Abstract
I will characterize the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice game-theoretically. That is, I will introduce games whose solutions are the utilitarian and maximin distributions respectively. Then I will compare the rules by exploring similarities and differences between these games. This method of comparison has been carried out by others. But I characterize the two rules using games that involve bargaining within power structures. This new characterization better highlights the ethical differences between the rules.
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Weirich, P. A game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice. Erkenntnis 28, 117–133 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204428
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00204428