Skip to main content
Log in

The autonomy of chemistry: old and new problems

  • Published:
Foundations of Chemistry Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The autonomy of chemistry and the legitimacy of the philosophy of chemistry are usually discussed in the context of the issue of reduction of chemistry to physics, and defended making use of the failure of reductionistic claims. Until quite recent times a rather widespread viewpoint was, however, that the failure of reductionistic claims concerns actually epistemological aspect of reduction only, but the ontological reduction of chemistry to physics cannot be denied. The new problems of the autonomy of chemistry in the context of reductionism seem to be ontological and metaphysical. In the present paper it is argued that there is no need for some kind of metaphysical-ontological underpinning for rejection of the secondary positions of chemistry and philosophy of chemistry with respect to physics and philosophy of physics. The issue can be elucidated in terms of the philosophy of science accepting practical realism (also known by other names).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This is a response to (Scerri 2006), which in its turn is a response to (Hendry 2005).

  2. See (Vihalemm 2003b: 62–65), where this difference is educed: the concept of a natural kind has an exact meaning in the conceptual framework of philosophy of science together with the concepts of laws of nature, scientific explanation, scientific theory. For instance, chemical elements can be regarded as natural kinds, as they can be identified as scientific-theoretical entities in the periodic law and periodic system. In “pure philosophy” this kind of concepts are missing and this is the reason why the problem of natural kinds remains indefinite as well.

  3. See, e.g., (Hacking 1983: Part B). Hacking’s experimental realism, that might be regarded―in my opinion―as the core of practical realism, seems to be best summarized by him as follows:

    Reality is bigger than us. The best kinds of evidence for the reality of a postulated or inferred entity is that we can begin to measure it or otherwise understand its causal powers. The best evidence, in turn, that we have this kind of understanding is that we can set out, from scratch, to build machines that will work fairly reliably, taking advantage of this or that causal nexus. Hence, engineering, not theorizing, is the best proof of scientific realism about entities. (Hacking 1983: 274).

References

  • Blackburn, S.: Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, A.F.: What Is This Thing Called Science? An Assessment of the Nature and Status of Science and its Methods, 2nd edn. Open University Press, Milton Keynes (1986)

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, R.N.: Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, R.N.: Scientific Perspectivism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I.: Representing and Intervening. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1983)

    Google Scholar 

  • Harré, R.: Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences. Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986)

    Google Scholar 

  • Harré, R.: Review of Jaap van Brakel, Philosophy of Chemistry. Between the manifest and the scientific image, Leuven University Press, 2000. Hyle 7(2), 178–180 (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hendry, R.F.: Lavoisier and Mendeleev on the elements. Found. Chem. 7, 31–48 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hendry, R.F.: Substantial confusion. Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. 37, 322–336 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, J., Ross, D. (with D. Spurrett and J. Collier.): Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press, New York (2007)

  • Lombardi, O., Labarca, M.: The ontological autonomy of the chemical world. Found. Chem. 7, 125–148 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lombardi, O., Labarca, M.: The ontological autonomy of the chemical world: a response to Needham. Found. Chem. 8, 81–92 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Loux, M.J., Zimmerman, D.W.: Introduction. In: Loux, M.J., Zimmerman, D.W. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, pp. 1–7. Oxford University Press, New York (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Losee, J.: A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, New York (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  • Marx, K.: Theses on Feuerbach (1845). In: Engels, F. (ed.) Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy, pp. 73–75. Co-operarive Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, Moscow (1934)

    Google Scholar 

  • Mendeleev, D.I.: Principles of Chemistry Vol. I (1st English ed). Longmans, Green (1891)

    Google Scholar 

  • Needham, P.: Ontological reduction: a comment on Lombardi and Labarca. Found. Chem. 8, 73–80 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Niiniluoto, I.: Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H.: Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1981)

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H.: Realism with a Human Face. Harvard University Press. Cambridge (MA) and London (UK) (1992)

  • Rouse, J.: Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science. Cornell University Press, Ithaca (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  • Rouse, J.: Engaging Science: How to Understand its Practices Philosophically. Cornell University Press, Ithaca (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  • Rouse, J.: How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  • Rouse, J.: Kuhn’s philosophy of scientific practice. In: Nickles, T. (ed.) Thomas Kuhn, pp. 101–121. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  • Scerri, E.R.: Editorial 20. Found. Chem. 7, 119–123 (2005a)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scerri, E.R.: Some aspects of the metaphysics of chemistry and the nature of the elements. Hyle 11(2), 127–145 (2005b)

    Google Scholar 

  • Scerri, E.R.: On the continuity of reference of the elements: a response to Hendry. Stud. Hist. Philos. Sci. 37, 308–321 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Brakel, J.: Philosophy of Chemistry. Leuven University Press, Leuven (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  • Vihalemm, R.: Can chemistry be handled as its own type of science? In: Psarros, N., Gavroglu, K. (eds.) Ars Mutandi—Issues in Philosophy and History of Chemistry, pp. 83–88. Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leipzig (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  • Vihalemm, R.: Chemistry as an interesting subject for the philosophy of science. In: Vihalemm, R. (ed.) Estonian Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 219), pp. 185–200. Kluwer, Dordrecht (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Vihalemm, R.: Are laws of nature and scientific theories peculiar in chemistry? Scrutinizing Mendeleev’s discovery. Found. Chem. 5, 7–22 (2003a)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vihalemm, R.: Natural kinds, explanation, and essentialism in chemistry. In: Earley Sr, J.E. (ed.) Chemical Explanation: Characteristics, Development, Autonomy. (Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 988), pp. 59–70. New York Academy of Sciences, New York (2003b)

    Google Scholar 

  • Vihalemm, R.: The problem of the unity of science and chemistry. In: Sobczyńska, D., Zeidler, P., Zielonacka-Lis, E. (eds.) Chemistry in the Philosophical Melting Pot. (Dia-Logos: Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences, 5), pp. 39–58. Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  • Vihalemm, R.: Chemistry and a theoretical model of science: on the occasion of a recent debate with the christies. Found. Chem. 7, 171–182 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vihalemm, R.: A. Whitehead’s metaphysical ontology and I. Prigogine’s scientific ontology: from a point of view of a theoretical conception of science. Problemos 71, 78–90 (2007a)

    Google Scholar 

  • Vihalemm, R.: Philosophy of chemistry and the image of science. Found. Sci. 12, 223–234 (2007b)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

Previous versions of this paper were read at the 10th Summer Symposium (2006, in Split, Croatia) and at the 12th Summer Symposium (2008, in Coburg, Germany) of the International Society for the Philosophy of Chemistry (ISPC). The author would like to thank the participants of these symposia for discussion. I am especially grateful to Rom Harré, Jaap van Brakel, Eric Scerri, Eugen Schwarz, Olimpia Lombardi and Martin Labarca for the correspondence concerning my paper also after the event. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this journal whose comments helped me to improve this article. The writing of this article was partly supported by the Estonian Science Foundation Grant No. 7946.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rein Vihalemm.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Vihalemm, R. The autonomy of chemistry: old and new problems. Found Chem 13, 97–107 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-010-9094-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-010-9094-5

Keywords

Navigation