No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Agent and Spectator: The Double-Aspect Theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2010
Extract
One of the theories defined in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, published in 1901, is ‘The Double Aspect Theory’. It is ‘the theory of the relation of mind and body, which teaches that mental and bodily facts are parallel manifestations of a single underlying reality’. It ‘professes to overcome the onesidedness of materialism and idealism by regarding both series as only different aspects of the same reality, like the convex and the concave views of a curve; or, according to another favourite metaphor, the bodily and the mental facts are really the same facts expressed in different language’.
- Type
- Papers
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1968
References
page 139 note 1 Reprinted in Body and Mind, ed. Vesey, G. N. A. (London, Allen & Unwin, 1964), pp. 393–402Google Scholar. Further references to this sourcebook of readings on the body-mind problem will give only its title and the page number.
page 139 note 2 Ed. J. R. Smythies (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 163–200.
page 140 note 1 He has read this paper and has asked me to add that by two ‘languages’ he ‘did not mean two translations of the same facts, but two linguistic projections of the same multi-dimensional situation, which in its full nature cannot be expressed in either language alone’.
page 140 note 2 Ibid., p. 200.
page 140 note 3 Body and Mind, p. 58.
page 143 note 1 Descartes: Philosophical Writings, trans, and ed. Anscombe, E. and Geach, P. T. (London, Nelson, 1954), p. 246.Google Scholar
page 143 note 2 Descartes's Philosophical Writings, trans. Smith, Norman Kemp (London, Macmillan, 1952), pp. 298–300.Google Scholar
page 143 note 3 Body and Mind, p. 49.
page 144 note 1 Body and Mind, p. 51.
page 144 note 2 Ibid., p. 52.
page 144 note 3 Ibid., p. 81.
page 144 note 4 Ibid., p. 82.
page 145 note 1 Body and Mind, p. 76.
page 145 note 2 Ibid., p. 76.
page 145 note 3 Ibid., p. 66.
page 145 note 4 For Leibniz's account of the difference between the theory of preestablished harmony and that of occasionalism, see his letter to Arnauld, dated 30 April 1687, in Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology (Illinois, Open Court, 1902), pp. 184–9Google Scholar.
page 147 note 1 By G. M. Wyburn, R. W. Pickford and R. J. Hirst (Edinburgh and London, Oliver & Boyd, 1964), p. 321.
page 147 note 2 Ibid.
page 148 note 1 Illinois, Thomas, 1961, p. 72.
page 148 note 2 Body and Mind, p. 215.
page 148 note 3 New York, The Macmillan Co., 1903, p. 289.
page 149 note 1 Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Smith, Norman Kemp (London, Macmillan, 1934), A359.Google Scholar
page 150 note 1 Body and Mind, pp. 165–71.
page 150 note 2 Not to be confused with the ‘mind-dust’ theory.
page 150 note 3 Body and Mind, pp. 187–96.
page 151 note 1 London, Methuen & Co. (1911), ch. xi.
page 151 note 2 William James discusses this last aspect of Fechner's psychical monism in the chapter on Fechner in his Pluralistic Universe. For James's reactions to the theory, see Bush, W. T., ‘William James and Pan-Psychism’, Columbia Studies in the History of Ideas, vol. ii, 1925Google Scholar.
page 151 note 3 New York, Macmillan, 1932, p. 414.
page 152 note 1 Both these articles are reprinted in The Philosophy of Mind, ed. Chappell, V. G. (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1962)Google Scholar. The second article is reprinted in Body and Mind, pp. 424–36.
page 152 note 2 Human Senses and Perception, p. 322.
page 153 note 1 , McDougall, Body and Mind, pp. 145–6.Google Scholar
page 155 note 1 This is not quite true. Quinton, Anthony, in Brain and Mind, ed. Smythies, J. R. (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965)Google Scholar, says that the criterion is that of rough spatio-temporal coincidence, supported by concomitant variation of properties (p. 214). His reason for saying that mental states and events have ‘a real position’ in space is that if they had not they could not be individuated (p. 211). It seems not to have occurred to him that experiences are individuated by reference to the people whose experiences they are.
page 155 note 1 Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men (London, C.U.P., 1932), pp. 426–7.Google Scholar
page 155 note 2 London, Methuen, 1961.
page 156 note 1 Chisholm, R. M., Perceiving — A Philosophical Study (New York, Cornell U.P., 1957), p. 138.Google Scholar
page 156 note 2 White, A. R., in Attention (Oxford, Blackwell, 1964), p. 90Google Scholar, says that in feeling inclined to do something and in being inclined to do something, it is not the same inclination which is felt on one occasion and unfelt on another. I do not know whether he would contend, also, that feeling depressed is not feeling the depression one is in (cf.Strawson, P. F., Individuals (London, Methuen, 1959), pp. 108–9)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and that feeling hot is not feeling the heat of one's body (cf. Armstrong, D., Bodily Sensations, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 39)Google Scholar. On the last of these, see my ‘Berkeley and Sensations of Heat’, Phil. Review, vol. lxix (1960), pp. 201–10Google Scholar.
page 157 note 1 Body and Mind, pp. 236–45. See esp. p. 238. Cf. Ducasse, C. J. in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. Schilpp, P. A. (Chicago, Northwestern University, 1942), pp. 223–51Google Scholar.
page 158 note 1 New York, Macmillan, 1953, p. 262.