Abstract
David Eaton and Timothy Pickavance argued that interest-relative invariantism has a surprising and interesting consequence. They take this consequence to be so implausible that it refutes interest-relative invariantism. But in fact it is a consequence that any theory of knowledge that has the resources to explain familiar puzzles (such as Gettier cases) must have.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Gettier cases should perhaps be called Dharmottara cases, since Dharmottara’s eighth century examples somewhat predate Gettier’s, and are in some ways a little cleaner. Nagel (2014, 57) has more discussion of Dharmottara.
Is this restriction to ‘typical’ cases necessary? Perhaps—see recent work by Luzzi (2010) for a good discussion of the point.
References
Eaton, D., & Pickavance, T. (2015). Evidence against pragmatic encroachment. Philosophical Studies, 172, 3135–3143. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0461-x.
Luzzi, F. (2010). Counter-closure. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88, 673–683. doi:10.1080/00048400903341770.
Nagel, J. (2014). Knowledge: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weatherson, B. (2014). Probability and scepticism. In D. Dodd & E. Zardini (Eds.), Scepticism and perceptual justification (pp. 71–86). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Weatherson, B. Reply to Eaton and Pickavance. Philos Stud 173, 3231–3233 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0660-0
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0660-0