Abstract
An important objection to the “higher-order” theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the particular extrinsic characterization of the HO theory, the “transitivity principle,” against its intrinsic rivals, thereby showing that the misrepresentation objection conclusively falls short.
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Notes
See, e.g. Dretske (1995).
Nagel (1974, p. 519).
An additional possibility is a “mixed” reading of Nagel’s phrase. On this interpretation, the quality of conscious experience is intrinsic to the conscious state, but the state’s being conscious as opposed to nonconscious is due to extrinsic factors. For the purposes of this paper, I will consider such a reading to fall into the intrinsic camp. What it’s like for the subject in conscious experience is still determined by something intrinsic to the state—it’s not a matter of connections. Further, it is unclear what the extrinsic connections contribute if they do not fix what it’s like for the subject. What does it mean to say that extrinsic factors determine that there’s something it’s like for the subject, but not a determinate way that it’s like? In any event, the key point is that there’s a viable extrinsic reading of the “what it’s like” phrase. I will address the plausibility of a mixed reading in more detail at the end of the paper.
Or folk-theoretic—I will use these terms interchangeably.
Cf. Rosenthal (2002).
Neander (1998).
Armstrong (1968).
Rosenthal (1997, p. 744). See also Rosenthal (2004).
Note that the phrase ‘aware of’ may be factive. But this sort of factivity is satisfied by the TP: even in radical misrepresentation the self one is aware of is guaranteed to exist by cogito-style reasoning. However, the particular state the self is in need not exist. Being aware of oneself as being in a state is similar to being aware of an object as possessing a property—we can be aware of the object as possessing a property even if the property we’re aware of the object as possessing fails to exist. The crucial construction here is ‘being aware of X as Y,’ rather than ‘aware of.’ The former introduces an intensional context even if the latter does not. On the factivity of ‘aware of’ see Huemer (1998, Sect. 1.1).
See Rosenthal (2005, p. 209).
Cf. Byrne (1997, p. 129, footnote 48).
This is not, of course, to claim that the HO theory is true—that is an empirical question. Rather, it is to point out that if it’s true, we can expect some revision to our ordinary ways of thinking about consciousness. That’s a common price to pay for good theory.
It is worth noting that an additional source of the tension here is that even on a HO view, the subject can not directly recognize her error in radical (or even mild) misrepresentation. This is in contrast to how we normally recognize perceptual error. In perceptual error, we directly perceive additional information or we consciously cross-calibrate our perceptions in one modality with perceptions in another. We can then just see that we were wrong. In the case of inner misrepresentation, by contrast, there is no analogous line of independent but direct counter-evidence. Thus, the idea of internal error will seem counterintuitive, even if we have strong theoretical and empirical reasons to accept such error. If we never get direct counterevidence, why think we are ever wrong? The HO theory explains this intuition while rejecting the implausible claim that we never make internal errors.
See, for example, Block (1996).
There is another related worry nearby, one that might be thought to lend support to the misrepresentation worry. HO theory seems committed to the claim that a nonexistent state can have a property, the property of being conscious. But nonexistent things can’t have properties—they don’t exist! (See Mandik 2009). This, however, is a general problem for all theories of intentionality. And in this context, it seems reasonable to invoke Harman’s plea (1990).
Let me concede immediately that I do not have a well worked out theory of intentional objects…. Indeed, I am quite willing to believe that there are not really any nonexistent objects and that apparent talk of such objects should be analyzed away somehow. I do not see that it is my job to resolve this issue. However this issue is resolved, the theory had better end up agreeing that Ponce de Leon was looking for something when he was looking for the fountain of youth, even though there is no fountain of youth…. If a logical theory can account for searches for things that do not, as it happens, exist, it can presumably also allow for a sense of “see” in which Macbeth can see something that does not exist (pp. 37–38).
Nonexistent conscious states seem no worse off than nonexistent fountains of youth. If the fountain of youth can have the property of being looked for, a nonexistent state can have the property of being conscious, given that ‘being conscious’ just means ‘being an object of awareness.’ Whatever answer works for the one works for the other as well. Thanks to Pete Mandik for pressing this issue.
Cf. Mandik (2009).
While it should be clear from the text how my response answers the objection as formulated by Neander, Levine, and Kriegel, an additional word is in order concerning Byrne. Byrne’s objection focused on the HO theory’s alleged explanatory failure: how could a single HO state explain phenomenal consciousness? First, HO theory is not trying to explain an intrinsic feature with an extrinsic mechanism; rather, the feature requiring explanation is itself extrinsic. Second, if the TP provides the explanandum, then the HO theory is clearly a better explanation than the FOR theory, because FO states do not makes us aware of our mental states. Finally, etiology matters for explaining the appearance of immediacy characterized by the TP.
Block (2007).
A third means of providing support for a concept of consciousness might be proper connection with the history of philosophy. If a concept is rooted in long-standing traditional debates, it may gain some measure of support. Here, both views can point to tradition, with the intrinsic view noting Locke’s secondary qualities and the 20th century debates over sense data. The TP can trace its roots back to Brentano, Kant, Locke, and even Aristotle. So neither side gains a distinct advantage, if there is support to be gained in this way.
Siewert (1998, pp. 194–197).
Byrne (2004).
See also Lormand (2004) and Hellie (2007) for a complex debate over Lormand’s attempt to justify, by way of a complex linguistic analysis, a HO reading of Nagel’s “what it’s like” phrase. As I’ve indicated, I doubt that a linguistic analysis alone will be able to provide a definitive reason for favoring one interpretation. Instead, I believe that folk usage, combined with broader theoretical considerations, gives us reason to favor one reading over another.
Chalmers (1996).
Block (2002).
See Kriegel (2006). This may also capture what is intended by the “mixed” reading of Nagel’s “what it’s like” phrase, discussed in footnote 11 above.
For a more complete defense of these claims, see Weisberg (2008).
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Acknowledgments
Distant ancestors of this paper were presented at the SPP, Stanford, 1999, the conference on self-representational approaches to consciousness, University of Arizona, 2005, and the CUNY Cognitive Science Symposium and Discussion Group. My thanks to those audiences for helpful discussion. Thanks to Jared Blank, Ned Block, Alex Byrne, Gregg Caruso, Rocco Gennaro, Gil Harman, Uriah Kriegel, Pete Mandik, Liz Vlahos, and especially David Rosenthal. Thanks also to an anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies.
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Weisberg, J. Misrepresenting consciousness. Philos Stud 154, 409–433 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9567-3