Abstract
It furthers the dialectic when the opponent is clear about what motivates and underlies her critical stance, even if she does not adopt an opposite standpoint, but merely doubts the proponent’s opinion. Thus, there is some kind of burden of criticism. In some situations, there should an obligation for the opponent to offer explanatory counterconsiderations, if requested, whereas in others, there is no real dialectical obligation, but a mere responsibility for the opponent to cooperate by providing her motivations for being critical. In this paper, it will be shown how a set of dialogue rules may encourage an opponent, in this latter type of situation, to provide her counterconsiderations, and to do so at an appropriate level of specificity. Special attention will be paid to the desired level of specificity. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced by an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or from popular opinion. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with less than fully specific criticism?
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Notes
Note that in a later paper, Finocchiaro characterizes conceptions of "argument" as replies to objections, as "hyper-dialectical" (2005, pp. 299–300), and he abandons such conceptions in favour of a "moderately dialectical conception" that also allows for arguments that "attempt to justify a conclusion by giving reasons in support of it," and that do not (only) defend this conclusion from objections (p. 319).
Krabbe denies that his view is “hyper-dialectical” (see the previous note), for the reason that critical reactions also include, in addition to “objections,” pure challenges (and also other types of critical reactions).
With this model (van Laar 2007), a complex argument in which an arguer anticipates critical reactions, can be analysed as an arrangement of basic critical discussions, in which the arguer makes moves for the opponent, while having primary responsibility for the tasks of the proponent.
Rescher refers to this division of labour as a probative asymmetry (1977, pp. 17–18).
The reason to assume that there is a separate connection premise is that the opponent can make into a point of contention the specific argumentative connection between the argument’s premises and its conclusion.
The background of this fourfold distinction is the notion of a critical reaction: as a particular speech act or complex of speech acts, a critical reaction has a particular illocutionary force; as an (allusion to an) evaluation it is about something that constitutes its focus; as an evaluation it appeals to a norm; and as itself a contribution to a discussion it either contributes to the ground level of dialogue, or it comments on a dialogue at a metalevel of dialogue.
In addition to, or instead of having a propositional focus, a critical reaction can focus: (a) on the locution used by the other side, for instance by pointing out an ambiguous expression; (b) or on the situation in which the interlocutor’s contribution is put forward, for instance by alleging that this kind of move (“Our economy is not going to recover in the next few years.”) is in inappropriate within the circumstances (the speaker being the prime minister); (c) or on the person addressed, for instance by alleging that she has a financial bias and cannot be trusted on this issue (van Laar and Krabbe 2013). I restrict my attention in this paper to the propositional focus of criticism.
Note that this request could be answered in at least two ways by the proponent. First, he may support it by, for example, stating a generalization of the connection premise: "If an expert in a field says A then, generally, A," which amounts to a statement to the effect that the underlying argumentation scheme is sufficiently reliable. Second, he can strengthen the connection between the earlier adduced premises and the conclusion by giving an additional reason, hoping that the new connection premise, with an antecedent made up of the conjunction of the old reasons and the new one, is acceptable to the opponent: “Not only does weatherman Erwin say so, but you can also see the air-pressure dropping, which indicates rain.”
As became clear from note 7, a challenge to the connection premise may lead, but does not force the proponent to assert the reliability of the argumentation scheme. The only preferred response to scheme criticism, however, is a defence of the argumentation scheme.
However, if a connection premise—such as “It is going to rain, if weatherman Erwin says so”—has been supported by a generalization to the effect that "If an expert in a field says A then, generally, A (see note 7), then that general proposition has become a proper part of the proponent’s argumentation, and a challenge to that statement by the opponent does not amount to the start of a metalevel dialogue. For in that case, the general proposition, including a possible defence of it, is part of the proponent's argumentative structure, whereas if he supports a challenged argumentation scheme, the proponent is contributing to the opening stage of the discussion.
This theory also examines dialogue norms that govern two other kinds of countercriticism on the proponent’s part: First, the countercriticism whereby the proponent requests the opponent to argue in favour of the denial of his assertion, “Why not-A?”; Second, the countercriticism whereby the proponent requests the opponent to argue in favour of the appropriateness of challenging his assertion, “Why (Why A?)?” In the current paper, I deal only with the dialectic resulting from a third kind of countercriticism, whereby the proponent requests the opponent to explain her criticism of A.
Note that I disregard a third way, to wit the presentation of a counterconsideration in counterargumentation. I do so in order to limit my account to dialogues that are and remain non-mixed, and fully asymmetrical.
If only she refrains from wrapping her explanatory counterconsiderations in counterargumentation.
This norm differs from that adopted by Walton et al. (2008), who hold that when the opponent raises a critical question, “Pose C,” against a premise with the status of a presumption, the opponent must, upon request, offer argumentation in favour of the denial of that premise, “not-C,” whereas in the view adopted here, the discussion should remain non-mixed if the opponent manages to criticize and explain her criticism in a cautious manner. See for a defence of the current position: (van Laar and Krabbe 2013).
In pragma-dialectical terms, the opponent steers the proponent to make particular choices from the topical potential and to make him meet audience demand (Van Eemeren 2010, chapter 4). Consequently, the opponent tries to influence the proponent's strategic manoeuvring.
Note that in the case of an unspecific challenge or of a moderately directive challenge, the opponent may express precisely what she intends to express, to wit a request for an argument of whatever type, or for an argument from a more delineated set of argument types. In that case, the counterconsideration may still be unclear to the proponent in the sense that he does not know in detail what kind of argument would remove the opponent’s doubts.
These rules form a normative proposal, motivated by the ideal of resolving differences of opinion based upon what the dialogue participants consider to be the merits of both sides. However, to the extent that these norms reflect the norms as they happen to be operative in argumentative conversations, these rules could be translatable into the correctness conditions that characterize the speech act with which to advance explanatory counterconsiderations.
For example, if the opponent first had explained her critical stance by advancing as a counterconsideration “Says who?,” she might choose to specify her counterconsideration by means of “Says what expert?” (or she might specify “Erwin might not be well” by means of “Erwin might be drunk”).
For example, if the opponent first had explained her critical stance by advancing as a counterconsideration “Says who?,” she might choose to replace it with the new counterconsideration “What are its consequences?” (or she might replace “Erwin might not be well” with “Erwin might be joking”).
I propose no further guidelines for what counts as a more specific counterconsideration or what counts as a replacement, and I simply assume that this is marked linguistically by the opponent.
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Acknowledgments
I am extremely grateful for the many useful suggestions and comments by the anonymous reviewers of this journal. I would also like to thank Erik Krabbe for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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van Laar, J.A. Criticism in Need of Clarification. Argumentation 28, 401–423 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9309-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-013-9309-8