Abstract
In his paper, “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is,’” John R. Searle made a valiant attempt to derive an ought-statement from purely descriptive statements. In a recent issue of Philosophia, Scott Hill has offered criticisms of that proposed derivation. I argue that Hill has not established any errors in Searle's proposed derivation.
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Notes
Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought from ‘Is,’” p.50. Searle (1969)
Conditions “C” include the speaker, Jones, being in the presence of the hearer, Smith. They also include the assumption that Jones is speaking seriously, and is not, for instance, acting in a play. Other conditions are included as well. Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is,’” pp.44–45.
Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is,’” pp.43–49.
Ibid., p.45.
Ibid., pp.44–45.
Ibid., p.44.
Ibid., p.547.
Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought from ‘Is,’” p.50.
Searle, Speech Acts, p.188.
Hill, pp.547–48.
Ibid., p.548.
Ibid., p.549.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.548.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.549.
Ibid., pp.552, 549.
Ibid., p.550.
Ibid., pp.550–51
Searle, Speech Acts, pp.179–81, 188.
Ibid., pp.179–80, 188.
Ibid., pp.180–81.
Ibid.
Hill, p.550.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. Maitzen argues that even if the truth conditions of “other things are equal*” and the truth conditions of the conjunction of the two statements (i.e., “Jones is obligated to pay” and “Jones ought to pay”) are identical, that would not be enough to ensure that “other things are equal*” is an ethical statement (Maitzen 2008). This matter needs further investigation. In the present paper, I pursue different criticisms of Hill’s treatment of “other things are equal*.”
Hill, p.551.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is,’” pp.46–48.
Ibid., p.47; Hill, p.549.
Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought From ‘Is,’” pp.46–48.
I get this basic idea from Wilkins (1970)
Hill, p.552.
Ibid. Also, see Searle, “How to Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is,’” p.47.
Hill, p.552.
This is not to say that Hill has interpreted Searle correctly and the latter was actually considering and rejecting a formulation equivalent to Hill’s account of “other things are equal,*” and thus actually claiming that in order for it to be true that “other things are equal,” it is not necessary that “other things are equal*.” Neither must we approve of this position, which after distinguishing between “other things are equal” and “other things are equal,*” maintains that for the former to hold, it is not necessary that the latter hold. Further investigation of this position would be required. The question before us here is whether Hill’s objections against “other things are equal” are convincing. I have argued above that his objections against “other things are equal*” are not, and am now arguing that the same holds true of his objections against “other things are equal.”
Ibid., p.549.
Ibid., p.552.
Ibid.
References
Hill, S. (2008). ’Is’-‘Ought’ derivations and ethical taxonomies. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 36(4), 545–556.
Maitzen, S. (2008). Anti-autonomism defended: a reply to Hill. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 36(4), 569.
Searle, J. R. (1964). How to derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’. The Philosophical Review, 73(1), 43–58.
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of language (p. 188). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilkins, B. T. (1970). The ‘Is’-‘Ought’ controversy. Ethics, 80(2), 162–163.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Isaac (“Yanni”) Nevo for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I also wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for this journal for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.
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Wall, E. Problems with Searle’s Derivation?. Philosophia 39, 571–580 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9287-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9287-0