Abstract
The purpose of the present paper is to challenge some received assumptions about the logical analysis of modal English, and to show that these assumptions are crucial to certain debates in current philosophy of language. Specifically, I will argue that the standard analysis in terms of quantified modal logic mistakenly fudges important grammatical distinctions, and that the validity of Kripke's modal argument against description theories of proper names crucially depends on ensuing equivocations.
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Wehmeier, K.F. In the Mood. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33, 607–630 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:LOGI.0000046193.69391.18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:LOGI.0000046193.69391.18