers 1, 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ehrlich, P. R., and P. H. Raven: 1969, ‘Differentiation of Populations’, Science 165, 1228–1232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellstrand, N. C., and D. A. Levin: 1980, ‘Evolution of Oenothera laciniata (Onagraceae), A Permanent Translocation Heterozygote’, Systematic Botany 5, 6–16.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fales, E.: 1982, ‘Natural Kinds and Freaks of Nature’, Philosophy of Science 49, 67–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foster, A. B.: 1985, ‘Variation Within Coral Colonies and Its Importannce for Interpreting Fossil Sppecies’, Journal of Paleontology 59, 1359–1381.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghiselin, M. T.: 1987a, ‘Species Concepts, Individuality, and Objectivity’, Biology and Philosophy, 127–143.

  • Ghiselin, M. T.: 1987b, ‘Response to Commentary on the Individuality of Species’, Biology and Philosophy, 207–212.

  • Ghiselin, M. T.: 1987c, ‘Hierarchies and their Components’, Paleobiology 13, 108–111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gordon, R. E.: 1978, ‘A Species Definition’, International Journal of Systematic Bacteriology 28, 605–607.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould, S. J.: 1985, ‘The Paradox of the First Tier: An Agenda for Paleobioloy’, Paleobiology 11, 2–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grant, V.: 1981, Plant Speciation,(ed. 2), Columbia University Press, New York. 563 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grant, V.: 1986, ‘Reply to W. H. Wagner on the Species Question’, Taxon 35, 541–542.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gregg, J. R.: 1954, The Language of Taxonomy, Columbia University Press, New York. 70 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harrison, B. D.: 1985, ‘Usefulness and Limitation of the Species Concept for Plant Viruses’, Intervirology 24, 71–78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hennig, W.: 1966, Phylogenetic Systematics, University of Illinois Press, Urbana. 263 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holsinger, K. E.: 1984, ‘The Nature of Biological Species’, Philosophy of Science 51, 293–307.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hull, D. L.: 1981, ‘The herd as a means’, PSA 1980 2, 73–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hull, D. L.: 1983, ‘Karl Popper and Plato's Metaphor’, n N. I. Platnick and V. A. Funk (eds.), Advances in Cladistics, Volume 2, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 177–189.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hull, D. L.: 1987, ‘Genealogical Actors in Ecological Roles’, Biology and Philosophy 2, 168–184.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hutchinson, G. E.: 1968, ‘When are Species Necessary?’, in R. C. Lewontin (ed.), Population Biology and Evolution, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, pp. 177–186.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huxley, J. S.: 1912, The Individual in the Animal Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, Camridge, England. 167 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jongeling, T. B.: 1985, ‘On an Axiomatization of Evolutionary Theory’, Journal of Theoretical Biology 117, 529–543.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, P.: 1984a, ‘Species’, Philosophy of Science 51, 308–333.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, P.: 1984b, ‘Against the Monism of the Moment: A Reply to Elliot Sober’, Philosophy of Science 51, 616–630.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, P.: 1987, ‘Ghostly Whispers: Mayr, Ghiselin, and the “Philosophers” on the Ontological Status of Species’, Biology and Philosophy 2, 184–192.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krieber, M., and M. R. Rose: 1986, ‘Molecular Aspects of the Species Barrier’, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 17, 465–485.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lennox, J. G.: 1985, ‘Marjorie Grene, Aristotle's Philosophy of Science and Aristotle's Biology’, PSA 1984 4, 365–377.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr, E.: 1963, Animal Species and Evolution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 797 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr, E.: 1970, Populations, Species and Evolution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 453 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr, E.: 1980, The Growth of Biological Thought, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 974 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr, E.: 1987a, ‘The Ontological Status of Species: Scientific Progress and Philosophical Terminology’, Biology and Philosophy 2, 145–166.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr, E.: 1987b, ‘Answer too these Comments’, Biology and Philosophy 2, 212–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mills, S. K.: and J. H. Beatty: 1979, ‘The Propensity Interpretation of Fitness’, Philosophy of Science 46, 263–286.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milne, R. G.: 1985, ‘Alternatives to the Species Concept for Virus Taxonomy’, Intervirology 24, 94–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mishler, B. D., and M. J. Donoghue: 1983, ‘Species Concepts: A Case for Pluralism’, Systematic Zoology 31,(for 1982), 491–503.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ochman, H., and R. K. Selander: 1984, ‘Evidence for Clonal Population Structure in Escherichia coli’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, [USA] 81, 198–201.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oldroyd, D. R.: 1986, ‘Charles Darwin's Theory of Evolution: A Review of our Present Understanding’, Biology and Philosophy 1, 133–168.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg, A.: 1986, ‘Ignorance and Disinformation inthe Philosophy of Biology: A Reply to Stent’, Biology and Philosophy 1, 461–471.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salthe, S. N.: 1985, Evolving Hierarchical Systems, Columbia University Press, New York. 343 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sigal, J.: 1966, ‘Le concept taxinomique de spectre’, Mémoires Hors-série de la Société Géologique de France 3, 1–126.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slatkin, M.: 1985, ‘Gene Flow in Natural Populations’, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 16, 393–430.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sneath, P. H. A.: 1962, ‘The Construction of Taxonomic Groups’, in G. C. Ainsworth and P. H. A. Sneath (eds.), Microbial Classification, Cambridge Universtiy Press, Cambridge, England, pp. 289–332.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober, E.: 1984, ‘Sets, Species, and Evolution: Comments on Philip Kitcher's “Species””, Philosophy of Science 51, 334–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sokal, R. R., and P. H. A. Sneath: 1963, Princiles of Numerical Taxonomy, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco. 359 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stebbins, G. L.: 1985, ‘Polyploidy, Hydridization, and the Invasion of New Habitats’, Annals of the Missouri Botanical Garden 72, 824–832.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stent, G. S.: 1986, ‘Glass Bead Game’, Biology and Philosophy 1, 227–247.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tobias, P. V.: 1985, ‘Punctuational and Phyletic Evolution in the Hominids’, in E. S. Vrba (ed.), Species and Speciation, Transvaal Museum Monograph 4, Pretoria, pp. 131–141.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1964, ‘Analysis of Some Taxonomic Concepts’, in J. R. Gregg and F. T. C. Harris (eds.), Form and Strategy in Science, Reidel, Dordrecht, Netherlands, pp. 402–415.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1966, ‘On Discussing Human Races’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 9, 377–383.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1971, ‘Adaptive Zones and the Orders of Mammals’, Evolution 25, 420–428.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1973, ‘A New Evolutionary Law’, Evolutionary Theory 1, 1–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1975, ‘Group Selection, Sex, and Fossils’, Evolution 29, 87–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1976a, ‘Ecological Species, Multispecies, and Oaks’, Taxon 25, 233–239.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1976b, ‘Domains, Deduction, the Predictive Method, and Darwin’, Evolutionary Theory 1, 231–245.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1977, ‘Individualistic Classes’, Philosophy of Science 43 (for 1976), 539–541.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1978a, ‘Why not to be a Cladist’,Evolutionary Theory 3, 285–299.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1978b, ‘Arborescent Animals and Other Colonoids’, Nature 276, 318.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1980, ‘Evolution as a Zero-Sum Game for Energy’, Evolutionary Theory 4, 289–300.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1982a, ‘Integration of Species’, Evolutionary Theory 6, 99–112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1982b, ‘Why Misunderstand the Evolutionary Half of Biology?’, in E. Saarinen (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Ecology, Reidel, Dordrecht, Netherlands, pp. 323–343.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: 1984, ‘[Strategies, Causes, and Aristotle]’, BioScience 34, 602.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M.: and V. C. Maiorana: 1985, ‘Patterns of Orignization’, Evolutionary Theory 7, 107–125.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Valen, L. M., and R. E. Sloan: 1977, ‘EcoEcology and the Extinction of the Dinosaurs’ Evolutionary Theory 2, 37–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wade, M.: 1977, ‘On Experimental Study of Group Selection’, Evolution 31, 134–153.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallace, A. R.: 1871, Contibutions to the Theory of Natural Selection (ed. 2), MacMillan, New York, 384 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Werth, C. R., S. I. Guttman,and W. H. Esbaugh: 1985, ‘Recurring Origins of Allopolyploid Species in Asplenium’, Science 228, 731–733.

    Google Scholar 

  • West-Eberhard, M. J.: 1986, ‘Alternative Adaptations, Speciation, Spe Phylogeny (a review)’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, [UA] 83, 1388–1392.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams, M. B.: 1985, ‘Species are Individuals: Theoretical Foundations for the Claim’, Philosophy of Science 52, 578–590.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, D. S.: 1980, The Natural Selection of Populations and Communities, Benjamin/Cummings, Menlo Park, California. 186 pp.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolpoff, M. H., Wu, X. Z., and G. Thorne: 1984, ‘Modern Homo Sapiens Origins: A General Theory of Hominid Evolution Involving the Fossil Evidence from east Asia’, in F. H. Smith and F. Spencer (eds.), The Origins of Modern Humans, Liss, New York, pp. 411–483.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yamazaki, T., J.-K. Choo, T. K. Watanabe, and N. Takahata: 1986, ‘Gene flow in Natural Populations of Drosophila melanogaster with Special Reference to Lethal Allelism Rates and Protein Variation’, Genetics 113, 73–89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zadeh, L.: 1965, ‘Fuzzy Sets’, Information and Control 8, 338–353.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Biology Dept. (Whitman), University of Chicago, 915 E. 57th St., 60637, Chicago, Ill., U.S.A.

    Leigh M. Van Valen

Authors
  1. Leigh M. Van Valen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Van Valen, L.M. Species, sets, and the derivative nature of Philosophy. Biol Philos 3, 49–66 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127628

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00127628

Key words

Search

Navigation