Abstract
The paper deals with credible and relevantinformation flow in dialogs: How useful is it for areceiver to get some information, how useful is it fora sender to give this information, and how much credibleinformation can we expect to flow between sender andreceiver? What is the relation between semantics andpragmatics? These Gricean questions will be addressedfrom a decision and game-theoretical point of view.
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van Rooy, R. Quality and Quantity of Information Exchange. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12, 423–451 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025054901745
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025054901745