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Logic in a Social Setting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Johan van Benthem
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Abstract

Taking Backward Induction as its running example, this paper explores avenues for a logic of information-driven social action. We use recent results on limit phenomena in knowledge updating and belief revision, procedural rationality, and a ‘Theory of Play’ analyzing how games are played by different agents.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , October 2011 , pp. 227 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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