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A simplified taxonomy of 2 × 2 games

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Abstract

All 2 × 2 games are classified into eight configurations, following three natural criteria, and prototypes given for each, especially as concerns the Newcomb and chain-store paradoxes. Two pseudo-dynamic properties, move priority and dynamic inconsistency, are examined in that framework, as well as more specifically, the problem of the origin of social institutions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, Paris, France

    Bernard Walliser

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  1. Bernard Walliser
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Walliser, B. A simplified taxonomy of 2 × 2 games. Theor Decis 25, 163–191 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134158

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