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Grounding Action Representations

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Abstract

In this paper we discuss an approach called grounded action cognition, which aims to provide a theory of the interdependencies between motor control and action-related cognitive processes, like perceiving an action or thinking about an action. The theory contrasts with traditional views in cognitive science in that it motivates an understanding of cognition as embodied, through application of Barsalou’s general idea of grounded cognition. To guide further research towards an appropriate theory of grounded action cognition we distinguish between grounding qua acquisition and grounding qua constitution. On this basis, we distinguish three possible theoretical conceptions of grounded action cognition. In addition to these methodological and conceptual analyses, we draw on recent empirical evidence to motivate our inclination towards a particular theory. According to this theory certain representations are involved in action cognition and action perception that are not modality-specific as usually proposed by advocates of grounded cognition. Further, the evidence is in favor of our more specific theory stating that for some cognitive abilities, some motor abilites are constitutive.

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Notes

  1. However, Hesslow (2002) advocates a general non-representationalist account of conscious thought that does not make any clear appeal to dynamical systems theory. That is, Hesslow assumes that his hypothesis of simulation “requires no assumptions about the existence of ‘images’, ‘representations’ or other mental entities” (2002: 246). Naturally, this is not the only construal of “simulation” available (cf. Jeannerod 2006). In any case, Hesslow’s aims are broader than our specific concerns here.

  2. This is not to claim that every possible dynamical account like the dynamical systems theory is per se an anti-representationalist view. There are works rebuilding and integrating even an elaborated notion of representation in dynamic approaches; for example, Spivey’s “attempt to raise awareness of the benefits of emphasizing continuous processing, and therefore continuous representation as well” (Spivey 2007: 3) suggests some kind of “symbolic dynamics” (2007: 262ff.), thereby reconsidering symbolic, but not computational representations.

  3. The idea of defining acquisition conditions as necessary conditions is to refer to those abilities that must be present in order to acquire a new ability. Of course, there might then be different ways of acquiring the new ability (i.e. different sufficient processes or circumstances), which, however, are not interesting if grounded cognition is to make a substantial claim.

  4. From this it does not follow that every motor ability is thereby a perceptual or cognitive ability; indeed, we presuppose here that some motor abilities are not perceptual or cognitive.

  5. These theories are not anti-representationalist dynamic system theories (in the sense described above); they view cognition to be an entirely internal process based on representations.

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Acknowledgement

We are grateful to the VolkswagenStiftung for their kind financial support of the research project ‘ThinkAct’ (lead by G. Vosgerau, M. Synofzik, and S. Schütz-Bosbach) which made the research for this article possible. We also want to thank Adrian J.T. Alsmith and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Heinrich-Heine-Universität, Universitätsstr. 1, 40225, Düsseldorf, Germany

    Arne M. Weber & Gottfried Vosgerau

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  1. Arne M. Weber
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Correspondence to Arne M. Weber.

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Weber, A.M., Vosgerau, G. Grounding Action Representations. Rev.Phil.Psych. 3, 53–69 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0088-1

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