Prolegomena to a Theory of Rational Motives

Abstract

What do we want from a theory of rational decision making? At the very least we want some guidelines on how, rationally, we ought to make our decisions and a justification of the claim that decisions insofar as they are made in accordance with those guidelines are rational. This presupposes some account of rationality or, alternatively, offers the theory as a partial account of rationality. It is this larger problem, the giving of a justified account of rationality, which is at any rate the central problem. A particular theory of rational decision is of interest only to the extent that it either contributes to or is justified in terms of such a general account of rationality. Thus my interest here in the theory of decision is in terms of the contribution that such a theory might make towards a general, robust theory of rationality. Such a general theory will at the very least include not only a theory of rational choice among alternatives but also a theory of rational beliefs and of rational values, and, as I shall suggest, also a theory of rational design. Such a general, robust theory of rationality is of interest for the contribution that it could make towards a number of different areas of concern: an account of individual and social abberation as well as an account of sane individual actions and social interractions, to an account of educational and therapeutic aims, and as I propose to argue on another occasion to a general ‘cognitive’ theory of psychology.

An even more preliminary account of some of this material was presented at the Colloquium on the Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory held at London, Ontario in May of 1975. Much of my original reflection on the issues raised here was carried out during a very pleasant year as a Research Fellow at the Program for Humanities, Science and Technology at Cornell University. Bill Wimsatt with whom I there shared an office and a long drive to Ontario provided welcome stimulation. Some related considerations appear in my ‘Good Desires’ and discussions in Max Black (ed.), Problems of Choice and Decision, Cornell University Program on Science, Technology and Society,1975. I have learned much of the relevance from the work of L.R.Hubbard.See especially his Organizational Executive Course.