Abstract
Recent studies provide some support for the idea that prayer has curative powers. It is argued that even if prayers are effective in these kinds of cases it cannot be because God is answering them. While many have challenged theological explanations for the efficacy of prayer on epistemic grounds, the argument presented here concludes that the theological explanation conflicts with the standard conception of God. In particular, if God answers prayers in these kinds of cases then God is immoral.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Byrd, Randolph C., ‘Positive Effects of Intercessory Prayer in a Coronary Care Unit Population,’ Southern Medical Journal 81 (1988), 826–82; Harris, William S., et.al., ‘A Randomized, Controlled Trial of the Effects of Remote, Intercessory Prayer on Outcomes in Patients Admitted to the Coronary Care Unit,’ Archives of Internal Medicine 159 (1999), 2273–2278; Leibovici, Leonard ‘Effects of Remote, Retroactive Intercessory Prayer on Outcomes in Patients with Bloodstream Infection: Randomised Controlled Trial,’ British Medical Journal 323 (2001), 1450–1451; Cha, Kwang, Wirth, Daniel P., & Lobo, Rogerio, ‘Does Prayer Influence the Success of In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer? Report of a Masked, Randomized, Trial,’ Journal of Reproductive Medicine 46 (2001), Krucoff et al, ‘Integrative noetic therapies as adjuncts to percutaneous intervention during unstable coronary syndromes’, American Heart Journal 142 (2001), 760–769.
Krucoff et al, loc. cit.
Cha, Wirth and Lobo, op. cit.
Lewis, David, ‘Causation’, Journal of Philosophy, 70, (1970) 556–567.
Lewis, David, Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973.
As is well-known, Lewis himself believed that other possible worlds had to be the same sort of thing as the actual world. Others, of course, disagree and offer more deflationary accounts of possible worlds. Fortunately, the argument to be presented here is neutral on the question of how we ought to understand the ontological status of possible worlds.
Horwich, Paul, Asymmetries in Time, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987, p. 169.
Lewis, David, ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Nous, 13, (1979), p. 474.
Lewis, David, ‘Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Nous, 13, (1979), p. 474.
For an effort to build this sort of idea into the analysis of causation itself, see Woodward, James, Making Things Happen, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
I include the modifier ‘philosophical’ in acknowledgement that the God of the philosophers may not be the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob or even ordinary folk.
To avoid begging any questions against St. Anselm, I leave it open whether ascribing such properties to God entails that God exists.
As Lewis suggests, there may not be a “nearest” possible world (any more than there is a real number “closest” to zero). I set aside this worry for ease of exposition.
This point is just an echo of the very common complaint that free will theodicy fails to address natural evils.
Hick, John, Evil and the God of Love, San Francisco: Harper, 1978.
This paper was presented at Flagles College in 2003. The author thanks E.R. Klein and all who attended. The author also thanks A.J. Kreider and three anonymous referees for their helpful critical comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Veber, M. Why Even a Believer Should Not Believe That God Answers Prayers. SOPHIA 46, 177–187 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-007-0021-8
Received:
Revised:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-007-0021-8