Abstract
The Difference between Belief and Knowledge. The assumption that knowledge can be defined in terms of belief is considered to be mistaken. Since Gettier problems are shown to be misconstrued, the question cannot arise whether his conditions for knowledge are sufficient for claiming ``knowledge is justified true belief''. Ayers' conditions for knowledge in addition with a specific stipulation proof to be instructive for elaborating the differences between knowledge and belief.
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Welding, S.O. Die Differenz von Meinung und Wissen. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35, 147–155 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JGPS.0000035155.72041.bd
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JGPS.0000035155.72041.bd