Abstract
Evolutionary theodicies are attempts to explain how the enormous amounts of suffering, premature death and extinction inherent in the evolutionary process can be reconciled with belief in a loving and almighty God. A common strategy in this area is to argue that certain very valuable creaturely attributes could only be exemplified by creatures that are produced by a partly random and uncontrolled process of evolution. Evolution, in other words, was the only possible way for God to create these kinds of creatures. This article presents and examines two versions of the “only way”-argument. The anthropocentric version tries to justify God’s use of evolution by reference to the value of human freedom, and argues that freedom presupposes that God lets go of full control over the process of creation (Arthur Peacocke, Nancey Murphy). The non-anthropocentric version presents a similar argument with respect to more inclusive creaturely properties, such as that of being “truly other” than God, or of being a “creaturely self” with a certain degree of autonomy in relation to God (John Polkinghorne, John Haught, Christopher Southgate). With the help of a number of thought-experiments of the “Twin-Earth”-type, the author argues that both the anthropocentric and the non-anthropocentric only way-arguments fail.
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Notes
Evolutionary theodicies can be said to address a specific and limited aspect of the general problem of natural evil, viz. the problem of justifying God’s use of evolution as a method of creating. The problem of animal suffering is closely related to but distinct from this problem.
Murray also lists a third condition, which I have chosen to leave out in this article.
I will call evils that are inherent in the evolutionary process “evolutionary evils”.
Murphy claims that there is no neat distinction to be drawn between “logical” and “physical” necessity, so she is unwilling to specify what kind of necessity she has in mind when speaking about “necessary byproducts”, see (Murphy 2007, pp. 148–150).
Ian Barbour also subscribes to this idea and views it as fruitful for theodicy (Barbour 1997, p. 330). I will discuss similar ideas in John Polkinghorne’s and John Haught’s writings in the next section.
Murphy’s only way-argument can, at first glance, seem to have an agnostic aspect. She discusses possible objections to her argument that refer to imaginable alternative scenarios (more divine intervention, nonbiological life instead of biological life, etc.). Some of these scenarios she perceives as incoherent, but in some cases, she judges that they are “imponderable”, which means that they “call for a blank slate with regard to our general knowledge of reality” (Murphy 2007, p. 150). However, in the end, she concludes that the sentences that express the “imponderable” scenarios are in fact meaningless (p. 151).
Some of the thinkers examined in this article—such as Arthur Peacocke and John Haught—say that God has voluntarily chosen to limit his control over the universe in certain respects. None of them, however, claims—as far as I can see—that God’s power is intrinsically limited with respect to his ability to manipulate matter. None of them would, in other words, deny that God is in principle capable of instantly building a molecular replica of me.
For an introduction, see Lau and Deutsch (2008).
It is often pointed out that Putnam’s thought-experiment is inconsistent, because the human body consists of about 60 % water. A molecular duplicate would therefore have to consist of water too. I will do like everybody else and ignore this irritating fact, which has no significance for the argument.
It can even be argued that Swampman does not have the same experiential qualia as Davidson has. This is implied by Fred Dretske’s argument in (Dretske 1995, chap. 3).
In her later book on free will (Murphy and Brown 2007), Murphy seems implicitly to recognize that human freedom depends only on the structure and functioning of our neurobiological equipment in the present and in the individual’s past. The aim of the book is “to show how our neurobiological equipment makes rationality, responsibility and free will possible” (p. 4). There is no mention that our neurobiological equipment needs to have evolved over millions of years in order to make free will possible.
Murphy’s and Ellis’s theodicy, however, also has a non-anthropocentric aspect, viz. their claim that God does not want to violate the integrity of any natural entities.
On p. 16, however, Southgate calls the only way-argument an “unprovable assumption” (Southgate 2008).
Francisco Ayala has argued that a universe that is “creative” in the evolutionary sense is of more value than an evolutionary static and unchanging one: “a world of life with evolution is much more exciting; it is a creative world where new species arise, complex ecosystems come about, and humans have evolved” (Ayala 2008, p. 190). However, nobody except God experiences how “new species arise” and how “complex ecosystems come about”. It is therefore questionable if the way in which species and ecosystems come about can add much to the value of the universe. If God had created a number of planets on which all the different stages of the earth’s evolutionary history were “statically” present at the same time, would this universe be less valuable than ours, in which the same organisms exist, but they have evolved out of each other? At least I doubt that the (alleged) extra value inherent in the evolutionary universe can compensate for a great amount of suffering.
It is sometimes argued that a world of rich biodiversity presupposes the “creativity” of a process of natural selection, in which elements of chance and law cooperate to produce “true novelty”. Rolston, for example, claims that “a world without blood would be poorer, but a world without bloodshed would be poorer too, both less rich in biodiversity and less divine” (Rolston 2003, p. 85). John Haught, in a similar vein, implies that “true novelty” cannot exist in a universe that is “simply the unfolding of an eternally fixed divine design or plan” (Haught 2000, p. 54). However, it would be absurd to suggest that an interplay of chance and law is more creative than God—that evolution is more capable of producing “true novelty” or “biodiversity” than the divine Mind. Such a claim amounts, in my view, to a denial that God exists. (The claim might be compatible with certain process-theistic conceptions of God, however).
It is possible that beings with a moral character could not come into being in a heavenly environment, because a moral character must be acquired through the facing and overcoming of challenges and hardships (as John Hick, for example, suggests (Hick 1977)). However, in this context we are not talking about beings that have—or have the potential to acquire—a moral character. We are talking about lower forms of creaturely life. Of course, if God wants there to be some “creaturely selves” with moral character—such as humans—then he could not just create heaven. He would have to create, in addition, a harsh environment suitable for the acquisition of a moral character. This argument, however, is not a version of the only-way argument, because it does not say that an evolutionary process is necessary for the emergence of beings with a moral character. It just says that a harsh environment is necessary. It is unclear, moreover, why animals (who cannot acquire a moral character) must be subjected to the harsh environment, and especially why animals would have to exist in this environment in millions of years before beings with a capacity to acquire a moral character arrive.
The evolutionary theodicy of Richard Kropf, inspired by Teilhard de Chardin, could also be treated in this context (Kropf 1984).
The creation narratives of Genesis are, of course, open to a number of interpretations—including evolutionary ones—so it is a bit unfair to identify ”direct creation” with ”Genesis-style creation”. In the present context, however, I take the liberty of using Genesis as a symbol for direct, non-evolutionary creation.
I do not claim to have established that the ”Genesis method” of creating would have been a superior way for God to bring about the existence of free/autonomous creatures, compared to the evolutionary method. I only claim to have established that the evolutionary method, for all we know, was not the only possible way. (I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this clarification).
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Wahlberg, M. Was evolution the only possible way for God to make autonomous creatures? Examination of an argument in evolutionary theodicy. Int J Philos Relig 77, 37–51 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9486-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9486-x