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Semantics and the Liar Paradox

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Handbook of Philosophical Logic

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 167))

Abstract

The semantical paradoxes are not a scientific subject like Inductive Definitions, Algebraic Geometry or Plasma Physics. At least not yet. On the other hand the paradoxes exert a strong fascination and many a philosopher or logician has spent some thought on them, mostly in relative isolation. The literature on the paradoxes is vast but scattered, repetitive and disconnected. This made it impossible to give a presentation in which all ideas in the literature receive their due.

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Visser, A. (1989). Semantics and the Liar Paradox. In: Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Synthese Library, vol 167. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1171-0_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1171-0_10

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