Abstract
Beside instrumental rationality, concerned with consistency between available means and pursued objectives, cognitive rationality, concerned with consistency between current beliefs and detained information, is nowadays bursting in economic theory. For an individual decision, the two notions are expressed structurally in similar forms, but they heavily interact in the deliberation process, especially when the agent is searching relevant information on his environment and his own determiners. In a game framework, the players' representations are formalized in a more and more sophisticated way, and are closely interwoven with their preferences in contemporary equilibrium notions as well as in selection between corresponding equilibrium points.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arrow, K. J.: 1987, ‘De la rationalité de l'individu et des autres dans un système économique’, Revue Française d'Economie 2.
Aumann, R. J.: 1976, ‘Agreeing to disagree’, Annals of Statistics 4(6), 1236–39.
Aumann, R. J.: 1987, ‘Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality’, Econometrica 55(1), Jan.
Axelrod, R.: 1984, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books.
Axelrod, R. and Cohen, M.: 1984, ‘Coping with complexity: The adaptive value of changing utility’, American Economic Review.
Azariadis, C.: 1981, ‘Self-fulfilling prophecies’, Journal of Economic Theory 25(3), 380–96.
Benoît, J. P. and Krishna, V.: 1985, ‘Finitely repeated games’, Econometrica 53(4), Jul.
Bernheim, B.: 1984, ‘Rationalizable strategic behavior’, Econometrica 52(4), Jul.
Binmore, K. G.: 1987–88, ‘Modeling rational players’, Economics and Philosophy 3.
Bray, M.: 1982, ‘Learning, estimation and the stability of rational expectations’, Journal of Economic Theory.
Day, R.: 1967, ‘Profits, learning and the convergence of satisficing to marginalism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2, May.
Ellsberg, D.: 1958, ‘Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms’, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Elster, J.: 1979, Ulysses and the Sirens, Cambridge University Press.
Elster, J.: 1986, ‘Introduction’, in Elster, J. (ed.), Rational Choice, Basil Blackwell.
Fagin, R., Halpern, J. Y., and Vardi, M. Y.: 1984, A Model-Theoretic Analysis of Knowledge, Proceedings 25th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer and Science.
Feige, E. and Pearce, D.: 1976, ‘Economically rational expectations’, Journal of Political Economy.
Fudenberg, D. and Maskin, E.: 1986, ‘The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information’, Econometrica 54(3).
Gouriéroux, C. and Pradel, J.: 1983, Direct Test of the Rational Expectation Hypothesis, Mimeo, CEPREMAP.
Grossman, S. and Stiglitz, J.: 1976, ‘Information and competitive price system’, American Economic Review 66.
Harrison, J. M. and Kreps, D.: 1978, ‘Speculative behavior in a stock market with heterogeneous expectations’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 2, 323–36.
Harsanyi, J. C.: 1967, ‘Games with incomplete information by Bayesian players’, Management Science 14.
Harsanyi, J. C.: 1987, ‘The tracing procedure, a self-correcting reasoning procedure’, Theory and Decision 23, 7–23.
Harsanyi, J. C. and Selten, R.: 1988, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press.
Heiner, R. A.: 1983, ‘The origin of predictable behavior’, American Economic Review 73(4).
Hicks, J.: 1939, Value and Capital, Clarendon Press.
Hicks, J.: 1950, ‘Revealed preference and the utility function’, Economica, May.
Hirschleiffer, J.: 1971, ‘The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity’, American Economic Review.
Houtthaker, H.: 1961, ‘The present state of consumption theory’, Econometrica, Oct.
Johansen, L.: 1982, ‘On the status of the Nash type of non-cooperative equilibrium in economic theory’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 84(3).
Jones, R. A. and Ostroy, J. M.: 1984, ‘Flexibility and uncertainty’, Review of Economic Studies.
Keynes, J. M.: 1921, A Treatise on Probability, Macmillan.
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R.: 1982, ‘Sequential equilibria’, Econometrica, Jul.
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R.: 1982, ‘Reputation and imperfect information’, Journal of Economic Theory 27.
Laffont, J. J. and Maskin, E.: 1982, ‘The theory of incentives: An overview’, in W. Hildenbrand (ed.), Advances in Economics, Cambridge University Press.
Lehmann, D.: 1984, Knowledge, Common Knowledge and Related Puzzles, Mimeo.
Lewis, D. K.: 1969, Convention, a Philosophical Study, Harvard University Press.
Mac Kelvey, R. D. and Page, T.: 1986, ‘Common knowledge, consensus and aggregate information’, Econometrica 54(1), Jan.
Marschak, J. and Radner, R.: 1972, Economic Theory of Teams, Yale University Press.
Maynard Smith, J.: 1982, Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge University Press.
Mertens, J. F. and Zamir, S.: 1985, ‘Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information’, International Journal of Game Theory 13.
Merton, M.: 1936, ‘The unanticipated consequences of purposive social action’, American Sociological Review.
Mongin, P.: 1985, ‘Simon, Stigler et les théories de la rationalité limitée’, Information sur les Sciences Sociales 25(3), Sage.
Mongin, P. and Walliser, B.: 1987, ‘Infinite regressions in the optimizing theory of decision’, in B. Munier (ed.), Risk, Decision and Rationality, D. Reidel.
Muth, J.: 1961, ‘Rational expectations and the theory of price movements’, Econometrica 29, 315–335.
von Neuman, J. and Morgenstern, O.: 1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press.
Neyman, A.: 1985, ‘Bounded rationality justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma’, Economic Letters 19.
Pearce, D. G.: 1984, ‘Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection’, Econometrica 52(4), Jul.
Radner, R.: 1979, ‘Rational expectations equilibrium: Generic existence and the information revealed by price’, Econometrica 47.
Radner, R.: 1980, ‘Collusive behavior in non-cooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives’, Journal of Economic Theory 22.
Rubinstein, R.: 1986, ‘Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma’, Journal of Economic Theory 39.
Sen, A.: 1973, ‘Behavior and the concept of preference’, Economica 40, Aug.
Sen, A.: 1977, ‘Rational fools’, in F. Hahn and M. Hollis (eds.), Philosophy and Economic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1979.
Simon, H.: 1957, ‘Bandwagon and underdog effects of election predictions’, in Simon H. A., Models of Man, Social and Rational, Wiley.
Simon, H.: 1959, ‘Theories of decision-making in economics and behavioral science’, American Economic Review.
Simon, H.: 1976, ‘From substantive to procedural rationality’, in S. Latsis (ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge University Press, 129–148.
Simon, H.: 1979, ‘Rational decision-making in business organizations’, American Economic Review, Sept.
Spence, M.: 1973, ‘Job market signalling’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 87(3).
Stigler, G.: 1961, ‘The economics of information’, Journal of Political Economy 69(3), 213–225.
Sugden, R.: 1986, The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, Basil Blackwell.
Sukai, Y.: 1985, ‘The value of information in a simple duopoly model’, Journal of Economic Theory 36.
Tan, T. C. and Werlang, S. R.: 1986, On Aumann's Notion of Common Knowledge. An Alternative Approach, Mimeo, University of Chicago.
Tan, T. C. and Werlang, S. R.: 1988, ‘The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games’, Journal of Economic Theory 45, Aug.
Walliser, B.: 1985, Anticipations, équilibres et rationalité économique, Calmann-Lévy, Paris.
Winter, S.: 1964, ‘Economic “natural selection” and the theory of the firm’, Yale Economic Essays 4.
Winter, S.: 1971, ‘Satisficing, selection and the innovating remnant’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Walliser, B. Instrumental rationality and cognitive rationality. Theor Decis 27, 7–36 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133986
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133986